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Introduction
Spills, Countercurrents, Sinks
Henry Sussman and Jason Groves 
Virtual Post-Global Omnibus
Impasses of the Post-Global considers a range of insults to the post-global 
Prevailing Operating System that is now broad enough to be bewildering. 
This evident series of affronts extends from satellite photographs of Gaia 
to plastic bags accumulating along the shores of once-pristine inland Chi-
nese waters. The contributors have trained their sensors or viewfinders 
on the emergent catastrophe, tracking money, immigration, news and ad-
vertising hype, geophysical feedback, trash, and even water itself, all as 
the currents of contemporary mutation and change, each one a potential 
‘X-factor’ precipitating the next systemic disaster, the next destabilization 
of what was once conceived as self-sustaining and correcting equilibri-
um. Perhaps the most prominent “current” of contemporary ecocatastro-
phe is the collection of ocean currents known as the North Pacific Gyre, a 
planetary vortex that recently re-emerged in the ecological imaginary, as 
the Plastic Trash Vortex, following the discovery of highly elevated levels 
of plastics, chemical sludge, and other anthropogenic gifts to an oceanic 
area estimated in most scientific literature at the size of the continental 
US—perhaps less a convenient measure of volume and more a prescient 
image of a coming continental liquidation that registers itself already in 
this uncanny aquatic other. Like a petrochemical twin of the cosmic fetus 
orbiting the earth at the close of “2001: Space Odyssey,” in the Pacific 
Trash Vortex we can glean the polymeric afterbirth of a consumer society. 
In this non-biodegradable database of the post-global, the productivist 
dream of unlimited growth degrades into mermaid tears, nurdles, and 
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the other insoluble microplastics that already outweigh the Gyre’s zoo-
plankton by a factor of six. In place of promised global economic integra-
tion is the planet’s largest landfill, a toxic multinational legacy erupting in 
the center of the Pacific Rim, invisibly proliferating outward across the 
biosphere, and bio-accumulating as we speak throughout planetary food-
webs, conventional and organic alike. This carcinogenic breeding ground 
for future birth defects, genomic mutation, trophic cascades, species ex-
plosions, dead zones and other ecological no-nonhuman’s land also fa-
cilitates the mutations in critical thought evident in this volume. More 
than merely contaminated food for thought, the silence, invisibility, and 
pervasiveness of these spills intertwines an ecological with a representa-
tional problem, since its detection eludes the eye and satellite image alike.
Every mediatized and subsequently “contained” oil spill occludes 
the uncontainability of spills, their inability to conform to clear trajec-
tories, well-choreographed multinational comedies of error, or human-
ized networks of corporate greed. Arguably, critical inattention to the 
formless and rhetorical unformalizability of the “spill” contributes to the 
continued polymerization of the Pacific (and to a lesser extent, Atlantic 
and Indian) ocean, no less than an unregulated industry and its care-
less factories. Emerging in response to the empirical and technological 
undetectability of the more life-threatening spills today, the possibil-
ity of a distinctly critical contribution takes shape in the various calls 
to attend to spills not (yet) bearing the initials of energy conglomerates 
(e.g. “BP”) and yet no longer bearing the imprimatur of the 20th century 
critical canon (e.g.“WB”). Today the ecological crisis itself spills into the 
theoretical with no less turbulence than it spills into the political. Walter 
Benjamin’s materialist historian, emblematized in the figure of the Pari-
sian ragpicker, may have been consigned to the dustbin of an ineffective 
politics; however, it returns, undead and deanthropomorphized, in the 
faceless thing known in biological parlance as a “sink”—both space and 
metabolic process capturing, breaking down, or otherwise channeling 
the waste and effluvia of aggregate social and ecosystems, whether urban, 
natural, disturbed, or pristine.1 Where the celebrated cultural critic-cum-
chiffonier gathered together the material and conceptual detritus of the 
19th century into so many convolutes, the convoluted contributions to 
this volume turn to those overlooked biomes in which the function of the 
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ragpicker is distributed, amplified, and de-humanized: the overburdened 
lakes, lagoons, estuaries, atmospheres, forests, and other all-but saturated 
sites of carbon sequestration—ecological doubles of the financial sinks 
known as offshore banks . If the poet was the antenna of the species these 
critics could be called the cirrhotic kidneys of a dehydrated, intoxicated, 
and hepatitis-ridden Gaia. So the twelve entries that flicker before you 
could be called a 12 stutter-step program, but one with no guarantee of 
leading to any lasting recovery, since Avital Ronell has decisively exposed 
critique as an addiction as forceful as any scheduled narcotic.2
Wonderfully diverse—in approach, strategy, and improvisation—as 
the materials comprising Impasses of the Post-Global may be, they arise 
out of a shared story about the failure of the master narrative of global-
ization, whose outfall consists in the radioactive unfolding of ecological 
disaster, political legerdemain, massive disenfranchisement, population 
culling, financial meltdown, narco-war, resource misappropriation, IMF 
restructuring, technological stopgap, and reductive cultural slogans that 
we are all currently living, responding, and writing through. The conflu-
ence of the multiple out-of-control flows and currents—spills—that mo-
tivate the contributors’ accounts and stories is, specifically, the arena of 
informed, rigorous critique, the medium par excellence for this read-out. 
In the wake of the extension of the respective schools and paradigms of 
disciplinary cultural commentary to the open-ended concatenation of 
ecological insults, material shortages, and desperate administrative and 
political measures currently besetting us, the current academic division 
of labor and set of authorized practices will never be quite the same as 
it was. In its ineluctable aberrancy Impasses of the Post Global evinces 
an emergent institutional, theoretical, terrestrial, and climactic depat-
terning, one far more diffuse and decentralized than the psychotechni-
cal genealogy that Naomi Klein traces from Dr. Ewan Cameron’s “psychic 
driving” experiments at McGill University to the CIA-sponsored and 
university-supported MKUltra Project to Saigon, Honduras, Guantána-
mo, and all the black sites in between.3 It is as though depatterning, the 
hypnosis and narcosis-based technique for disturbing an interrogatee’s 
“time-space-image,” has gone viral in an era of climate change to become 
synonymous with the Prevailing Operating System itself.
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Even in the context of this broad narrative backdrop, however, it would 
only be too reassuring if the diverse admonitions and complaints making 
up the present volume could be ascribed to a coherent or coordinated 
set of technological or conceptual practices, ideological agendas, miscon-
ceptions, or out-and-out aggressive or suicidal campaigns or impulses. 
The volume’s lead article, Tom Cohen’s “Anecographics: Climate Change 
and ‘late’ Deconstruction,” performs the double service of establishing 
the widest theoretical parameters of the critical environment that its di-
verse materials join; also, in setting a distinctive tone, urgent in its mea-
sured assessment, for the ongoing discourse of critical climate change. 
These materials issue from inattention, conceptual blockage, and a gen-
eral articulation block so deep-seated and widely dispersed as to skirt 
the very threshold of legibility. If not in outright solidarity then at least 
in a general accord with the recent proliferation of successful if short-
lived climate and social justice blockades in Germany (main rail line of 
Castor nuclear waste cargo), France (massive refinery strikes), England 
(road leading to Coryton refinery and over which 80% of all consumed 
oil in the U.K. passes), Greece (blockade at the Acropolis), Impasses of 
the Post-Global tracks the spiraling and in most senses irreversible crisis 
ensuing from ecological analphabetism and blindness (contributions 
by Clarke, McKee, Bunn, and Song); from callow greed and miscalcula-
tion in the financial sphere (Martin, Sussman); from runaway ambition 
effected by military aggression and its ideological self-justification (We-
ber); through draconian social controls enacted by means of calculated 
lapses and misrepresentations on the mimetic stage (Chow, E. P. Ziarek, 
Moreiras). Certain of the symptoms that the volume pursues do not ex-
press themselves in bounded artifacts or initiatives so much as subtend 
policy abuses at the level of phenomenological or psycho-social precon-
ditions (K. Ziarek). In my own intervention, I may have strayed as close 
as the volume gets to a linear account of skewed if interrelated catastro-
phes, supplied by Naomi Klein in the scenario of brainwashing and hos-
tile socio-economic takeovers on a global scale that she choreographs in 
The Shock Doctrine. Even Klein’s reportorial virtuosity cannot spare us the 
malaise ensuing from a backdrop of coordinated systematic absences at 
the level of critical acuity and ethical sensibility.
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Critique, as the theoretically driven responsible and rigorous decod-
ing and reprogramming of messages, motives, trends, performances, and 
systematic aberrations, has a special mission and role to play in an en-
gagement with the composite and evolving climate of catastrophe. In full 
admiration for an unbroken string of methodological advances emerg-
ing over the past half-century from the fields of literary criticism, criti-
cal theory, cultural studies, psychoanalysis, and theoretical inquiries into 
linguistics, philosophy, gender, and post-colonialism, the IC3 initiative, 
since its outset, has struggled to budge the discourse and its synthesis 
away from the corridors of academe and into the tsunami’s debris. And 
the discourse must also be budged away from melancholically lingering 
over wreckage and debris, whose finality forecloses the initiative in ad-
vance by staging its own belatedness, a melodrama in which the inertia 
of political apathy finds its perverse self-justification by the end of every 
episode, every foretold extinction event, every inundated island commu-
nity. Rather than armchair disaster tourism made up in the tweed of eco-
criticism or “timely” critical theory, the discourse needs to be dragged, 
looking forward rather than back, out into the streets, or into the Depart-
ment of Defense databases, to the occupied factories, the recovered com-
panies of Argentina, the French blockades and the Gaza flotillas and the 
indebted future spilling through the shattered glass façade of London’s 
Tory Headquarters. If the critical endeavor will survive as anything more 
than the ideological self-justification of the status quo it must be able to 
imagine a present in which the much-touted irreversibility of climate 
change is not equated with its inexorability—and also in which the hope 
that there would be a regulatory top-kill for climate change is abandoned. 
In this impasse a concerted and multiple effort is indispensable. This dis-
location in the scene of critical notation, as rehearsed by a cadre of writ-
ers extending from Walter Benjamin, Roland Barthes, and Michel Fou-
cault to Jacques Derrida, René Girard, J. Hillis Miller, and Samuel Weber, 
is not only justified; it is precariously overdue.
The founder or patron saint of the critical anthology ricocheting be-
tween the various zones or spheres demarcated by the Prevailing Oper-
ating System, if we look to one, is none other than Friedrich Nietzsche, 
even allowing for the fact that his own improvisations in the genre—such 
works as Beyond Good and Evil and Human All Too Human—allowed only 
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of a single author, himself. The space of the contemporary critical anthol-
ogy, even if currently a virtual space, was invented by Nietzsche, who in 
his own omnibus volumes of trenchant philosophical critique, roams 
from sector of social order to the next, deconstructing the pieties that le-
gitimate and perpetuate it. Nietzsche was one of the first philosophers to 
employ a typewriter, to display the text he synthesized on a typographic 
“screen.” He negotiated a landscape of cognitive and spatio-political stric-
tures implemented by such analog media as the army, the church, the 
school system, and the printing press. We may have since graduated to a 
web of political and intellectual impasses rendered all the more exasper-
ating through the encompassing invisibility powering and surrounding 
digital technology and relations. We live amid the instantaneous simulta-
neity of “Real Time.” This heightens the inexactitude and even danger of 
rendering our critical read-outs “on the fly,” in a condition of instability, 
maddeningly, whose account must be rendered in its own right. But even 
with all these transformations and their attendant responsibilities, whose 
effect on what we can see and what we can say is material, we remain on 
the watch of critical attentiveness that Nietzsche initiated; we persist in a 
cultural bearing that his inscription inaugurated and defined.
In Human All Too Human, for example, Nietzsche careens from moral-
ity and organized religion to the culture wars, between “high and low” 
cultures, of his day, to gender politics and political theology. The predica-
ments shared by the spheres of articulation and social engineering are 
common; the enabling rhetorics and instrumental mechanisms of power, 
whether termed “metaphysics,” “hegemony,” “Empire,” or “Prevailing 
Operating System,” diverse. It is, then, a stunningly brief interval from the 
variegated scene of critique that Nietzsche established, albeit in his own 
discursive idioms, to the topically-organized, multi-author critical an-
thology. Readers delving into such productions meander in stutter-steps 
in a trajectory leading from one socio-cultural impasse, or dead-end en-
suing from a closed system, to the next. The entries in a critical collection 
prompted by a common set of features on the geophysical, cultural, and 
teletechnic landscapes relate to one another as multiple takes of one pre-
possessing image or as spinoffs ensuing from a shared anecdotal heritage, 
one nonetheless undergoing—in Real Time—its own variants and shifts 
in direction and emphasis. Each response is at once plausible and bound 
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by its author’s predilections, the specific lenses or objectives compris-
ing her critic-rhetorical viewfinder. Each entry is both emblematic and 
symptomatic not only of the catastrophe at hand but of the theoretical 
instrumentation and choreography we bring to it.
The following volume articulates itself in eddies and turbulences them-
selves energized, if not exactly determined or organized, by circulations, 
measures, and meltdowns transpiring in such zones as the environment, 
finance, globalization and its underlying political theologies, and demog-
raphy, as well as in communications and representation themselves. Dif-
ferent ones of the following essays spill into each of the aforementioned 
zones. Yet each one of these spontaneous groupings is itself a feedback 
loop winding its way back to the others comprising the collection. Such 
is the interconnectivity of the stresses and insults that have been imposed 
on Gaia herself and the systemic organizations ensuing from her through 
economic exploitation, runaway urban development, uninformed re-
source management, and distraction and non-attentiveness in cultural 
articulation. The particular thrust and urgency of this volume is to argue 
that one of the more egregious misappropriations of resources today is 
that of critical attention itself, whose possible avenues of redistribution 
this volume more than hints at.
As in all omnibus publications, the individual interventions must, in 
the end, speak for themselves. The best that can be ventured by way of in-
troduction is a map or schematic of the configuration that a collaborative 
reality-check regarding the current sequence of catastrophes, shocks, and 
aftershocks has formed, accompanied by a brief legend indicating inter-
actions, reverberations, and specific instances of feedback. Like all critical 
receptions and registrations of the manifold stresses, flows, and aporias 
comprising actuality and engaging the domains of politics, economics, 
and public policy, the following reactions, as Symbolic rapprochements 
by the authors to the emergent turbulence and muddle, shuttle back and 
forth between the Real of the material underpinnings and collective af-
tershocks, the Imaginary transmutations of these conditions as epiphe-
nomena in the diverse theaters of culture, and the screen or notepad of 
inscription. Otherwise put, each essay may start out as a bound discur-
sive response to one or several of the semiotic registers implicated in the 
current impasses of demographic shift, resource and work availability, 
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ecological compromise, and economic and political meltdown; but it 
perforce ends up in performative mode, allegorical evidence of what the 
“prompts” issuing from actuality demand and impose.
The lead article, Tom Cohen’s “Anecographics: Climate Change and 
‘late’ Deconstruction,” not only establishes a theoretical terrain for all to 
follow in Impasses of the Post-Global; it opens a window on the prevail-
ing climate and mood at the moment when IC3 crystallized. It was clear 
to us at that juncture that the established academic disciplines and sub-
specializations, even ones with noble traditions of theoretical innovation 
and acuity, were simply incapable of responding compellingly, mutating 
quickly enough and with enough plasticity, to respond to an escalating 
and continuing sequence of disasters, those engulfing the organization 
and systems of information, communication, government, and education 
to the same degree as the biosphere, the environment, and the econo-
mies of critical resources. The challenge we faced, and no one has been 
more attentive to it than Cohen, was to retrofit the medium of critical 
theory to upgrade its response-capability to the tenor and tempo of the 
recent political meltdowns accompanying climatic and ecological disas-
ters. The climate of enduring, attenuated disaster called for a theoretical 
update seeping through to the performative level. It was not only the con-
ceptual repertoire of theory but its very preconditions for inscription and 
the specifications of its performance that a turbulent, rapidly expanding 
domain of radical climate change was impacting.
Among Cohen’s most original contributions to the field of critical in-
terventions and counter-proposals so far has been his approaching it as 
a climate zone, with full appreciation for the turbulence that this bear-
ing unleashes. Since his magisterial Hitchcock’s Cryptonymies,4 Cohen has 
worked consistently at monitoring the flows of the theoretical weather-
zones from which he has learned the most and in whose ongoing up-
dating he has been most active: deconstruction (as a field launched by 
Jacques Derrida, but from the outset receiving indispensable input and 
amplification from the likes of Jean-Luc Nancy and Bernard Stiegler) 
and rhetorical reading, as consolidated and introduced to a generation of 
innovative critics by Paul de Man. Drawing on ecologically astute phi-
losophers and critics among Cohen’s contemporaries including David 
Wood and Timothy Clark, what we find in “Anecographics” is a calm and 
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measured impact statement on just how far Jacques Derrida was able to 
torque the discourse of deconstruction toward engaging the same events 
and aberrations that prompted, say, IC3. We also find between its lines 
Cohen’s prognostications regarding the most viable and plausible future 
ahead of deconstruction in its full diversity, both as a model for and force 
impacting on the “critical climate.” No challenge that Cohen puts to the 
readers of Impasses of the Post-Global is more intriguing than beginning 
to think, paralleling a notable phrase from Derrida’s Specters of Marx, the 
conditions for a “deconstruction without … Derrideanism.”5
In the wake of this presentation-piece, to the volume as well as to the 
IC3 project, the two most prominent feedback loops of articulation and 
response torquing the Impasses are one setting out from the apprehen-
sion of Gaia as an encompassing system in demographic and cultural, as 
well as material terms, but whose representation, articulation, and cri-
tique present an intriguing challenge, even opportunity—to the most 
advanced digital and virtual technologies available; and a second, surely 
a complement as well as a supplement to the first, beginning with the 
crises facing language and mimesis even in thinking the abuse that Gaia, 
along with its human and animal inhabitants, has sustained. The marvel-
ous Möbius strip articulated by these two groupings of contributions 
serves, in the best sense, as a “strange attractor” grounding and placing 
other crucial interventions.
It is, then, from a compelling systemic point of view that the present 
volume continues with Bruce Clarke’s “Autopoiesis and the Planet.” For 
some time now, Clarke has been engaged in the updating of systems 
theory’s foundational contributions, made by the likes of Gregory Bate-
son, Norbert Weiner, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, and Anthony Wilden. He 
would hope to temper the claims of objectivity and stark subject-object 
polarity imagined, say, by “first-order cybernetics” with a second wave 
whose rallying cry gathers around the term autopoiesis, a figure of “circu-
larity, operational closure, and self-referring processes” that immediately 
reoriented the playing field in 1974, when Humberto Maturana, Francis-
co Varela, and Ricardo Uribe invoked it in their ground-breaking article 
“The Autopoiesis of Living Systems, Its Characterization, and a Model.” 
Clarke finds the above terms characteristic of the feedback loop between 
Terra and the largely human-devised modifications imposed on the eco-
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system in the course of adaptation, improvisation, urbanization, and 
mechanization. It is, of course, this autopoietic dynamic that prompted 
James Lovelock and his associates to coin the term “Gaia theory” as an 
umbrella for increasingly tenuous prospects for these contrived “system-
environment” interactions centered around the planet (as Niklas Luh-
mann termed them).
The encompassing interactive dimensions of the crises currently beset-
ting the planet make a compelling, but by no means exclusive claim on 
serving as the base-position in the present volume’s serial meditation on 
contemporary impasses in Terran logistical, demographic, teletechnic, 
and cultural capability. Clarke’s intervention goes on to chronicle crucial 
contributions to the interactive, “second-order” autopoietic Gaia con-
cept made by paleontologist Peter Westbroek, biologist Lynn Margulis, 
biophysicist and cyberneticist Heinz von Foerster, and astrophysicist 
turned systems theorist Erich Jantsch along with Lovelock. Throughout 
this sequence of major updates and modifications to the Gaia concept, 
Luhmann’s effort to translate a broad range of philosophical, sociological, 
and linguistic models into their systematic terms and implications sub-
tends the collective enterprise as a secret (or not so secret) sharer.
Clarke’s systemic overview of Gaia serves as an illuminating framework 
for several related papers. Through the aerial photography of Subkanar 
Banerjee, Yates McKee, in “Of Survival: Climate Change and Uncanny 
Landscape in the Photography of Subhankar Banerjee,” discerns the 
ghosts of disastrous impending transformation registered in faint geo-
logical legend: “Bannerjee’s photographs eschew the typical iconography 
of crashing glaciers and melancholic polar bears that dominate the visual 
cultures of climate change discourse, instead calling for us to read the pre-
carious traces, tracks, and vestiges inscribed in the rapidly transforming 
Arctic landscape.” McKee is too acute a theorist to imagine that we access 
the ecological inconvenient truth through anything but an earth-writing 
slowly registered on photographic plates and digital screens, a notation 
unavoidably multidimensional and ambiguous at the same time that its 
implied narrative is dire. In the wake of his essay, we are all spectators at 
a climatic and geophysical spectacle made all the more fascinating and 
unbearable by the strain it imposes on our collective gaze and sensibility. 
With particular acuity, McKee traces the challenge that such benchmark 
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photographs as “Caribou Skeleton” pose both to theoretical discourse, as 
generated by none less than Jacques Derrida and Eduardo Cadava as well 
as to contemporary sociopolitical debate.
The challenge posed simultaneously by already documented geophysi-
cal crisis to representation and mediation themselves along with nation-
al, regional, and scientific and social welfare organizations does not relent 
in its urgency as the topos shifts from the Arctic north to the terrestrial 
aquasphere. In his “Shapes of Water,” James H. Bunn assures us that our 
ability to read the ongoing progress report concerning this precious and 
increasingly impacted medium of life as well as “natural resource” inheres 
in our ability to discern water’s inherent crystalline structure (proving, 
among other implications, the wisdom of the Chinese “five-phase” the-
ory that relates, in more than incidental ways, water to metal). Bunn is 
a distinguished semiologist, whose past studies have treated certain in-
frastructures—among them spirals and wave-patterns—emerging from 
physics to assert a disproportionately strong hold on literature, the visual 
arts, and music in a vast array of cultural epochs and theaters. In his con-
tribution to the volume, Bunn registers the vulnerabilities of the aqua-
sphere by means of the very crystals, waves, and other fractal organiza-
tions that have, in the past, served to define and track this vital medium.
In “Global Warming as a Manifestation of Garbage,” Tian Song pursues 
the same confluence of matter and signification to a point far beyond the 
possibility of any sub-system to assimilate the residue of contemporary 
material exploitation and deployment. The plastic bags accumulating 
in venues as restricted as remote Chinese villages and as vast as Beijing 
themselves become a semiological marker of current economic and eco-
logical impasses as telling as the rifts and fissures faintly evident in Sub-
kanar Banerjee’s Arctic photography. The proliferation of quite up-to-
date garbage in Chinese locations that had for centuries been inimical to 
it takes place, in Song’s account, against a backdrop of geophysical equi-
librium, mathematically schematized, forever disrupted. Both abstractly, 
then, and as pursued through the media of ice, water, and synthetic ma-
terial, the Gaia system is defined by the insults it has sustained and the 
free-floating disequilibrium into which it has been plunged. Systematic 
thinking nonetheless furnishes an indispensable template for observing 
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and articulating the evidence of the related disasters and the sequential 
developments/mutations ensuing from them.
A significant counterpoint to the pursuit of semiological patterns and 
drifts within indispensable geophysical elements emerges in those con-
tributions setting off from a fundamental crisis in mimesis itself, one 
manifest in the most dramatic instances of filtration, exclusion and liqui-
dation performed by social systems. While it is undeniable that contem-
porary trends in, say, undocumented exploitative labor or sex-trafficking 
bear the mark of their times, are facilitated by contemporary fashions in 
communications, transportation, manufacture, and related technologies, 
the sacrificial logic by which the impacted populations bear the brunt of 
socioeconomic shortfall is, according to Rey Chow, the feature of ages-
old and ubiquitous symbolic and semiotic negotiation. By this logic, at-
tenuated social under-privilege, ostracism, and deprivation, even of es-
sential materials and substances, is a function of such infelicities in the 
matrix of representation itself as a fundamental inability to process so-
cial undecidability, to sustain ongoing relations of symmetry and inde-
terminacy. For Chow as for Ewa Plonowska Ziarek, Giorgio Agamben, 
particularly in Homo Sacer, highlights the point at which a priori categori-
cal philosophical judgment and logic converge with the most deleteri-
ous social engineering that human communities are capable of devising. 
In an appreciation of the cultural and theoretical sources that Agamben 
is capable of mobilizing in the analysis of only too tangible punitive ar-
matures and mechanisms, Chow appeals to René Girard’s great mimetic 
coup: his understanding of the irrecuperable human tragedy of sacrifice, 
particularly of scapegoated populations, in terms of meaning-systems’ in-
ability to sustain unresolved doubling or parity. Her acute exegetical tac-
tic is an indispensable warning to all of us who would leap into the tech-
nical, communicative, and logistical particulars of today’s catastrophes 
overlooking the fact that their very apprehension, let alone articulation, 
is contingent on the distortion-effects as on the equivalencies configured 
by representation.
Following Girard, Chow’s essay and the considerable segment of the 
volume caught in its drift treat mimesis as “an originary force rather than a 
secondary phenomenon whose rationale/justification comes from some-
where else.” “To desire is, behaviorally speaking, to compete with a rival 
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in a vicious circle of reciprocal violence, in which the antagonists become 
increasingly indistinguishable from one another The only way in which 
the circle can be broken is through sacrifice—that is, through an artificial 
process in which someone who is, like everybody else, a member of the 
community becomes chosen as a scapegoat and expelled as a surrogate 
victim ‘Social coexistence,’ he [Girard] writes, would be impossible if no 
social surrogate existed, if violence persisted beyond a certain threshold 
and failed to be transmuted into culture.’” Chow thus reminds us that 
ominous news and threats seeming to proceed from emergent conditions 
of environmental stress, resource shortage, overpopulation, and so on, 
have in fact been mediated by short-circuits as venerable as culture itself, 
ones tricking the field and system of mimesis. It is the mimetic overload 
in which the crises of non-metabolized population growth and shift, cli-
mate, water, oil, and fire are already couched that allows each new epi-
phenomenon to place us at the brink, in a disaster site whose particular 
melange of conditions seems unprecedented.
In broad but lucid strokes, then, Chow’s contribution furnishes a back-
drop to interventions by Samuel Weber, Alberto Moreiras, and Ewa Plo-
nowska Ziarek. Whether the phenomenon under critical review is the 
classical notions of survival and recuperation underlying the contem-
porary ideology of security (as in “Homeland …”), the complex (even 
Spinozan) pyrotechnics of identity conditioning the “marrano register,” 
hunger strikes on the part of early twentieth-century suffragettes as an 
applied instance of Agamben’s “bare life,” or the unprecedented menace 
posed by Alfred Hitchcock’s skies, brimming under certain conditions 
with predatory birds, the downbeat in these essays is on the sublime dou-
ble-bind in mimesis itself foreshadowing and coloring specific contem-
porary incursions of the Real.
Samuel Weber, whose Targets of Opportunity: On the Militarization of 
Thinking,6 has attained canonical status as an overall incitement to the IC3 
project, furnishes us with a brief but particularly disciplined instance of 
deconstructive readout as etymological survey at the deep-conceptual 
strata of cultural formation. His deft pursuit of such constructions as the 
distinction between polis and household, survival, and salvation as they 
emerge in key texts by Plato and Aristotle, showcases the powerful ap-
peal of enduring Western philosophical concepts (as well as of the Great 
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Books curricula from which they figure prominently) to current mili-
tary planners.
Alberto Moreiras’s groundbreaking studies of linguistic and spatial 
boundaries under global conditions gravitate as much in the direction 
of philosophy as a conceptual repository and generator as Weber’s. With 
impressive rigor, he teases out the full conceptual nuance of complexities 
in the assumption and declaration of identity prompted by the double-
bind logic of the Spanish Inquisition:
The marrano register is not primarily interested in a relapse 
into Judaism. It concerns, rather, the pulsional drive to find 
strength in the subjective deconstitution caused by the fall 
of the shadow. The marrano shadow ciphers the melancholy 
moment in the wake of which it becomes necessary to de-
velop an affective position which would not simply be anti-
melancholy. The game consists of embracing melancholy and 
its other. From its inception the marrano register is already a 
double register.
We are multicultural to the extent that we are hybrid, but we 
are hybrid insofar as our identity is constituted in a differen-
tial relation with every other identity. This differential relation 
is already the sign of hybridity. The hybrid register is openly 
anti-marrano. It is still an identitarian register.
Arising in the late Middle Ages, but nuanced, as Moreiras makes cer-
tain to point out, by the foundational early-Modern reasonings of Spi-
noza, the marrano register is a battery of adaptive social and performa-
tive tactics in the background, say, of the subaltern relations analyzed so 
deftly by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Homi Bhabha. Although the 
contemporary emanation of the marrano register arises in the context of 
such trends as persistent colonial social hierarchies (even where colonial 
rule has long disappeared) and the makeshift living conditions entailed 
by massive diasporas in the quest for work and political stability, this phe-
nomenon is, at its core, a crisis in the looped wiring of representation and 
performance themselves.
A fascination with Foucauldian biopolitics as it is mobilized, figured, 
and performed by the construct of bare life in Giorgio Agamben’s decon-
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structive reading, in Homo Sacer, of the World War II camps as “zones of 
indistinction” is the starting point for Ewa Plonowska Ziarek’s taut quest 
for further zones of relevance for bare life. Ziarek is at once taken with 
how many situations of political resistance put bare life itself, life stripped 
of its defining cultural contexts and communal housing, on display. And, 
she evinces frustration at Agamben’s exclusively conceptual treatment of 
such phenomena as the homo sacer himself, who can be killed at any time 
with impunity but not communally mourned or commemorated, the le-
gal rationales distilled in different political formations over the centuries 
for imposing this status on marginal and tenuous individuals or popula-
tions, and the World War II camps themselves, ultimate extensions both 
of this logic and its multifaceted execution. While Ziarek’s frustration 
may well be less with Agamben’s conceptual or scholarly lapses than with 
the specific project-design he crystallized for Homo Sacer, we are in her 
considerable debt for extending in an inventive and resonant way the rel-
evance of the bare life construct: how Orlando Patterson can deploy it in 
his analyses of slavery, how it serves as a “secret sharer” in the sexual vio-
lence and exploitation enacted in prison camps and similar installations, 
and, most astonishingly, how the suffragettes transformed it, as highlight-
ed by the urgency of the hunger strike, into a particularly effective tactic 
of political resistance. In Ziarek’s treatment, the persistent value of “bare 
life” is as an abject signifier rendered all the more vivid in the denuding to 
which it has already been subjected.
Impasses of the Post-Global closes with the three interventions most 
tightly adhering to the job description for philosophy and critique dis-
tilled by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in the course of their “Capi-
talism and Schizophrenia” diptych: the critic as flow-monitor. The co-
presenter to this volume has elsewhere argued that flow is the persistent 
and dominant phenomenon under Deleuze/Guattari’s scrutiny.7 Like mi-
mesis itself, flow is an ambiguous and intractable signifier, one doubling 
back on and in certain respects counteracting itself. Deleuze/Guattari do 
not worry too much about resolving or deciding its dual material and se-
miotic constitution. There is a flow of money, commodities, and sexual 
impulses, secretions, and traffic, just as there are slippages and glides of 
meaning and volatile trajectories of the signifier. Flow is neither “inside” 
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nor “outside” language, as in complex ways it both definitively is and is 
not language.
By honing in on Martin Heidegger’s notion of worlding and its vacuous 
contrary moment (“unworlding”), Krzysztof Ziarek performs the signifi-
cant service to the volume of raising the question of the current atmo-
sphere or climate of post-global conditions. The post-global is nothing 
if it has not had the effect of radically altering the mood of transactions 
in a terrestrial variance of locations (social as well as geographical), and 
at a vast range of scales. Allowing atmosphere or mood to enter rigorous 
philosophical deliberation opens the field to the X-factors (incursions of 
chaos and turbulence) increasingly at play in catastrophic surprise. Zi-
arek acutely traces the inception of a key series of global and post-global 
apprehensions in Heidegger’s work starting out in his 1955 “Overcoming 
Metaphysics” and continuing in comments related to his 1962 lecture, 
“Time and Being.” Ziarek does well to remind us that Heidegger’s phi-
losophy remains a vital and hardly exhausted resource for dealing with 
the distractions ensuing from sensational media and breakneck technolo-
gies of production and communications (it occupies a prominent place, 
for example, in Michael Heim’s 1993 The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality).8
At a moment “of global climate change, world-wide economic instabil-
ity, and genetic and informational possibilities and threats,” Heideggerian 
thought issues a challenge “to open thinking to a questioning otherwise 
foreclosed to it The age of globalization tends to perpetuate and intensify 
precisely the global or planetary unworlding, and to such an extent that 
the very issue of world is no longer experienced as an issue or question.” 
Acute contemporary theorists will continue to press their appeals to and 
deployments of Heidegger in the direction of critical performativity and 
of context-specific readings of different technologies and their claims to 
innovation and indispensability. The play of language such as Heidegger 
has liberated and deployed it, in its etymological roots as in its refined 
philosophical vocabularies, is far more radical and suggestive than the 
homiletics to which Heidegger studies all-too often gravitate.
Swept up in the turbulent economic exchange and prospects of the 
current phase, Randy Martin, an expert in the performative dimension of 
Cultural Studies, hones in on the historical paradoxes and logical anoma-
lies of bailout—as image as well as strategy. “Bailout prompts a haunting, 
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a return of a spectral post-scarcity socialism even while the referents of 
public ownership, nationalization, expanded entitlement hint at a sea-
change in the name of a trope meant to ease anxieties and stay the course 
For the climate change afoot may not foretell an absolute beginning or 
end, but a refiguring of the social imaginary—in this case that of nothing 
less than neo-liberalism itself. It would seem to make all the difference 
in the world to present understanding if, rather than believing that we 
are being delivered to a new era, we come to notice that whatever winds 
prevail, the countercurrents were likely there all along.” For Martin, bail-
out strategy is symptomatic of the extractive mania and free-market eco-
nomics that have prevailed since the advent of Reaganomics; it is hardly a 
countermeasure to these trends. The present writers can only second and 
affirm Martin’s admiration for and appeal to Naomi Klein’s lucid narrative 
of the global, U.S.-driven dissemination of Friedmanian economic prin-
ciples in her 2005 The Shock Doctrine. In Martin’s imagistically responsive 
as well as economically rigorous rendition, “Shock would describe the 
queasy condition of navigating between subject and object, of interven-
ing without guarantee, of rippling waves of consequence ungoverned by 
intentionality.”
Shock, whose multifaceted incursion into urban experience, industrial 
production, mass entertainment, and interpersonal encounter had been 
tracked in a systematic way as early as Walter Benjamin in his writings, 
of the mid and late 1930’s, on the emergent media and around Baude-
laire, is both an ultimate arbiter and new configuration for flow. Naomi 
Klein’s account, in her splendid The Shock Doctrine reaches back to im-
ages of shock treatment and brainwashing in Cold War cinema (e.g. “The 
Manchurian Candidate”) as a cultural icon for a cycle of economic desta-
bilizations that has now encompassed the globe and returned, so to speak 
to its home base. As Klein tracks these economic meltdown effects, from 
Latin America to East Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and back 
again, she discerns their deep underlying pattern: severe indebtedness to 
such institutions as the World Bank and IMF implemented as a condition 
of foreign aid dynamically linked to a sudden and severe curtailment of 
social welfare infrastructure and expenditures. My own entry to the led-
ger of responses in the face of endless catastrophe takes off from wonder 
at the parallelism between Klein’s journalistically time-lapse montage of 
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the precedents leading to the current crises (demonstrating that history, 
as anticipated by astute and committed journalism, can indeed catch up 
with itself) and the trope of auto-immunity that added so much wisdom 
to Jacques Derrida’s political writings. National sovereignty and the mul-
tifarious forms of its exercise is, for Derrida, merely another miasma of 
selfhood (“ipseity”), whose structures and mechanisms are analyzed at 
the very roots, i.e. in signature texts by Plato and Aristotle, of Western 
philosophy. Invoking such tangible instances of political abuse as torture, 
as well as its enabling underlying figure, the wheel, Derrida painstakingly 
demonstrates in Rogues that unilateral political aggression will eventu-
ally attack the logic rationalizing it and the political system promulgat-
ing it—in outbreaks of auto-immune dysfunction. The current coming to 
terms with the economic meltdown and the radical rethinking of labor, 
industry, and work that it necessitates can still benefit—significantly—
from the application of auto-immune dynamics and logic to its analyses 
and self-analyses. The fact that Naomi Klein’s discernment of an underly-
ing pattern and logic to what might seem a cluster of unrelated economic 
accidents eventuates at a figure—auto-immunity—that the most inven-
tive philosopher of our age deploys in very different contexts and at a 
markedly different grain to parallel phenomena is an authentically note-
worthy happening and surprise. This discursive epiphany strongly sug-
gests both that astute chronicle will eventuate at the theory requisite to 
the events within its compass and that the most powerful theory retains 
a footing in the tangible imagery making it possible. The conjunction be-
tween Derrida and Klein may offer scant recompense amid the ongoing 
concatenation of global climate events and socio-economic destabiliza-
tions. But it encourages those of us engaged in cultural programming, cri-
tique, and production to stay at our posts with our eyes still trained on 
the scrolling screen.
～
The “volume” you have before you would more accurately be described 
as a carefully selected collation, bound by nothing more substantial than 
an electronic paper-clip, of reactions gauging the impacts of a current 
Prevailing Operating System whose implications are at once economic, 
sociopolitical, technological, technocratic, cultural, and educational. 
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The respondents who have graciously contributed their reactions and 
feedback to a suspended catastrophe-in-progress whose parameters 
seem to morph with increasing acceleration, are all acute and close read-
ers schooled in several of the dominant theoretical paradigms through 
which the flows of power, money, information, memory, and material can 
be monitored.
The two companion volumes of Theory in the Era of Climate Change, 
emanate from a series of colloquia and workshops organized largely by 
one of the series co-editors, Tom Cohen, 2005–09, in diverse locations 
including Beijing, Albany, and Buffalo under the aegis of the Institute 
of Critical Climate Change. In planning and coordinating these events, 
Cohen was aided and abetted locally, at his home institution, the State 
University of New York at Albany, by Mike Hill, the departmental chair 
(English) and Mary Valentis. At the antipodal extreme of the SUNY sys-
tem, the inaugural events were planned and external support solicited in 
collaboration with Henry Sussman, editor of the present volume, who, in 
March, 2009, extended the IC3 event-series with a conference sponsored 
by the University at Buffalo called “Idioms of the Post-Global.” That 
event, which included eloquent status reports on fish in Alaskan waters 
by documentarian Sarah Elder and on contemporary regimes of cogni-
tion by philosopher Catherine Malabou, left a palpable imprint on the 
present volume, which contains several of its interventions.
The IC3 project has from its outset been at its core an incitement to 
torque the suggestive and empowering treasury of contemporary theo-
retical inquiries, improvisations, interventions and performances toward 
the actuality, in several senses, of an interrelated, if open-ended sequence 
of ecological, demographic, economic, and informational contemporary 
disasters. These not only vie for our attention on a daily level but tangibly 
affect the potentials of cognition, interpretation, and expression on a ter-
restrial scale. More than the standard call for “political relevance,” itself as 
much a symptom of consensual acquiescence as dissensus, the challenge 
that IC3 has issued in the several venues of its happenings has demanded 
a performative resonance with the violence of the unfolding catastrophe; 
a heightened sense of the complicity and role of the mass-media, cyber-
netic technology, and autocratic systems of public administration in the 
chain of disasters; reaching toward a phenomenological accounting of 
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the severe curtailment of interpretative, communicative, and cultural re-
sources and potential that current conditions impose.
～
This book goes to press in the very recent wake of the Japanese tsunami 
of late winter, 2011, at a moment of intriguing possibility in the Middle 
East, conditioned as ever, however, by the contingencies of multilateral 
intervention. The individuals most deserving of the editor’s and con-
tributors’ appreciation belong to the rhizomatically distributed collectiv-
ity of cultural scholars, critics, and theorists, whether in the ranks of the 
instructors or the students, who continue to bring their full talents and 
intelligence to bear in synthesizing and extracting sense from the accel-
erations and radically altered flow-patterns with which terrestrial systems 
are currently beset. In very different ways, the following interventions all 
contribute to a picture in which these patterns—of climate, intellectual 
as well as meteorological, of adaptation, feedback, and mutation, are ex-
periencing unprecedented degrees of stress and burnout. Persistence un-
der these conditions at the generative margins of theoretical paradigms 
and environments is, in itself and for its own sake, an achievement elicit-
ing serious celebration.
Attempting, collaboratively with Tom Cohen for some years now, to 
factor current exacerbating climatic and atmospheric conditions into the 
purview and performances available to contemporary critical theory has 
been a consistently edifying experience. It has gone a long way toward 
counteracting and in many ways undoing the stasis emerging from the 
professional and institutional organization of innovative critique and the-
oretical update.
Notes
1. Jennifer Gabrys, “Sink: the Dirt of Systems,” Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space, 27 (2009), pp. 666–681.
2. Avital Ronell, Crack Wars: Literature, Addiction, Mania.
3. Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, 40.
4. Tom Cohen, Hitchcock’s Cryptonymies.
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5. Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, 82: “This condition of possibility of the event 
is also its condition of impossibility, like this strange concept of messianism 
without content, of the messianic without messianism, that guides us here 
like the blind.”
6. Samuel Weber, Targets of Opportunity: On the Militarization of Thinking.
7. Henry Sussman, “Deterritorializing the Text: Flow Theory and 
Deconstruction,” Modern Language Notes, 115 (2000), rpt. Sussman, The Task 
of the Critic, 129–51
8. Michael Heim, The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality, 7–8, 55–71.
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Chapter 1
Anecographics
Climate Change and “Late” Deconstruction
Tom Cohen
“The relationship between earth, terra, 
territory, and terror has changed.”
– Jacques Derrida1
“ … might not environmentalism provoke a certain 
materialistic mutation within deconstruction?”
– David Wood2
“The environmental crisis is inherently deconstructive, 
viciously so, of current modes of thought in politics, 
economics and cultural and literary theory. At the same 
time, the lack of engagement with environmentalism in 
deconstructive thinking seems increasingly damaging.”
– Timothy Clark3
The specter of climate change arrives like a time experiment: if there were 
a dominant species that accelerated its own disappearance by consuming 
and altering its planet, how would that effect critical orientations? One 
response may understandably be either occlusion (as in America today) 
or what we might call the relapse, the attempt to restore what is taking 
place or going under (in Nietzsche’s sense). Let us pretend such a thing 
exists and one is no longer in the zone of limitless imaginary time, of end-
less generations to come, and let us pretend, in the case of deconstruc-
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tion, this emerged to full media light just after Derrida’s death (who lived 
to write of terror, “9/11,” the American suicidal “auto-immunity” spiral). 
How does one address that this appears nowhere in his text, which seems 
to have missed little: as an oversight or as a constitutive occlusion? Today, 
a few years later, the façade of a “war on terror” has evaporated to disclose 
an accelerating set of ex-anthropic vortices that displace the polemic with 
neo-liberal triumphalism (the then “new world order” of the 1990s). The 
positive nature of these disclosures is often overlooked by the quality of 
threat they induce or compel anestheticization before. Hyper-financial-
ization threatening “currency” as such, “peak” everything (oil, water, 
agriculture), neo-feudal telecracies, calculations of “population culling” 
going forward decades, and what have become the disaster porn enter-
tainments of media. In contemplating how or whether 20th-century 
critical preoccupations mutate before or with such other materialities, one 
would have expected “deconstruction” to be most pliable—with its in-
dexing of a non-human trace not bounded to historical narratives. But 
what we will call here “climate change” (rather than “environmentalism” 
or “ecological” thought, both of which seem bound to the mimetic orders 
that arguably fuel hyperconsumption) appears almost nowhere in Derri-
da and appears to have been avoided by his most feverish exegetical heirs, 
those presuming to prolong the brand or canonize the archive. If, dur-
ing what cannot quite yet be called the 21st century, there is a shift away 
from 20th-century preoccupations within a human narrative—an “oth-
erness of the other,” social justice, cultural agency—toward what cannot 
be fit into an “otherness” model as such—cultural others, subalterns, ani-
mals—why did deconstruction appear to blank on this?
This question seems to have been posed by David Wood and Timothy 
Clark, both of whom I quoted in this essay’s epigraphs, before the 21st-
century horizons neither contemplated nor addressed by Derrida—yet 
promising to engulf and alter critical legacies in uncharted ways. I will 
attempt to dialogue with these citations in the following essay. As op-
posed to the term “environmentalism,” which is loaded with definitional 
assumptions and political agendas (some already regressive), I will call 
this advent by the impersonal name or non-name “climate change.” The 
phrase is verbally redundant but impersonal and indifferent to “man.” 
Keeping in mind that if the ruse of “9/11” was that it pretended there 
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was a spectral other still to wage war with, a human-on-human contest, 
what it concealed from view was the threat without enemy—faceless, 
“anthropogenic,” out of which the disappearance of species, of “life as we 
know it,” becomes calculable. While today one may speak of an emergent 
climate change imaginary that permeates discourse and referential chains, 
an imaginary replete with “climate change subjectivities” captured by the 
rhetorics of crisis, the latter’s tie to apocalypticism and disaster-porn ap-
pears too familiar.4
A Grand Mal d’Archive
Could one step outside the type of academic exegesis plentifully repre-
sented today—such as the hagiography and mimes of mourning and self-
inscription—and imagine that Derrida had lived another decade or two? 
Since according to certain maps there was a second or “late Derrida” or 
its simulacrum (denied but tolerated by him), might there not have been 
a third phase—after the hiatus of what we will call the mainline crowd-
pleasers, such as “ethics,” “religion,” and the “political?” Such might have 
been a final turn to the ex-anthropic strands of early and more marginal 
texts.5 May these have been effaced by a “late” phase in which Derrida 
turned back from the openings toward allo-humanist lines of thought—
earlier or scattered openings in his work that may have lost readers at the 
time (or for decades)?
Might a labor of consignation evident in the aprés Derrida—a “turn” 
accelerated by public rituals of mourning—have led elsewhere than to 
the auto-immune phase one witnesses today: that is, not turning to the 
exegetical normalization of Derrida’s writings to the point of recom-
mending, as some legacy-keepers now do, the retirement of “decon-
struction” with a full focus on “Derrida studies,” a Derrideanism without 
deconstruction that ennobles the proper name? Might it instead have 
attempted to reconfigure itself toward unprecedented 21st-century hori-
zons that Derrida had not lived (or chosen) to address? In fact, does not 
a period of consignation not, precisely, converge with what he meant by 
declaring that his work would disappear after death?6
One could imagine a deconstruction after Derrida’s death that did not 
immediately circle back to his immense production, manage it, congeal 
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imagined orthodoxies, erase the rogue in favor of the saint that presumed 
that proximity or contact meant inheritance, and so on. This other de-
construction would blink, look about the new 21st-century horizons, 
and instead ask (as if anew) what “deconstruction” would do before these 
horizons, those of neither metaphysics nor institutions, but material, 
biomorphic, geomorphic horizons, as if from outside, from without the 
human enclave altogether and without face—neither other nor wholly 
other, since processual and banal.7 And might it—this absent “decon-
struction”—ask what adaptation, what contretemps, what challenge or 
accelerating catalyst this newly disclosed combinatoire of shifting refer-
entials did not present? Since “deconstruction” after Derrida wraps itself 
in its auto-immune moment turned toward its own recycling without 
orientation or clear opponent, does it not pose the question inversely of 
a deconstruction without “Derrida,” a deconstruction without “decon-
struction,” and without the proper name or imaginary of a family or style 
to retreat to?
Derrida lived to comment upon “9/11” and the intricate discussion of 
terror and the auto-immune responses (of “America”), just as he made 
it through the neo-liberal fantasy of totalization entering the 90s. Yet in 
both cases, his contretemps are inscribed in the topical theatre of the 
day. In Specters of Marx, Derrida will rise in mock-Mosaic form to ad-
dress his “ten plagues,” or rather telegraph them, as he says, pretending 
to do so in ten words: unemployment, homelessness, economic wars, 
free markets, debt, arms industries, nuclear weapons, inter-ethnic wars, 
mafia drug cartels, and problems of international law(lessness).8 Strange 
Morse code, and stranger still the covert messages thus imparted—since 
the “ten plagues” in fact are banal enough, human-on-human ills, insti-
tutional. In fact, he seems to almost have difficulty finding ten (drift-
ing into weak international laws and mafia-states). There is no mention 
of “climate change,” oil, mass extinctions, toxification, water, and so on. 
David Wood, dismayed that these “ten plagues” did not include the en-
vironment, reports that Derrida conceded (“willingly”) that ecological 
catastrophe would be an eleventh. In “On Being Haunted by the Future,” 
Wood does not consider that it could not be on this list and that its occlu-
sion is also already a textual mark. The problem seems to be that of will-
ing a green deconstruction to begin with.
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The swarming logics of climate change arrive to deconstruct the arte-
factual real of human modernity as if from without (though this arrival 
discloses that there was no “outside” as such). For Clark, “What Derrida 
once called ‘Western metaphysics’ is now also a dust cloud of eroded top-
soil, a dying forest and what may now be the largest man-made feature 
detectable from space, the vast floating island of plastic debris that spans 
a large part of the Pacific ocean” (Toward 49). In addressing terror, Der-
rida is still analyzing “the political” as he pretended to appropriate it—
even where that can appear as a diffuse or undefined “progressive liberal-
ism.”9 Derrida’s “terrorism” mimes a human-on-human drama, a war of 
doubles logic, the work of an enemy “other” of sorts (pretending to be 
like “us,” flying “our” planes, then detonating). Derrida chooses to be for 
the West, not bin Laden, in whom he sees no future at all. While the West 
at least can, in time, strive to perfect its institutions, Bin Laden’s “actions 
and such discourse open onto no future and in my view, have no future. 
If we are to put any faith in the perfectibility of public space and of the 
world juridical-political scene, of the world itself, then there is, it seems 
to me, nothing good to be hoped for from that quarter” (Terror, 106). 
That is fine, a commitment to Europe, to institutions capable of devel-
opment, unclosed at least if brutally corrupt if not criminal. But from a 
perspective of planetary or species survival, it is hard to maintain that Bin 
Laden’s vision—retreating from Western globalization to 12th-century 
modes of production—may not be defended, irrespective of ideology. 
Bin Laden recently attached his Jihad to the cause of stopping those re-
sponsible for ecological catastrophe and climate change. Such logic is not 
essentially different from what Žižek proposes as the sole possible answer 
to the prospect of ecological disaster. First, concede that the catastrophic 
is irreversible and no longer avoidable in its worst implications, so that 
at least one does not go through the gymnastics of denial and hope. This 
idea is indebted to Dupuy’s suggestion that we already regard the present 
retrospectively, as a moment that from the perspective of that catastroph-
ic future might have been avoided.10 Second, Žižek suggests instituting a 
Maoist-Leninist green state, brutally policing uniform levels of consump-
tion, restitution local denunciations, and so on.11 Who could say, from 
a non-Western and non-humanist perspective, that perhaps a thousand 
years of Taliban would not interrupt a suicidal direction of the species it-
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self, allowing something else to emerge and creating new civilized forms 
into millennia? If so, the context of a choice is altered. The new aporia
of “climate change” are refreshingly bracing and absolutely ruthless, like 
the future prospect of a geo-engineering scramble that can patch up one 
catastrophe at one time (e.g., aerosol deflection) but exacerbate another 
(e.g., monsoons, droughts, pollution).
The trouble seems to be in willing a green deconstruction to begin 
with—that is, in presuming the green politics of environmental meta-
phors to be a given or exigency, even in its less organicist forms, or to in-
sist there be a transposition of it, that this name and critical signature be 
carried on, re-initialized, and so on, by fealty. To inquire of “deconstruc-
tion” and “environmentalism” raises a conundrum about both terms. 
Does “deconstruction” now name a vague network of writings touched 
by Derrida, or a trans-epochal effect with numerous names and texts, or 
primarily “Derrida himself ” —and if the latter, then which Derrida, at 
the expense of which others? (The construct of a “late Derrida” here ren-
ders this a question.) Or, differently put, which among a multiplicity of 
Derridas should be now produced, not uniform but contradictory: some 
“at war” with others, some with themselves (for instance, an ex-anthro-
poid vector, on the one hand, and the crafted institutional “late Derrida” 
of hospitality on the other)?12
Both Wood and Clark are diplomatic. Each more or less brushes aside, 
as one might today, the import of a “democracy to come” or “weak mes-
sianism” and such maneuvers. Wood asks that the phantom “New Inter-
national” in Specters of Marx be extended to include other life forms: a 
new biocentrism (though one ignores that a trace neither living nor dead, 
or “life/death,” may not simply be “biocentric” at all). Clark asks instead 
that it include the unborn, the “future,” the generations vandalized in 
their being and reserves by a feeding frenzy of the artefacted present—a 
sort of “time bubble” and spellbound telecracy of today. This “new” time 
of abrupt geomorphic mutation is far more out of joint than the dark un-
derbelly of another “new world order.” This time is not of phenomenology 
nor of its deconstruction. For however disjointed the phenomenological 
present was, it was always a present that differed from itself. The logics of 
“climate change” are even more counter-Hamletian since they inhabit a 
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present that is zombified by what it knows would be now irreversible, yet 
which it does not see, and hence occludes.
The disclosure of the biosemiotic logics of “climate change” and their 
impact on historical and cognitive aporia compels a different question—
as well as what might be called a future conditional back-glance at “de-
construction” itself, or the deconstruction produced today.
What emerges, then, when a biomorphic and geomorphic turn be-
comes manifest (since it was never other) that folds the archive in its 
entirety one more time, scattering its referentials? Must one pretend to 
address an outer rim to the anarchival, at the point it loops back before 
and into itself, or is there no “the” archive (but many differentially inter-
embedded archival machines, including organic and inorganic processes, 
genetic codings, eco-niches)? Does what one would have to call human 
mnemotechnics—out of which memory and world co-derive with their 
blinds—interface legibly with ex-anthropic “archival” modes that are 
proleptic and that animate, read, or produce themselves forward? What 
is called evolution, genetics, photosynthesis, mutation, biomorphism, 
the transference of biomass, and so on would indicate such monstrous 
counter-archives where the perpetual anteriority of marking systems 
whose technics, machines, and inks have accompanied the era of hydro-
carbons would collude with, consume, and alter these inorganic and or-
ganic effects.
No Revelations: Not “Not Now”
The phrase “climate change” is, then, less an encompassing term than 
one without a prescribed mode of reference—a non-name that is frac-
tal. One can fill in a myriad of macro- and micro-threads, intersecting 
active backloops and different proleptic narratives from polar ice to mi-
crobials, medical toxins to oil, hyperindustrial psychotropies to species 
extinctions, geopolitical corporate plundering and regime maintenance 
to food riots, the credit collapse and scientific prospects of synthetic bi-
ology and geo-engineering, resource wars and, yes, “weather” militariza-
tion and “population culling.” All these narratives correspond to different 
combinatoires as the calculations of time scales are adjusted. This “long 
now”—as Stewart Grant’s foundation of that name calls it (stretching 
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10,000 years in either direction from the putative present)—must be en-
fabled from geomorphic or biomorphic times, in which scores of years 
may be noted as a mere point, or suddenly tip into cataclysmic muta-
tions (methane bubbles, abrupt die-offs). “Climate change”—even of the 
anthropogenic variety (assuming this term is not, still, a plea for human 
sovereignty, blame, or centrality)—appears outside of short-term calcu-
lations of the compressed experience of the daily, memory programs, or 
mediacratic spells. Yet climate change is not a fable or, as Derrida says 
of nuclear war, an “apocalyptic imaginary.” That is, the catastrophic pos-
sibility imagined by Derrida—the nuclear erasure of life—was, for him, 
potentially present in the archive before its actuality. Noting this, Derrida 
did not consider a more radical destruction beyond possibility and po-
tentiality in its “quasi- transcendental” differential forms.
This destruction is not apocalyptic at all. That is: there is no calami-
tous precise instant, no revelation, and it is in its way irreducibly banal—
a matter of chemical compositions, physics, molecules, biomass, and the 
feeding of energy off organic waste of dead terrestrial species, a form of 
necrophagy. It suggests a blunt revolution of epistemological settings 
for which Žižek—who then curiously returns to a Christian apocalyp-
tic wedded to a green Leninist ideal—avers: “everything should be re-
thought, beginning from the zero-point” (First as Tragedy 87). It is what 
contemporary thought seems reluctant to conceive, a force beyond any 
model of sovereignty.
Thus, 20th-century historical and cultural critical maps are seemingly 
interrupted as the geographic template shifts from human-on-human 
events to what lies outside of and encompasses those dramas, a trajectory 
of dispossession indexed to auto-extinction. These mutations are none-
theless all about “reserves,” representation, survival (ultimately between 
groups, localities, or national entities), and the wearing away of premises 
and of whatever we confirm as “life as we know it.” One can insert the 
topoi of “climate change,” then, into any 20th-century-derived critical 
idiom (culturalism and … emancipatory thought and … deconstruc-
tion and), and step back, allowing some variant of this metamorphosis to 
proceed as the later breaks, contracts, contradicts itself, must try to mu-
tate—or goes into a blind, a relapse, doubling down on itself, and so on.
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What if deconstruction were itself the byproduct or the point of orien-
tation toward a movement of ex-position that could not, finally, be de-
lineated or given one name (Derrida, de Man, Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, 
Plato, or just script)—and not only because there might be types or even 
a typology of trace? It would have to peel back from its current preoc-
cupations and recuperations—reactive gestures of literalizing “ethics,” 
domesticating the animal, naturalizing deconstruction.13 It would then 
be able to interrogate those vectors in Derrida’s work that appear non-
recuperable and, for that reason, would never quite have been mourned.14
These would not have been enough on which to gamble the survival of an 
imperial production. What if this legacy (a clogged and tiresome term, 
much as inheritance implies capital and resulting family plots) were best 
served today (should that be some end in itself) by cutting it up into in-
compatibles, contradictory pulsions, violent forces that would give them-
selves over to the fascination of rehearsal in variation?
The perspective of “climate change” questions the rhetorical premise of 
today’s hagiographic or normalizing readings by recalling the rogue Der-
rida, but this time in earnest: that is, the limitless strategician and seducer 
(a term to be heard neutrally). It casts a different light, say, on Martin 
Hägglund’s recent Radical Atheism—Derrida and the Time of Life, which 
argues that a systemic misreading and retheologization trends through 
the mainstream Derridean commentators (it is an impressive list). A per-
sistent relapse and recuperation occurs which Derrida’s early writings pa-
tently exceed.15 However melancholy it is to think that a book of the 21st 
century needed to point out to Derrideans that Derrida was not theo-
tropic (in the diverse senses of this term), the image that evolves suggests 
a strategic choice made by Derrida. He would appear to have artefacted a 
“late Derrida” that he could, at the same time, disown, or whose host dis-
course he could sabotage after waiting a generation or two. Specifically, 
that artefacted Derrida would enter into the main arteries of humanis-
tic traditions (religion, ethics, politics, or what we might call REP) in or-
der, as a pivot, to counter the entrapping clichés of him as anti-humanist 
“post-structuralist” (he saw what happened to de Man).16
Did Derrida strategically generate an artefacted “late phase,” a Trojan 
Horse strategy that would —after the current generation of carriers—
deform the predicates of the main arteries of academic and humanist 
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thought over time? If deconstruction assumes that where there is archive 
there is also a necessary contamination and the imminent extinction gen-
erated by techno-genesis, or if Derrida presumed to account for every 
future reading of his text (as he says of Joyce), then he would have calcu-
lated the auto-immune moment and recuperation that his death would 
trigger. Derrida’s calculation of survival, however, veers from many of de-
construction’s own premises; thus, among the Derridas one might want 
today to revive and inspect is the rogue—since we have already had the 
dear friend, Jewish saint, Proteus unbound, and so on.
This is the missing logic implied by Hägglund, since if Derrida tolerated 
the production of “late Derrida” around him (yet would chase Nancy to 
the shed for daring to metaphysicize touch), it could only be by a sort of 
higher duplexity or contamination of strategies—a contamination which 
his concept of archive accepts as necessary and structural. Rather than 
slowly turn “deconstruction” into a self-disowning intellectual moralism 
and stylistic groupthink, still haunted by an imaginary of persecution and 
the illusion of familial clustering, the figure of “climate change” or eco-
catastrophe arrives as a gift and de-orientation—though not in the sense 
of re-initializing his text as “for” environmentalism or leading to a “green” 
econstruction (in Wood’s offering). In fact, one might say that Derrida’s 
“late” phase involved a strategic practice of hospitality according to cer-
tain rules, complications, inversions—accepting the deployment of cer-
tain words (“justice,” the “wholly other”) without marking them, hover-
ing at the edges of the eco, without summoning the ecologico-graphic 
dispossession. “Hospitality” appears, instead, as a sort of holding strat-
egem, a jungle-gym for practicing aporetic logics mostly in what appear 
primarily as “systems of law and communication.”17
But “climate change” is not apocalyptic, any more than it enters the 
combinatoire of hospitality or the home.18
Derrida’s analyses of “nuclear” extinction and war, along with the possi-
bility of the extinction of the archive (and life forms), interfaces curiously 
with “climate change.” He speculates on the literariness of the “nuclear 
war” as organizing threat, and this threat’s weave into apocalyptic imagi-
naries. Let us adapt Žižek’s or Dupuy’s premise and imagine a future dis-
sident reader, who would read these “apocalyptic” texts of Derrida, after 
the apocalypse had been eclipsed by less revelatory destructions. Such 
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a reader would look back from decades hence, perhaps, for we are con-
juring this reader, too, as “to come” (from another state or stage in this 
terrestrial mutation). This reader might regard the entirety of critical cul-
ture today as strangely spellbound and, as such, not entirely disconnected 
from the relapses we witness on the political, international, mediacratic, 
and cultural fronts. That “deconstruction” today cannot ask itself the hard 
questions that might be posed by a “reader to come,” cannot turn against 
itself or play the contretemps, and cannot give Derrida the confidence to 
respond or reconfigure before them as a plastic force of assault and vio-
lence whose referentials survive by mutation, tells its own story. How, to-
day, do we negotiate these revivals of past apocalyptic logics and figures 
as we face a “to come” that both refuses any revelatory intervention and 
threatens to annihilate not with a bang but a whimper, not in the form of 
an intruding other but of an “outside” that was never exterior?
Derrida examines these missiles and missives, yet must align the apoc-
alyptics of the nuclear threat (around which Cold-War geopolitics were 
organized) with the standoff logics of war between two sides. Yet nuclear 
war also is analyzed by Derrida as a fable allied to the era of literature. 
Nuclear war is a fable since it never has happened, so one does not know 
what is feared and warded against (or unconsciously desired). Thus, Der-
rida says that deconstruction is itself of the nuclear era, watched over by 
it (with its Cold War trace). What, however, would exceed the era of lit-
erature, or not occur in the mode of nuclear strikes in the reversible sus-
pension of a non-present “present” which the flash of fiery erasure too 
enphantoms, similar to the model of the impact, the caesura, the sudden 
blow, the chiasmic exposure, the epoche, and so on? “Climate change,” 
in contrast with these fabled nuclear apocalyptics considered by Derrida, 
can be thought of as cinematized, breaching decades and millenia as in 
a micro-instant, much as the sixth mass extinction event on earth—the 
only such event accomplished by an organism—might cover a century or 
be traced back millennia to the megafauna. That is, its time would not be 
“of literature,” archive or time-space differance but cinematic in terms of 
its inhuman, machinic, and interrupted temporality.
For Derrida, the nuclear fable is ciphered through a war for recogni-
tion, of two human-like others who could commit annihilation (by de-
cision) in the name of mastery, or in this case, “the Name” itself (since 
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there would be no one left to recognize the Master potentially). One rea-
son “climate change” is without “Name,” and doesn’t ascribe to the nar-
rative of human-on-human war in the name of the “Name,” is because it 
eludes the analytic of the name. Derrida:
But as it is in the name of something whose name, in this logic 
of total destruction, can no longer be borne, transmitted, in-
herited by anything living, that name in the name of which 
war would take place would be the name of nothing, it would 
be pure name, the “naked name.” That war would be the first 
and the last war in the name of the name, with only the non-
name of “name.” It would be a war without a name, a nameless 
war, for it would no longer share even the name of war with 
other events of the same type, of the same family. Beyond 
all genealogy, a nameless war in the name of the name. That 
would be the End and the Revelation of the name itself, the 
Apocalypse of the Name. (“No Apocalypse” 30–31)
Yet “climate change” is not of a human other, does not occur in a flash, 
cannot occur in the name of “the Name” (and, in essence, is un-name-
able). It requires no decision, unless that be the elusive counter-decision 
against what today accelerates its vortices—a “decision” to throw the 
brake on, say, hydro-carbon emission in the illusion of a sovereignty that 
is non-existent (Copenhagen). It is without the agency of war explicitly, 
but folds all war into itself (resource wars) and redistributes them as in-
visible wars in which totalities hang in the balance as its own blind-spot. 
The nuclear strike corresponds with an anti-linear counter-strike on the 
placeless “event,” which wants to read itself as instantaneous, a decision, 
the irreversible, the inversion of the non-present “present” or its rhetori-
cal or narrative premises. But perhaps not only this model but its decon-
struction would partake of a blind even when in excess. And who would 
expect or think, in the early 80s and before, that rather than the hypothet-
ical nuclear strike between a binarized standoff modeled on war, recogni-
tion, and the pleasures of annihilation, there might be a relentless shrink-
age of earth’s ass’s skin of surfaces and biosystems, a dispossession that 
would proceed from the ground up, as a slow, miserable population cull-
ing over decades? Who might have anticipated a turning of the biosphere 
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into an inhospitable zone—as if the figure of the home had forcibly been 
recast as a trope of its own hyperconsumption? Such a mutation could 
not be figured as apocalyptic, of the instant, or remotely redeemable.
By asking after the tropology of “climate change” it would be possible to 
explore the figures and failed personifications by which ecological dam-
age is tracked, politicized, put into media or entertainment vehicles, or 
gets absorbed as an assented to acceleration. This is a step Wood avoids 
altogether. He does not ask how a “deconstruction” might read or resist 
“environmentalism” as a configuration, rather than be accommodated to 
it. Wood does not consider what modes of ethics may arise from logics of 
competitive survival that are likely to compel the exact opposite develop-
ments of what any progressive program might wish to shape. That is, if 
the polity is pressured, as if from without, from what can no longer be 
considered as “environment,” it would usher in events that would not be 
those of justice or democracy to come. New Orleans after Katerina might 
be a rehearsal in petto: abandonment of the underclass, a virtual triage, a 
hole in the symbolic, the invasion of the “homeland” from without. Un-
like the missiles become missives of Derrida’s analysis, which launch to-
ward targets and make speed a desideratum, the climactic in general and 
what issues from it is radically counter-linear, a mutating hive of feedback 
loops of counter-referential force-lines, tensions, and transferences. It is 
not deconstructible, is not narrateable, implies “futures” more calculable 
than archival pasts, is not of the era of “literature”—or even containable 
within a designated tropology. Yet it “is” and assumes the perspective of 
non-personifiable agencies.
Destructive Affirmatives
“Today,” certain sutures in Derrida can be read against themselves, as 
“at war” with themselves, and ruptured from the anesthetized routines 
of mourning and consignation. From such a point of view it is as if—to-
day—nothing of note were occurring beyond the horizons that Derrida 
was exposed to. It is as though one remains within the Derridean prob-
lematic that emerged from the nuclear era, attached to it, to thinking with 
and against the sudden flash—rather than the relentless anthropogenic 
draw toward extinction events beyond cognitive maps or precedence 
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in memory formations. We might imagine, in contrast with this fidelity 
to the apocalyptic, messianic and “to come,” different referentials that 
would shatter these rehearsals, opening onto a monstrous future whose 
logics were not anticipated and that would break the very protocols upon 
which Derrida had more or less gambled. Such different, non-apocalyt-
pic, horizons would suggest not that “deconstruction” be rescued from 
itself (Wood’s econstruction?), but that its auto-immune phase be left 
to suicide unimpeded. Only if the legacy that sought to maintain and 
conserve itself were to spend itself utterly and die its own death would 
it be possible to release what survives unburdened by the proper name, 
numbing recitations, the dedicated imaginary of managers and heirs. For 
this crippling survival of deconstruction that devours its own host also 
draws a parallel between the systemic relapse of contemporary theoretic 
tribes. The shudder and attempt to restore, recuperate, or restitute yet a 
bit longer the familiar order or façade accelerates the very disappearance 
of a phantom “homeland” it would guard against. Not environmentalism, 
then, but something else that is no longer “literature” or of its age—and 
yet which, because of that, rereads the archive in its entirety with differ-
ent referentials.
Do the horizons of climate change alter and turn against the systemic 
premises of 20th-century representational and critical practices? Clark 
mentions the dead-end of a postcolonial ethics that parallels the neo-
liberal faux promise, in the era of the democratic imaginary, of a world of 
American-style consumers, i.e., restored subjectivities. But what does the 
beyond of an era of literature—which is also to say of the archive in one 
of its epochal configurations—indicate, if not a mal d’archive in the tro-
pological itself? This would open not the transit circuits of metaphorics 
and anthropisms, but the contretemps to tropology itself. It would be not 
a caesura from without, as Wood implies, but an internal break with the 
very premises that support it, a counter-gaze without personification, a 
perspective without “man” altogether. Such a perspective affirms even 
the implications of extinction in order to get on with the clarifications 
at hand. One should not assume that the auto-immune phase of “decon-
struction” today, X-rayed by the problematic of “climate change,” though 
entirely scripted, was inevitable. That is, it should not appear as seamless 
and possible that one might simply supplement the corpus of Derrida’s 
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work with “and environment” or “and climate change” that he acciden-
tally failed to mention. It may be conceived as an obvious turn for which 
an alternative would nonetheless be thinkable, though to consider the el-
lipses in Derrida’s thought would occur at the expense of the memorial-
ization of the capital of the name, the legacy, the mimic style, and so on. 
Such untimely questions might ask, for example, what “deconstruction” 
would do in the 21st century’s model of inhospitality?
That is, rather than playing the standard riffs of the aporia of the ethics 
of the “otherness of the other,” one might experiment with addressing—
as it were, without a net—the entirely new and exitless aporia emerging 
across every discursive field (the political, the economic, the referen-
tial). The seemingly toothless “ethicism” Derrida seemed to license (an 
all too human “ethics of literature?”), in the name of a “justice” that had 
no necessary human reference, more pre-Socratic than legalistic in invo-
cation—which, in essence, could turn against a broader criminalization 
of the human—now enters the Olympics of para-ethical aporetics. What 
decisionism arrives in the face of an “ethics” of this dimension, the re-
sponsibility and irresponsibility toward “futures,” the affirmation of dis-
appearance, or survivalist logics and rationalizations, of triage (long term 
or short, economic and organic)?
These other aporetics are already emerging. One is named by Clark in 
scanning the replay of postcolonial orthodoxies—not the identifications 
of historical injustice and their address, but the premise that such address 
implies a universal restitution of the oppressed into the equalizing prom-
ises of 90s neo-liberalism: that this justice is measured by the model of 
freedom to consume, thus accelerating the autophagy of resources (Chi-
na and India normally enter this discussion). Another is the global debt 
trap itself. One encounters such aporia within 21st-century protocols, 
such as the rhetorical clash between the wishes of emancipatory agendas 
and the real, or feminism and advocates of population control. Within 
critical culture, the prioritization of a rhetoric of praxis marshaled by a 
return to “history” now seems to have played into this accelerating im-
passe quite literally—preserving a “political” imaginary that led straight 
to the implicit suspension of practical effect or politics (and more or less 
accompanied the advent of the Bush catastrophe). That anything calling 
itself deconstruction today is not fully immersed in the relative joys of 
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exploring the exitless rhetorical labyrinth of telecratic spells, which are 
the new “commons,” and the anesthetization of the public and private 
spheres, seems curious (and suggests curatorial obsessions). Others arise 
which may give today’s crypto-humanist backwater of “ethical” conun-
dracism and commodified “otherness” chills, having to do with virtual 
and real triage, the counter-cataclysmic choices of geo-engineering and 
bio-engineering. One has entered an irreversible zone before which the 
instincts of deterral, mitigation, sustainability, and the “regressive organi-
cism” (Timothy Morton) of contemporal critical options appears part of 
the complex itself.
Perhaps one is even more in the time of the relapse that mimes the rec-
reation of a semantic enclave, again and again, an oikos, at the heart of “to-
day’s” accelerations. Today, the “political” is repeatedly mourned (Agam-
ben) while the era of post-democracy proceeds; Deleuzians swarm to the 
“affect” or embodiment side of the vessel (Protevi) while zombie “de-
construction” melds into an index of exegetical memoirs and academic 
cohorts (names too numerous to list); the feral eudaimonism and cryp-
to-catholicisms of the “multitude” circulate (Hardt and Negri), while 
“animal studies” crystallizes as an anthropo-colonial dossier of one’s 
pets (Haraway). Culturalists ply on, as the narratives of victimology of 
the 90s are applied to future cyborgs (Hayles); emancipatory faiths deny 
the calculus not of formal democracies to come but of an encircling era 
of techo-feudalism (Lovelock) if not species differentiation (the hyper-
rich) and emerging survival logics (“human rights,” alone, being all but 
irrelevant today), while new media studies revert to the phenomenologi-
cal and pre-critical gesture of restituting a centered “human” (Hansen).19
And, of course, there is what would call itself the “ethical,” which some-
times speaks in a Levinasian gesture to facial otherness (Butler), peace, 
and recognition, and makes the practitioner feel part of the “good” (Ben-
habib). Finally, I suppose, one would include nihilist Lacanians who em-
brace, as the new ground zero, green Christian Leninism (Žižek). What 
emerges when the discourse of mourning (for pasts, for futures) recedes?
One turns from the gaze of this reader of the future, who may wonder 
about all this scrambling to preserve 20th-century legacies and ostrich-
postures from the very discourses that, unfinished, promised to exceed 
that very fold.
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This may cast the spellbound “present”—from the back-glance of read-
ers beyond this generation, however far—in a weak and indulgent light. 
From this perspective, “climate change” arrives as a hyper-referential, 
ruthlessly positive opportunity, the contretemps of contretemps, invis-
ibly welling up from within an-archival programs and interstices. The 
prospect of giving something up—from energy consumption or retire-
ment accounts to semantic investments and academic rituals and nor-
matizations of the latter’s capital—disappears here as it does from the 
cultural programs of hypercapital (see “Copenhagen”). “Deconstruction” 
would not be killed despite innumerable announcements of its death, yet 
it would not have to be, since it would innocently enough commit sui-
cide (as “deconstruction”) in a fashion that an auto-immune moment can 
never read from within itself. Derrida seemed to more or less program 
this. Gambling on the entrée to academic humanism at its arteries and 
the bonding of followers with inheritance prescriptions, Derrida suc-
cumbed at least in part to a calculation of “survival” that he knew would 
be scrambled and dashed. He allowed late deconstruction to enter its 
auto-immune shell, and yet hoped, it seemed, to deliver his text to un-
born readers. The irony would be that, as a matter of survival-relevance, 
Derrida blanked on the defining transmutation in the 21st century. So, if 
there was anxiety as to the turn “deconstruction” would take in the après-
Derrida—between, say, memorialization, canonization, re-circulation, 
mourning rituals, family capital (what band of translators would put up 
the shingle “Derrida & Sons?”), and asking, without a map, where this 
legacy (to speak in familiar codes) might turn and reconfigure itself be-
fore radically emerging 21st-century horizons—well, that seems settled. 
The imbrication of (and with) mourning has been, again, a self-mourning 
that should not be transferred simply to a mourning for disappearing fu-
tures. What emerges to repeat again, when the discourse of mourning 
and face recedes?
Such rituals of maintenance and memorialization preclude questions 
of futurity arising precisely by their hysteria about insisting on a radi-
cally open or promissory to come. Our earlier imagined future dissident 
reader in her stupidity cannot bring to the ghosts of deconstruction irrel-
evant pharmacopic suggestions, with the irritability of future-hindsight. 
She cannot advise: 1) suspend the misread or supposed ban on address-
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ing “futurity,” which penetrates the “present” today as anteriority had—a 
memory of “futures” (Toward 52); 2) break the homogenization of the 
Derridean corpus by releasing incompatible Derridas “at war” with them-
selves; 3) explore without a net how a certain “spirit of deconstruction” 
(as Derrida speaks of a “spirit of Marx”) might enter the contemporane-
ity of a ruptured set of temporal metrics, without a name; 4) practice the 
contretemps against your own rituals of academic capitalization; 5) relin-
quish the mourning posture that re-inscribes its carriers in a groupthink 
which “deconstruction” once (and Derrida always) took as a prime target 
(now that there is no “metaphysics” or it is proven so systemic as to be 
the effect of consignation itself).
If Derrida strategized the production of a “late Derrida” whose sup-
posed “turn” he disowned simultaneously, and this to block the clichés 
of an anti-humanist “post-structuralist” by entering mainstream human-
ist institutions—even to the point of crowd-pleasing caricatures (“de-
construction ‘is’ justice”)—it would be “monstrous” again if in this cal-
culation of survivability Derrida erred: that is, that it would be, precisely, 
the side of Derrida drawn outside the human effect and constitution 
(the oikos) that would arrive, after his death, as the change of referentials 
spawning a 21st century.
Then someone asks: would a living “deconstructive” project not rather 
attempt this third phase on its own—the master leaving this task open, 
incomplete, by default, structurally, like some properly excommunicat-
ing challenge and gift? Which would a contemporary “deconstruction” 
then be: redeploying these energies and strategies, in exploratory fash-
ion, before 21st-century horizons unaccounted for in his text, or block-
ing those out to rehearse, canonize, and normatize a zombie deconstruc-
tion? One would want to say the former, even if (or precisely because) 
that would mean an unrecognizable turn or departure, without proper 
name, without rehearsals, without a net, a deconstruction without “de-
construction” (or Derrideanism). That might mean waiting for yet an-
other generation beyond those pretending to a corporate afterlife, or re-
turning to a romantic promise of the 80s, or restaging familiar motifs in 
conferences (“… and Specters,” “… and Psychoanalysis,” and so on). If 
a hypothetical “late Derrida” was in part a strategic creation, then those 
closest to it (translators, truly significant scholars such as Hägglund re-
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views) would understand that they, too, were to be viral carriers, were to 
be played, in Derrida’s calculations. This decay of the brand falls into and 
echoes with a wider relapse today. The return of Deleuze studies to “af-
fect,” the return to phenomenology, the implicit organicism of post-hu-
manists, various forms of embodiment, and liberationist politics running 
on as if nothing had altered are akin to Obama’s restitution of the term, 
“Wall Street”: a doubling-down in the idioms in which the 20th-century 
had long invested. Thus Clark: “It is far easier for critics to stay inside the 
professionally familiar circle of cultural representations, ideas, ideals, and 
prejudices, than to engage with long-term relations of physical cause and 
effect, or the environmental costs of an infrastructure, questions that in-
volve nonhuman agency and which engage modes of expertise that may 
lie outside the humanities as currently constituted” (Scale, 75). The zom-
bie deconstruction of today—like much else (zombie banks, zombie de-
mocracy)—stands to be reinvigorated by what it can only crash against 
and redistribute itself within, at the sacrifice of (its) capital, and name: 
the ahorizons of “climate change.” What other aporia? Not the “pathos” 
of undecidability. Not the enigma of a “democracy to come” whose non-
existence would be different than even Derrida projected—since the mu-
tations of “formal democracy” in the U.S. or India contain the logic to 
spell, as Arundhati Roy observes, the death-knell of human life on earth 
as such: accelerated hyperconsumption and corporate sovereignty.
Whatever it means for life forms as we know them, climate change is 
destructively wired to and saturates telemorphic circuits of exchange, bi-
osemantic reserves, protocols of personification, perceptual regimes and 
spells, the linguistic hypothesis of a home. It encircles the “present” as a 
hyper-referential that might be considered ruthlessly positive, almost joy-
ously so—at least for thought.
It has been possible to speak, recently, about an emergent “climate 
change subjectivity” that can be mapped, to its disadvantage, as caught 
between a sort of will to save and restore (environmentalism, sustain-
ability) and cognitive deflection (denial, derealization).20 Such suggests 
the emergence of a climate change imaginary that has permeated diverse 
discourses without achieving a common template. Yet rather than track-
ing the arrested doubleness of a “climate change subjectivity” captured 
by the rhetoric of crisis (as misleading as that of apocalypse and linked 
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to it), one can as easily speak of an asubjectality that does not fit into ei-
ther option above, for which the premise of irreversibility (and the posi-
tive apprehension of extinction, say) serve as a point of departure. Such 
a concept presupposes what could be called an anecographic thought, 
un-invested in any proper name it would ennoble or recuperate as legacy. 
It would integrate new referential agencies and decouple from the her-
meneutic reflex of creating an oikos, interiority, home, or “we” in recog-
nizable forms, since it knows it will not recapture a communal politics, a 
metaphysics to deconstruct, or a perpetuation of the familiar conceptual 
preoccupations before aporia that, in fact, have always represented one 
limit of the conceptual machine today—the one which has walked hand 
in hand with the accelerations now disclosed. Those aporia are not hard 
to find, from the global debt trap to the calculus of disappearing reserves. 
What, one might begin again, has writing and archivization ever not had 
to do with metaphysics (if that ever existed) and the hydrocarbon era, ink 
with oil, perceptual programmings determined prehistorically with telec-
ratically induced anaesthetics today? The geomorphic fold occurs at the 
rim of the mnemo-scape that Derrida would patrol, hold vigil over end-
lessly, invent into, dart beyond, but restrict himself and at times turn back 
into rhetorically as by a contract to a readership or a constitutive blind. 
Metaphysics never “existed,” of course, could not be made the pretext of a 
deconstruction, would turn out to have been all along a referential reflex 
and hermeneutic effect sanctioned by the social imaginary it conjures. 
This war between Derridas (the Derridawars) might now be read togeth-
er with the invisible ones that encircle the earth today, autogenic, acceler-
ant, forecasting not only the obvious “to comes” (water wars, survivalist 
contests) but those internal to the global system—the spitting away of a 
hyper-plutocratic class separated in near-speciesist terms and the pros-
pect of techno-feudal states before an era of global population culling.21
Notes
1. Jacques Derrida, “Autoimmunity—Real and Symbolic Suicides”, in Giovanna 
Borrodori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and 
Jacques Derrida, 85–136.
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2. David Wood, “Specters of Derrida—On the Way To Econstruction”, in 
Ecospirit: Religions and Philosophies for the Earth, 264–290.
3. Timothy Clark, “Toward a Deconstructive Environmental Criticism”, Oxford 
Literary Review, 30:1 (2008), 44–68.
4. Ben Dibley and Brett Neilson, in “Climate Crisis and the Actuarial 
Imaginary: The War on Global Warming,” open this prospect: “What kind of 
subject, then, is the political subject of climate crisis? In so far as this subject 
partakes in a fluctuation between cosmopolitan recognition and the fetishist’s 
denial, it seems to remain caught in the antinomies of modern citizenship: 
between membership and exclusion, rights and duties, participation and 
representation, formal equality and substantive inequalities, and so on. 
Whatever else this oscillation might imply—which is to say, however emptied 
of meaning it and its formal correlate of citizenship might be—it sets the 
terms by which crisis after crisis is defined on the cusp of modernity’s 
exhaustion. In the delicate environment of the earth’s atmosphere, this 
exhaustion manifests itself as an excess of greenhouse emissions, depletion of 
fossil fuels, acidification of the oceans and warming of the air. The exhaustion 
of modernity is not just some pretty theoretical trope. However, the ways it is 
figured in accounts of risk varies widely” (147).
5. One could identify less obvious sites relatively marginal to these investments 
that open ex-anthropic corridors which Derrida, nonetheless, chose not to 
highlight (and which would likely have cost him in terms of readership and 
brand). “Violence and Metaphysics” exceeds and renders peculiar much 
that latter involves the appropriation of Levinasian tropes of “otherness” (as 
Martin Hägglund implies), and even “Structure, Sign and Play” addresses 
in closing yet another “dance” or metrics, as does Specters of Marx’s “visor-
effect”? On Touching seems to perform at a certain limit of the archive which 
he does not want to cross over from, instead continually turning back to 
remind scions, as if yet again, of the deconstruction of phenomenology—a 
perpetual point of departure for Derrida that might be supposed, by then, 
to be simply subsumed. And there remains the least political and least 
humanisable zone, the unusable and depersonified non-site of khora, where 
inscriptions are posited out of which perceptual worlds and mnemotechnics 
occur—the non-site at which a “politics of memory” would need be violently 
and otherwise hypothesized.
6. Derrida describes this activity in Archive Fever: “Consignation aims to 
coordinate a single corpus, in a system or a synchrony in which all the 
elements articulate the unity of an ideal configuration. In an archive, there 
should not be any absolute dissociation, any heterogeneity or secret which 
could separate (secernere), or partition, in an absolute manner. The archontic 
principle of the archive is also a principle of consignation, that is, of gathering 
together” (10).
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7. J. Hillis Miller’s For Derrida finds itself speaking “for” Derrida as if against 
trends of appropriation called Derridean today. Peter Sloterdijk addresses a 
“post-Derridean situation” in Derrida, An Egyptian: On the Problem of the Jewish 
Pyramid, querying a reading that would be “an antidote to the dangers of a 
cultic reception” (xiii). He ventriloquizes Boria Groys as “convinced that the 
work of philosophy from the neo-Derridean position can only continue if its 
carriers change direction and do something else. One could define the change 
of direction … in the après-Derrida in the following terms: where there was 
grammatology, there must now be museology—the later could be termed 
archival theory” (69). Groys “enquires as to the transformation of mere life 
through its transference to the archive. Of all Derrida’s readers, he is the one 
who honours him by leaving the paths of imitation and exegesis” (72).
8. Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx (77–82). Derrida later takes up and 
complicates the chosen number “ten” of this section (fingers, the digital) 
in ways of that would be of interest to read with and against the my 
remarks here (142).
9. Thus Clark in “Derangement of Scale”: “Reconfiguring a notion of the 
subjectivity as openness to the other etc., instead of an autonomous self-
presence, and attention to aporias of freedom/equality and conditional 
and unconditional hospitality, do not alter the basic terms of Derrida‘s 
commitment to a liberal progressivist tradition whose assumptions of scale 
are here at issue.”
10. Slavoj Žižek in “Nature and its Discontents” (67–8), proffers a Benjaminian 
mode of active interventions in virtual pasts prefaced by a complete 
assumption of the “catastrophe” premised on Jean-Pierre Dupuy’s Pour un 
catastrophisme eclaire.
11. Slavoj Žižek is one of few theorists to engage these impasses directly in 
First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, where he weaponises the zero-degree logics 
of “ecological catastrophe” in a jeremiad against the decade’s “critical Left.” 
For Žižek the logic of eco-catastrophe benefits from specifically Christian 
apocalyptics, which he would appropriate for a sort of green Christo-
Leninist global conversion. (83) The heritage of apocalyptic thought would 
be retained but diverted: “Perhaps the solution resides in an eschatological 
apocalypticism which does not involve the fantasy of the symbolic Last 
Judgment” (132).
12. Alternately, the term “environmentalism” has already evolved into its others, 
and been targeted by some scientists as harmful, a diversion from the eco-
catastrophic real at this late date, its logics no different than the phantom of 
geo-engineering (our missing Plan B) it often eschews, the management of a 
totally artificed “environment,” and so on. That includes entrapping moralism, 
theotropisms, and a concept of the local (environs) that accelerates the 
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cataclysms it would impede. See “Are environmentalists bad for the planet?” 
by John Rowlatt: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00q3cnl/>.
13. Johanna Zylinska, “Bioethics Otherwise, or, How to Live with Machines, 
Humans, and Other Animals”: In this piece, Zylinska examines how today’s 
animalists’ recurrent focus on their empathic relations to subordinate pet 
mammals (cats, dogs, horses) has delimited a discourse that waivers between 
an extended anthropism and soft humanism—implying that, rather than 
projecting outward identification with favorite domesticated mammals 
(“being undone by pet love”) one must begin to read backwards from 
microbes, insects, and so on, toward the human construct: “what happens if 
this animal is not just a dog, a cat or a horse from the family of befriended or 
domestic animals, but rather a parasite, bacteria or fungus?” A recent example 
of how a sort of masked regression is constitutive of “animal studies,” is Cary 
Wolfe’s “Cognitive Science, Deconstruction, and (Post)Humanist (Non)
Humans”, where one is given a critical review of animal theorists as if pivoting 
around a Derrida citation. Wolfe bases his address on explaining to readers 
that “language” matters, an echolalic offering from 80’s deconstruction 
emerging in a time-warp, and concludes that while he doesn’t know if he is 
or is not a post-human, we must approach with “humility” the thought of 
animalian subjects.
14. I have tried, in “Toxic Assets: Paul de Man and the Ecocatastrophic 
Imaginary,” to sketch an anti-genealogy of the “late Derrida” in relation 
to the suicidal deconstruction of Paul de Man and the former’s rhetorical 
adjustments to the latter’s crashed brand with the “de Man affair” or its threat 
to deconstruction (intentional or otherwise). The import I suggest is that, left 
in the wake of this decision and its ramifications for Derrida’s strategy, is the 
occlusion of a different “materiality” (contrary to Derrida’s deft appropriation 
as a “materiality without matter”) what would be a “matter without 
‘materiality’” that is irreversibly ex-anthropic.
15. That disappearance of an originary violence is charted by Martin Hägglund’s 
Radical Atheism—Derrida and the Time of Life as a systemic relapse and return 
to theotropisms by many of his foremost commentators, in the mode of 
exegesis, attendant to the construction of a “late Derrida” focused on religion, 
ethics, and politics.
16. See my “Toxic Assets.”
17. Clark: “Of Hospitality (2000) argues how the supposedly inviolable interiority 
of the home is already de-constituted, turned inside-out, by its multiple 
embeddings in public space, the state, the telephone line, monitored 
emails etc., yet there is residual idealism in Derrida’s exclusive attention to 
systems of law and communication. The focus on the moment of decision 
in individual consciousness and its pathos (its ordeal of undecidablity etc.) 
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seems narrow and inadequate in a context in which things have now become 
overwhelmingly more political than people” (Scale).
18. “Environmentalism” can be heard, today, not at the effort to bring about a 
successful green infrastructure but a long surpassed premise, one understood, 
in any case, as positioned today reactively and as a techno-managerial 
ideology. It segues seamlessly into the reactive geo-engineering experiments 
to come (the missing Plan B), for which all environments would be artificially 
serviced, a park-earth managed by technocrats. If Copenhagen publicly 
indexed the impossibility of a global response to ecocatastrophe, the follow 
up, Cancun, seems to have turned the corner in accepting its irreversibility by 
turning to issues of adaption rather than pre-emption. In so doing, it put on 
display where Capital, too, anticipates the prospects of geo-engineering as a 
profitable target of industrialization itself.
19. Timothy Morton, in Ecology without Nature, opens a critique of how the 
writing of nature indexed to a misreading of Romanticist tropes has become 
endemic to critical thought itself—which he terms ecomimesis. That is, the 
manner in which an oikos is perpetually re-posited out of mimetic ideology 
or practices he terms “beautiful soulism”: “the “new organicism is possibly 
even stranger than the old one. In the new organicisim, ‘emergent’ formal 
organization—compared with the growth of flowers or the spread of 
clouds—depends upon the operation of some essentially algorhythmic 
process.” (191) From this perspective—which Morton gothically tropes as 
“dark ecology” without redemptive traits or reflexes—he opens a critical 
auto-deconstruction, of sorts, of contemporary critical idioms which he finds 
shaped, repeatedly, as “regressive organicism.” It is in this sense, transposed, 
that Žižek excoriates the ecological itself as the repository of residual ideology 
(or ideation) today.
20. Ben Dibley and Brett Neilson, in “Climate Crisis and the Actuarial 
Imaginary: The War on Global Warming,” open this prospect: “What kind of 
subject, then, is the political subject of climate crisis? In so far as this subject 
partakes in a fluctuation between cosmopolitan recognition and the fetishist’s 
denial, it seems to remain caught in the antinomies of modern citizenship: 
between membership and exclusion, rights and duties, participation and 
representation, formal equality and substantive inequalities, and so on. 
Whatever else this oscillation might imply—which is to say, however emptied 
of meaning it and its formal correlate of citizenship might be—it sets the 
terms by which crisis after crisis is defined on the cusp of modernity’s 
exhaustion. In the delicate environment of the earth’s atmosphere, this 
exhaustion manifests itself as an excess of greenhouse emissions, depletion of 
fossil fuels, acidification of the oceans and warming of the air. The exhaustion 
of modernity is not just some pretty theoretical trope. However, the ways it is 
figured in accounts of risk varies widely” (147).
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21. In America this is an open secret, now, with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision to equate corporations with individual rights: the zombie 
“individual” without body controlling the entire façade.
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Chapter 2
Autopoiesis and the Planet
Bruce Clarke
The biosphere as a whole is autopoietic in the sense 
that it maintains itself.… Planetary physiology 
… is the autopoiesis of the cell writ large.
– Margulis and Sagan, What is Life?
From its inception in 1971 as a cybernetic theory of biological form, to 
its current presence on research fronts extending from immunology to 
Earth system science to sociology, from geobiology, artificial life, and 
cognitive science to a range of literary and cultural theories, the concept 
of autopoiesis has developed on the margins, not in the strongholds, of 
mainstream Anglo-American science. It may be that its persistent Conti-
nental and countercultural vogue has made it suspect there, and also, that 
its outsider status within this scientific academy has increased its extra-
scientific traffic. Additionally, as a recent Italian commentator has point-
ed out, “autopoiesis originated in a time-window (the early 1970s) when 
the world of biology was completely dominated by a vision of DNA and 
RNA as the holy grail of life. Alternative views about the mechanism of 
life didn’t have much chance of appearing in mainstream journals” (Luisi, 
“Autopoiesis” 179). The concept of autopoiesis is interesting, then, for 
its multifarious cultural history, itinerant discursive career, and contrar-
ian stance. Moreover, it has been particularly important for enabling mi-
crobiologist Lynn Margulis to outline a second-order form of Gaia theory 
(see Clarke, “Neocybernetics”). Here I will connect the conceptual link-
age of autopoiesis and Gaia theory to the wider discourse of self-referen-
tial systems.
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Autopoiesis marks a reorientation “from interest in design and control 
to an interest in autonomy and environmental sensitivity, from planning 
to evolution, from structural stability to dynamic stability” (Luhmann, 
Social Systems 10). In this remark, social systems theorist Niklas Luhmann 
glosses the distinction of his cybernetic mentor, Heinz von Foerster, be-
tween first- and second-order cybernetics (see Foerster, ed., Cybernetics). 
First-order cybernetics is hetero-referential, it concerns “objects” such as 
natural or technological systems. Second-order cybernetics observes the 
self-reference of “subjects,” that is, the necessary recursivity of cognitive 
systems capable of producing observations in the first place. However, 
from the recursive logic of second-order cybernetics it follows that the 
traditional distinction between objects and subjects is (un)grounded in 
the primary self-reference of observing systems (see Luhmann, “Cog-
nitive Program”). In Autopoiesis and Cognition (Maturana and Varela), 
the inventors of the concept made their definitive case for considering 
autopoietic systems, such as living cells, cognitive—not merely as ob-
served systems but more fundamentally as observing systems. As a part of 
the process of its self-making operation, a biological autopoietic system 
produces and maintains a boundary, a membrane by which to regulate 
cognitions of its environment. Bound up in a higher-order reiteration of 
those same dynamics, we cannot look at Gaia as a planetary whole with-
out looking, self-referentially, at ourselves, a part of Gaia, looking at Gaia. 
In either case, “objectivity” is surpassed by participation.
The system concept in its proper theorization denotes a complex en-
semble unified in such a way that a process emerges from, and only from, 
the interdependent interactions of those elements. Systems theory at-
tends to both the elements and the processes of the systems it observes, 
precisely because in self-referential systems those elements are them-
selves the products of those processes—just as, in the Gaian view, the 
forms of living organisms coevolve along with the forms of their envi-
ronments. Autopoiesis and Gaia fit together as interlocking, micro- and 
macro- modes of systems theory: biological autopoiesis defines the mini-
mal formal requirements for living systems, beginning with the cell, and 
Gaia captures the “planetary physiology” of the biosphere, for which the 
atmosphere is the autopoietic membrane.
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Both theories participate in the travails of an epistemological transition 
by which the contingencies of self-referential systems now determine the 
bottom line of any possible observation. “Constructivism is the form as-
sumed in reflection on the system of science facing its own extravaganc-
es” (Luhmann, “Cognitive Program” 151). The periodic ups and down of 
Gaia theory, as that concept of planetary self-reference and self-regula-
tion has crossed between scientific and cultural discourse at large, bears 
out the travails of this transition. However, in the current upheavals in 
the Earth system as observed with reference to the place of the human 
within planetary dynamics, the climate crisis has made the stakes of these 
throes of transformation even clearer. If we are to render our technosci-
entific culture fit for the long term, then we will have to complete a perva-
sive redistribution of the ways that knowledge, scientific and otherwise, 
is constructed and communicated. A systems-theoretical observation of 
our geobiological situation within the planet we inhabit is a good place to 
start this rebooting of interrelations between science and society.
Both autopoiesis and Gaia (in its original form as the Gaia hypothesis) 
were first published in the same year, 1974. Their conceptual histories 
have become significantly intertwined. But to begin with, Gaia theory 
has been if anything more controversial and more widely disseminated 
than the discourse of autopoiesis. In a 2004 article, the Dutch paleontol-
ogist and emeritus professor of geophysiology at Leiden University, Peter 
Westbroek, offers an account of his own scientific development focused 
on the advent of the Gaia concept. He begins by evoking his participa-
tion in a scientific meeting convened in San Diego in 1988 to debate the 
Gaia theory. The counter-arguments at that meeting were so critical that 
for a while Westbroek backed away from Gaian science. However, by the 
2000 Gaia theory meeting in Valencia, Spain, even some of the skeptics 
of 1988, such as geophysicist Jim Kasting of Penn State University, had 
come around. For Westbroek, the improved fortunes of Gaia theory in 
the new millennium have been part of “the new wind blowing through 
the earth and life sciences since the beginning of the ’90s. The geologi-
cal forces of life are hot stuff at present, as are gaian feedbacks; new sci-
entific journals appear on ‘Biogeology’ and ‘Earth System Science,’ while 
the old ones eagerly compete for copy in this burgeoning field” (West-
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broek, “Gaia” 415). But as Westbroek admits, in mainstream science Gaia 
remains hands-off:
And Gaia, what about Gaia? When you look through the lit-
erature you can hardly find a trace of it. Research on Gaia is 
OK, but do not mention that name if you want a job! Gaia 
is taboo. The scientific inquisition is watching you. With the 
primacy of physics evaporated and global biology on its way, 
what else is standing in the way of Gaia? The problem is epis-
temology. (415)
Landing square in the midst of the epistemological upheavals of post-
classical science, both autopoiesis and Gaia theory are roiled by the 
philosophical turmoil centered on systems theory. As Gregory Bateson 
once remarked in conversation with Stewart Brand about the millennial 
implications of cybernetics: “We didn’t realize then (at least I didn’t real-
ize it, though McCulloch may have) that the whole of logic would have 
to be reconstructed for recursiveness” (Brand, “For God’s Sake” 33). All 
of our systems are in turmoil, and so are the theoretical bases by which 
we try to understand how these systems operate. Taken together, the sys-
tems concepts of autopoiesis and Gaia epitomize a shift in the aims of 
scientific rationality, from instrumental control without due regard for 
environmental ramifications, to the observation and integrated coordina-
tion of system/environment relations. They entail more reflective ethical 
stances toward such contingencies of interrelation. An autopoietic read-
ing of Gaia theory, as advanced by several prominent bioscientists and 
systems theorists, allows that premier model for the recursive turn in sec-
ond-order systems theory to scale up from cellular dynamics to psychic, 
social, and planetary systematics. The autopoiesis of the planet links life, 
mind, society, and biosphere, even in their systemic differentiations, in a 
way that threads the world with a common mode of operation-in-con-
text. Second-order systems theory thus creates a conceptual framework 
large enough to contain and sufficiently complex to guide the requisite 
thinking of ecosystematic interconnectedness thrust upon us by the lit-
eral climate crisis.
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The Evolution of Autopoiesis
A certain renegade and globetrotting streak runs through the pedigree of 
autopoiesis. The concept was invented by the Chilean biologists Hum-
berto Maturana and Francisco Varela, and initially vetted by the Austri-
an-émigré cyberneticist Heinz von Foerster. The concept of autopoiesis 
may be traced in utero within Maturana’s 1970 paper “Neurophysiology 
of Cognition.” In this essay, the particular physiology of cognitive pro-
cessing in the nervous system is referred back to that of living systems in 
general: “Although the nervous system expands the domain of interac-
tions of the organism by bringing into this domain interactions with pure 
relations, the function of the nervous system is subservient to the neces-
sary circularity of the living organization” (Maturana, “Neurophysiol-
ogy” 8). In 1971, Maturana and Varela coined the neologism of autopoi-
esis as a singular term for this cluster of interrelated concepts—circular 
organization, operational closure, and self-referring processes, a name for 
the self-referential or recursive form of the “organization of the living.” 
With an acknowledgment of von Foerster’s assistance in translating and 
placing the article, the first English-language publication of the concept 
of autopoiesis occurred in 1974:
The autopoietic organization is defined as a unity by a net-
work of productions of components which (i) participate 
recursively in the same network of productions of compo-
nents which produced these components, and (ii) realize the 
network of productions as a unity in the space in which the 
components exist. Consider for example the case of a cell: it 
is a network of chemical reactions which produce molecules 
such that (i) through their interactions [they] generate and 
participate recursively in the same network of reactions which 
produced them, and (ii) realize the cell as a material unity. 
(Varela, Maturana, and Uribe, “Autopoiesis” 188).
At its inception, the discourse of autopoiesis was coupled directly to a 
self-referential description of the cognitive process that produces the dis-
course. Observed both as and by an autopoietic operation, the minimal 
organization of life, the cell, takes the form of a closed circular process 
of self-production (autopoiesis) within a system open to environmen-
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tal interaction (cognition). In other words, while the environment can 
(and must) feed such a system, and can bring about responses within 
the system that compensate for environmental perturbations, neither 
the environment nor the observers it contains can operate (or control) 
the system. All mythical tales and literary fantasies to the contrary, life 
cannot be endowed from without. Open to the material-energetic flux of 
its environment, an autopoietic system is closed or “information-tight” 
in the sense that it is self-operating, or autonomous. It self-maintains the 
continuous production of the components that bind and replenish the 
system that produces the components that bind and replenish the sys-
tem, and so on, until or unless the co-realization of the living system and 
its medium can no longer conserve their co-adaptation, and the lapse of 
autopoiesis induces the death of the system.
The inclinations of both Maturana and Varela were to tamp down ef-
forts by others to extend autopoiesis beyond biological systems. They in-
sisted on its delimitation to the realm of molecular dynamics, on its mate-
rial specificity as a membrane-bounded process of biological production. 
As Varela put it in 1980, “autopoiesis is a particular case of a larger class 
of organizations that can be called organizationally closed, that is, defined 
through indefinite recursion of component relations”; however, it “is 
tempting to confuse autopoiesis with organizational closure and living 
autonomy with autonomy in general” (Varela, “Describing” 37). With 
regard to social systems, he was quite definitive: “Unless a careful distinc-
tion is made between the particular (autopoiesis and productions)”—
meaning that in autopoiesis proper, the system produces itself, produces 
the very elements that compose it as a system—“and the general (orga-
nizational closure and general computations), the notion of autopoiesis 
becomes a metaphor and loses its power. This is what has happened, in 
my view, with attempts to apply autopoiesis directly to social systems” 
(Ibid. 38). Varela’s particular concern is warranted for theories that posit 
persons as the elements “produced” by social systems. Placing the auto-
poiesis of social systems on a non-metaphorical basis would have to lo-
cate an alternative rationale.
Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory has arguably established a 
properly non-metaphorical approach to the autopoiesis of social systems. 
Luhmann proceeds like so: “If we abstract from life and define autopoi-
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esis as a general form of system building using self-referential closure, we 
would have to admit that there are nonliving autopoietic systems, differ-
ent modes of autopoietic reproduction, and that there are general prin-
ciples of autopoietic organization that materialize as life, but also in other 
modes of circularity and self-reproduction” (Luhmann, “Autopoiesis” 2). 
So far this could appear to conform to Varela’s notion of “the general (or-
ganizational closure and general computations),” that is, to no more than 
a metaphorical extension of closure in the absence of self-production. 
What maintains Luhmann’s social appropriation as autopoiesis proper is 
that “the particular (autopoiesis and productions)” is supplied by commu-
nication itself. In social autopoiesis, communications are the social prod-
ucts that continuously reproduce the system of further communications.
Social systems use communication as their particular mode 
of autopoietic reproduction. Their elements are communi-
cations that are recursively produced and reproduced by a 
network of communications and that cannot exist outside of 
such a network. Communications are not “living” units, they 
are not “conscious” units, they are not “actions.” Their unity 
requires a synthesis of three selections, namely information, 
utterance, and understanding (including misunderstanding). 
This synthesis is produced by the network of communication, 
not by some kind of inherent power of consciousness, nor by 
the inherent quality of the information. (Ibid. 3)
Further, Luhmann observes the operational differentiation but “inter-
penetration” of social and psychic systems. Both are autopoietic. Either 
co-emerges with the other; either presents the immediate environment 
of the operation of the other. For both, the elements of autopoietic self-
production are the forms of systemic events proper to each: events of 
consciousness for psychic systems, events of communication for social 
systems: “In the areas of the theory of consciousness or the theory of 
communication, the event-character of elements that cannot be further 
dissolved forces itself upon us. A sentence is a sentence, it is spoken when 
it is spoken, and no longer afterwards and not yet before. A thought or 
a perception, when I see something, is current in this moment and no 
longer afterwards and not yet before, so that the event-character of the 
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operations becomes obvious” (Luhmann, “Self-Organization” 150). 
However, biological autopoiesis has its own clock with regard to the 
material-energetic contingencies of metabolic self-production: “The for-
mal definition of autopoiesis gives no indication about the span of time 
during which components exist Conscious systems and social systems 
have to produce their own decay. They produce their basic elements, i.e., 
thoughts and communications, not as short-term states but as events that 
vanish as soon as they appear. Events too occupy a minimal span of time, 
a specious present, but their duration is a matter of definition and has to 
be regulated by the autopoietic system itself: events cannot be accumu-
lated” (Luhmann, “Autopoiesis” 8–9).
Over numerous volumes published from the 1970s to the 1990s Luh-
mann carried out the most rigorous and pervasive extension of autopoi-
esis outside of biological research in particular and the scientific academy 
proper. Above and beyond its own ongoing establishment in sociology, 
legal studies, literary theory, media theory, and other discursive disci-
plines, Luhmann’s work can deepen and augment the other discourses of 
autopoiesis specific to other environments and modes of system produc-
tion. We must get past whatever idiosyncratic preferences stand in the 
way of integrating biological, psychic, and social autopoiesis into a com-
prehensive systems theory adequate to contemporary hypercomplexi-
ties and the manifold of environmental challenges our current systems 
confront. The autopoietic reformulation of Gaia theory is one important 
vector for this conceptual integration.
The Evolution of Gaia
Along one line of development, then, the concept of autopoiesis has un-
folded with second-order systems theory as a discourse of epistemologi-
cal constructivism. Here autopoiesis has been exported beyond its origi-
nal living borders into the realms of mind and society—the metabiotic 
organizations of consciousness and communication that have emerged 
from the evolution (or Gaian proliferation) of living systems. In this realm 
Luhmann’s theory stands out as the most successful and far-ranging exa-
ptation of autopoiesis to metabiotic systems theory. Many observers con-
sider Luhmann’s definition of the elements processed by social autopoi-
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esis as communicative events (as opposed to, in the biological instance, 
molecular dynamics) and his subsequent specification of the temporal-
ization of autopoiesis to be his primary innovations, his most important 
contributions to the field of general systems theory. Along another line of 
development, as we have noted, autopoiesis has been brought up to the 
level of the biosphere with geobiological systems theories of planetary 
regulation, the Gaia theory of James Lovelock as elaborated, following 
some critical commentaries given by Varela himself, by Lynn Margulis.
In the final chapter of her memoir Symbiotic Planet, Lynn Margulis nar-
rates the first-order cybernetic framework of Lovelock’s original Gaia hy-
pothesis: “The term Gaia was suggested to Lovelock by the novelist Wil-
liam Golding Lovelock asked his neighbor whether he could replace the 
cumbersome phrase ‘a cybernetic system with homeostatic tendencies as 
detected by chemical anomalies in the Earth’s atmosphere’ with a term 
meaning ‘Earth.’ ‘I need a good four-letter word.’ … The name caught on 
all too well” (Margulis, Symbiotic Planet 118). Lovelock’s initial hypoth-
esis had modeled the sum of the biota as a thermostat controlling the vi-
ability of the abiotic environment. As its critics were quick to point out, 
the limitations of this scheme were several. For one, it overcompensated 
for traditional geoevolutionary accounts, in which life always played the 
passive partner having to adapt itself to the whims of a capricious and 
overbearing environment, by placing life itself over and in charge of its en-
vironment. For another, this biocentric version of Gaia in turn prompted 
Lovelock to venture the first-order cybernetic vocabulary of optimization, 
looking at the cybernetics of Gaia as one would at the engineering of a 
control mechanism.
In the development of his hypothesis into a theory, by the later 1980s 
Lovelock had both relinquished the rhetoric of optimization—at least 
to the extent of replacing notions of optimal with, at best, viable—and 
brought life and Earth back into realignment as a coupled meta-system. 
Gaia theory integrates life with its terrestrial environment into a geobio-
logical system whose coevolution has been a composite phenomenon of 
co-emergence, bounded by a self-organized atmosphere filtering the in-
put of solar radiation:
Through Gaia theory, I see the Earth and the life it bears as a 
system, a system that has the capacity to regulate the tempera-
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ture and the composition of the Earth’s surface and to keep 
it comfortable for living organisms. The self-regulation of the 
system is an active process driven by the free energy available 
from sunlight Gaia had first been seen from space and the ar-
guments used were from thermodynamics. To me it was obvi-
ous that the Earth was alive in the sense that it is a self-orga-
nizing and self-regulating system. (Lovelock, Ages of Gaia 31)
But in point of fact, Lovelock has never entirely relinquished his com-
mitment to “strong Gaia”—the conviction that Gaia is in some sense 
alive, even if only, as here, in virtue of its being a system. Varela once called 
Lovelock out on this orientation, in terms of, with reference to the the-
ory itself, “some of the more animistic notions that have parasitized it” 
(Thompson, ed., Gaia 2 211). In her account of Gaia in Symbiotic Planet, 
discussing Lovelock’s tendentious troping of the properly scientific sys-
tem-concept of Gaia, Margulis confessed:
I regret this personification Gaia, the system, emerges from 
ten million or more connected living species that form its 
incessantly active body Gaia … is not an organism directly 
selected among many. It is an emergent property of interac-
tion among organisms, the spherical planet on which they 
reside, and an energy source, the sun. (Margulis, Symbiotic 
Planet 118–19)
Restated in the terms I use to distinguish biological from social auto-
poiesis, Margulis is saying that, literally considered, Gaia is not a biotic 
but a metabiotic system.
Let us briefly trace the development of this second-order Gaia theory. 
CoEvolution Quarterly for Summer 1975 presented the first publication 
of the Gaia hypothesis in a non-specialist journal. Margulis and Lovelock 
led their readers into the topic with a seventeenth-century engraving and 
a discussion of Harvey’s demonstration of the circulatory system of the 
body, presenting this earlier discovery as an analogy for the atmosphere’s 
Gaian role as a circulatory system in relation to the planetary “body” 
(Margulis and Lovelock, “Atmosphere”). Fatefully, however, to this more 
popular article was appended a separate section titled “Gaia and Cyber-
netics,” an excerpt from a more technical piece that had been published 
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the year before, with Lovelock rather than Margulis as the lead author 
(Lovelock and Margulis, “Atmospheric Homeostasis”). That excerpt 
gave mathematical formulae for the application of Shannon and Weaver’s 
information theory to the thermodynamics of living systems. The next 
number of CoEvolution Quarterly devoted an entire page to a letter to the 
editor from Maturana and Varela’s colleague Heinz von Foerster, assert-
ing defects in the information theory presented in “Gaia and Cybernet-
ics.” Nonetheless, von Foerster supported the main innovations of that 
presentation: “I found Lovelock’s and Margulis’s ideas too important 
to see them becoming vulnerable because of deficiencies of a different 
kind. As a comment on their—or anybody else’s—classification of Life 
I suggest that you reproduce ‘Autopoiesis: The Organization of Living 
Systems, its Characterization and a Model’” (Foerster, “Gaia’s Cybernet-
ics”). Von Foerster’s constructive criticism is to my knowledge the first 
and original suggestion of a relation between the cybernetics of Gaia and 
the theory of autopoiesis as a description of the operational organization 
of living systems.
Erich Jantsch’s The Self-Organizing Universe of 1980 took autopoiesis in 
the opposite direction from Luhmann, back to the abiotic nexus of dis-
sipative structures, and then, forward once more to the singular super-
organic system of Gaia. Jantsch aligned the concepts of self-organization 
and evolution to connect emergent forms in physics and biology to cos-
mological events and cultural repercussions. Given that autopoiesis can 
be construed as a theory of minimal life emerging from prebiotic auto-
catalytic processes, underscored by its readiness for computer modeling 
as such, Jantsch proceeded to backdate the evolution of autopoiesis from 
biotic cells to abiotic chemical reaction systems: “In the more than 3000 
million years before the appearance of the first multicellular organisms, 
three main levels of autopoietic existence appear: dissipative structures, 
prokaryotes and eukaryotes. In macroevolution, however, the identifica-
tion of autopoietic levels is more difficult. Nevertheless it seems that the 
prokaryotes are matched on the macroscopic branch by the autopoietic 
Gaia system” ( Jantsch, Self-Organizing Universe 131).
Jantsch alluded here to the now broadly accepted account of Lynn 
Margulis’s serial endosymbiosis theory: all nucleated cells (eukaryotes) 
evolved from the viable merger of distinct forms of bacteria (prokary-
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otes) (see Margulis, Symbiosis). Even before the appearance of eukary-
otes about 1.5 billion years ago, Margulis and Lovelock have argued, once 
the bacteria had achieved critical mass on their own and blue-greened the 
planet, the phenomenon of biospherical self-regulation binding the biota 
and their total geological environment into an emergent whole earth sys-
tem—Gaia—had already appeared (see Lovelock, Ages of Gaia; Margulis 
and Sagan, What is Life?). While Jantsch may be said to have stretched 
the idea of autopoiesis too thinly over multiple arenas of application, his 
was nonetheless a seminal grasp of its possibilities as a unifying concept 
within systems theory. And while von Foerster was likely the first to put 
the two concepts side by side, without suggesting that Gaia was itself au-
topoietic, Jantsch may have been the first to directly assert the autopoi-
etic nature of the Gaia system.
In 1988, Lovelock, Margulis, and Varela participated in a Gaia theory 
symposium in Italy. Its vigorous concluding symposium began with Va-
rela’s lengthy assessment and critique of Lovelock’s Gaia theory. His tour 
de force of scientific conversation provides a definitive second-order cy-
bernetic perspective on Lovelock’s first-order orientation. First of all, as 
mentioned above, Varela addressed Lovelock’s continued use of phras-
ings that hypostatize the “life” of Gaia, and he implicitly suggested for 
that complex coupling of biotic and abiotic component systems, instead, 
a generalization of the discourse of biotic autopoiesis allowing for the 
“living-like” operational autonomy of metabiotic systems:
Jim has made it very clear … that Gaia cannot be described as 
other than having the quality of life But it seems to me that this 
difficult issue can perhaps be helped and clarified by making a 
distinction It is the difference between being alive, which is an 
elusive and somewhat metaphorical concept, and a broader 
concept, which is perhaps easier to tackle, that of autonomy. 
The quality we see in Gaia as being living-like, to me is the fact 
that it is a fully autonomous system … whose fundamental 
organization corresponds to operational closure Operational 
closure is a form, if you like, of fully self-referential network 
constitution that specifies its own identity Autonomy, in the 
sense of full operational closure, is the best way of describing 
that living-like quality of Gaia, and … the use of the concept 
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of autonomy might liberate the theory from some of the more 
animistic notions that have parasitized it. (cited in Thompson, 
ed., Gaia 2 211)
Although Varela would not have put it this way, the recognition that 
there are metabiotic modes of autonomy based on autopoietic closure—
that broadly considered, as Luhmann has argued, autopoiesis describes 
a general mode of systemic self-reference, one form of which is biologi-
cal—underwrites the extension of autopoiesis to a properly metabiotic 
observation of Gaia.
Margulis’s later adaptations of autopoiesis to Gaia theory appear to 
have been informed by the points Varela expressed in this exchange: “The 
simplest, smallest known autopoietic entity is a single bacterial cell. The 
largest is probably Gaia—life and its environment-regulating behavior at 
the Earth’s surface. Cells and Gaia display a general property of autopoi-
etic entities: as their surroundings change unpredictably, they maintain 
their structural integrity and internal organization, at the expense of solar 
energy, by remaking and interchanging their parts” (Margulis, “Big Trou-
ble” 267, 269). Margulis and Sagan would seem to echo Varela again in 
the way that they have stressed Gaia’s participation in, rather than identity 
with, the form of life per se: “The biosphere as a whole is autopoietic in 
the sense that it maintains itself As an autopoietic system, Gaia therefore 
shares an essential quality with individual living systems” (Margulis and 
Sagan, What is Life? 20).
In short, the biologist Margulis has effectively remediated the chemist 
Lovelock’s homeostatic or first-order cybernetic animism—that is, she 
has followed a second-order systems-theoretical resolution of the central 
problem with the overly “strong” form of the Gaia concept. If Gaia is “not 
an organism,” but is, nonetheless, “an autopoietic system,” then Margulis 
has essentially retraced for Gaia a metabiotic course parallel to that by 
which Luhmann has carried the theory of autopoiesis over into the meta-
biotic co-emergence of psychic and social systems, consciousness and 
communication. This suggests that one could point to the formal echoes 
of these operational parallels among autopoietic systems to account for 
the powerful ways that Gaia has always propagated its prosopopoeias 
within meaning systems. That is, the Gaian system’s overlapping forms 
of life and Earth resonate with the forms of human psychic and social 
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systems, and these system/environment frequencies go all the way down 
and all the way out. Gaia’s systemic resonance for consciousness and 
communication produces both its mythic and its scientific faces—its pri-
mal intuitions, its historical articulations, and its belated re-cognitions.
The Autopoietic Planet
As the conversation around Varela’s critique of Gaia theory at the 1988 
symposium continued, the conceptual shift from first- to second-order 
cybernetic models—from homeostatic regulation to autopoietic recur-
sion—became more explicit. Varela went on to discuss the complex 
adaptability of Gaia’s ongoing emergence as a globally distributed net-
work of systems, a planetary network that, like an immune system, con-
tinues to learn on the job. In that case,
the best model for Gaia is not one of the old tradition of feed-
backs added together, but one of a fully distributed network I 
believe that one will not have a fully convincing argument for 
Gaia until the full plastic network qualities of Gaia become 
apparent. For then, you see, you will actually be able to put 
your finger on the learning capacity of Gaia to show just how 
it becomes adaptive. (cited in Thompson, ed., Gaia 2 212)
We note a related neocybernetic observation in another passage from 
Peter Westbroek’s discussion of Gaia theory, in which he invokes the sys-
tems approach of the French theorist Edgar Morin. According to West-
broek, in La Vie de la Vie (La Méthode, II), Morin
provides a dazzling picture of a major phase transition in biol-
ogy, that is, the spontaneous emergence of smoothly operat-
ing ecosystems from “egocentric” organisms and their inani-
mate surroundings. He shows how multiple antagonisms may 
generate solidarity and generosity and how the omnipresence 
of noise and misunderstanding in a signaling cacophony may 
give rise to understanding and mutual collaboration. Thus, a 
flexible ecosystemic organization arises, autonomous, aceph-
alous, yet capable of learning by selecting its constituent parts. 
By implication this brings home the idea of Gaia learning over 
72 Bruce Clarke
the eons to recycle nutrients, to detoxify the global habitat, 
and to regulate the global climate. Recent advances in Earth 
System Science are revealing how and when the various steps 
in this learning process were accomplished. (Westbroek, 
“Gaia” 418; italics in the original)
As we can draw from Westbroek’s overview of complexity theory and 
Gaia, in contemporary systems theory the rigid structural paradigm of 
traditional holism gives way to fluid self-organizations from noise. The 
proper frame of such observations is the system/environment distinc-
tion. With Gaia, it may be, “the whole system uses itself as environment 
in forming its own subsystems and thereby achieves greater improbabil-
ity on the level of those subsystems by more rigorously filtering an ulti-
mately uncontrollable environment” (Luhmann, Social Systems 7).
It is also interesting that a recent study of autopoiesis by workers as-
sociated with Varela’s research group, developing a mathematical model 
of minimal life, defends the plausibility of Gaian autopoiesis in a manner 
that also addresses one of Varela’s standard complaints about social auto-
poiesis, that it cannot indicate a boundary by which to enclose its domain 
of operations. In the midst of their article “Autopoiesis and Cognition,” 
Paul Bourgine and John Stewart address the issue of higher-order auto-
poietic systems. They ask: “What is necessary in order to consider multi-
cellular organisms as autopoietic systems, not just because they are made 
up of first-order autopoietic systems, but as second-order autopoietic 
systems in their own right?” (Bourgine and Stewart, “Autopoiesis” 336). 
Their answer is that: “What is required for this is a ‘boundary’ defined in 
functional terms,” that is, in terms other than the material ones so literally 
presented by cellular membranes (Ibid. 336). Moreover, “these consider-
ations are even more compelling if we consider the possibility of a third-
order autopoietic system including among its components both first- and 
second-order autopoietic systems. One possible candidate here is the 
whole ecosphere of the planet Earth, considered in the light of Lovelock’s 
Gaia hypothesis. This is certainly a system consisting of a network of 
processes that continually produce the components (including first- and 
second-order autopoietic systems) that reproduce those processes”:
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It must be an open question at present whether the terrestrial 
ecosphere actually is a bona fide autopoietic system We do not 
want to rule out this possibility simply because the ecosphere 
does not have a single clearly reified membrane Our point 
here is not to argue particularly for or against the hypothesis 
that Gaia, or an insect colony, is a third-order autopoietic sys-
tem. Our point is rather that for these to become tractable 
questions, we require a renewed definition of autopoiesis that 
does not depend on an excessively reified definition of “mem-
brane” or “boundary.” (Ibid. 337)
Bourgine and Stewart’s emphasis on the functional rather than mate-
rial instantiation of the autopoietic boundary delineating the system/
environment dyad does several important things. It further promotes 
the integration of autopoiesis into the Gaia paradigm, and by doing so, 
it augments the concept of autopoiesis by integrating its cellular origins 
with its higher-order, ultimately metabiotic natural extensions. Their 
autopoietic spin on the Gaia concept is precisely metabiotic up to the 
“sentient” borders of life and mind, where it joins Luhmann’s metabiotic 
extension of biological autopoiesis to both consciousness and communi-
cation. Both psychic and social systems are higher-order natural systems 
self-producing their metabiotic forms only within the medium of living 
systems. The autopoietic “selves” of psychic and social systems are not 
organic but systemic—co-emergent, co-evolving, functionally bounded 
differential forms of virtual autopoiesis spun off from the literal meta-
bolic looping of living systems. In this way, autopoiesis comprehends the 
interconnections—the structural couplings as well as the operational dif-
ferentiations—among natural systems, in a way that can guide our critical 
efforts at comprehensive thinking past the pitfalls of holistic totalization 
and specious unification. Moreover, nothing and no one controls these 
systems. Beyond these considerations of theoretical comprehension, our 
challenge is to get right with autopoietic systems.
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Chapter 3
Of Survival
Climate Change and Uncanny Landscape in 
the Photography of Subhankar Banerjee
Yates McKee
“Will we fight to ensure that everyone has a right to survival?”
– Vandana Shiva1
“There can be no image that is not about destruction and 
survival, and this is especially the case in the image of ruin.”
– Eduardo Cadava
1.
In Subhankar Banerjee’s photograph, a flat, abstracted field of tans and 
browns transitions unevenly into an area of formless grey at the two up-
per corners of the picture. Appearing near these zones of indistinction 
are several clusters of black pock-marks, giving the impression that the 
central field is already suffering from a kind of internal deterioration. 
Traveling up the central expanse of the image is a series of imperfect lines 
that overlap, interweave, and reinscribe one another. At the bottom of 
the image, the lines stand out so sharply against the ground as to indi-
cate a microscopic pattern of print-making at work in the contours of the 
lines themselves; they then vanish altogether, only to reemerge as they 
approach the dissolving borderline at the top of the image. Fading in and 
out of visibility like a phantom, the lines undergo a slight diagonalization 
as they make their vertical procession, a compositional cue that sets the 
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image up as landscape, albeit one in which the typical perspectival cali-
bration of figure, ground, and horizon-line has been subjected to a kind 
of implosive derangement.
The title of the photograph, Caribou Tracks on Wetland, marks the oth-
erwise abstract lines traversing the picture as tracks, traces, or vestiges left 
behind by living creatures in their passage across the surface of the earth. 
In an earlier epoch, it might have seemed feasible to take the indexical 
causality ascribed to these tracks by the title at face value; they would per-
tain properly to the caribou, ephemeral signatures of absent bodies that 
would nonetheless confirm the creature’s migratory paths as they have 
been governed since time immemorial by the seasonal patterns of their 
polar habitat. In “our” time of climate change, however, any such appeal 
to the natural predictability of climate, season, weather (temps) is no lon-
ger possible—if it ever was—putting the legibility of these tracks and the 
dissolving ground into which they were impressed radically into ques-
tion. Photographically suspended between preservation and destruction, 
inscription and erasure, memory and oblivion, these vestigial remainders 
testify to a coming-to-pass and a living-on; but of who, or what?
Figure 1: Subhankar Banerjee, Caribou Tracks on Wetland, Teshekpuk Lake Wetland, 2006
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In its posing of this enigmatic temporality of survival, Caribou Tracks 
on Wetland is an exemplary work with which to begin a consideration 
of Banerjee’s long-term photographic project concerning the effects of 
so-called anthropogenic climate change on the landscapes and ecolo-
gies of what he calls the “Near North” of the Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge (ANWR) and its border regions. Shown in venues ranging from 
the Smithsonian Museum to the The New York Review of Books  to the 
nongovernmental counter-summit shadowing the 2009 Copenhagen cli-
mate conference, Banerjee’s photographs eschew the typical iconography 
of crashing glaciers and melancholic polar bears that dominate the visual 
cultures of climate change discourse, instead calling for us to read the pre-
carious traces, tracks, and vestiges inscribed in the rapidly transforming 
Arctic landscape. Banerjee’s images at once address and interrogate the 
identity, agency, and responsibility of the anthropos that has recently be-
gun to hold itself accountable for the irrevocable destabilization of the 
naturally-given climatic horizon against which the lives and deaths of 
human and nonhuman populations have hitherto been assumed to take 
place.2 Recalling Eduardo Cadava’s axiom that “the possibility of history 
is bound to the survival of the traces of what is past and to our ability to 
read those traces as traces,” Banerjee’s landscapes of survival, as I will call 
them, enact a politics of both memory and futurity in which the ques-
tion of climate change is exposed to claims for what activists recently 
converging on Copenhagen for the COP15 summit have begun to call 
“climate justice.”3
The imperative of survival sounded by Banerjee’s images is thus situ-
ated between a) a quasi-transcendental register concerned with the 
temporal structure of life-in-general b) a biopolitical concern with the 
uneven allocation of economic, ecological, and mediatic life-support sys-
tems across the globe and c) a self-reflexive meditation on the violence 
of photography as a medium that simultaneously freezes and immolates 
the actuality of life, thus allowing life to outlive itself as a mediatic or ar-
chival trace that opens onto an incalculable future. Read in relation to 
Banerjee’s photographs, survival thus emerges as a polyvalent keyword 
for thinking through critical climate change, understood as both an in-
calculable alteration of the planetary climate system as well as the ethico-
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political reorientation of the 21st century Humanities in response to the 
latter crisis.
2.
In a now-famous passage from his final interview, Jacques Derrida grants 
survival a quasi-transcendental status. As if stipulating a protocol of read-
ing to his audience with regard to his own imminent end from beyond the 
grave, Derrida offers a certain affirmation of life as an irreducible force at 
work in the apparent finality of death. Derrida’s affirmation does not of 
course involve the simple sublation of death into a triumphant continu-
ity of life, but rather an unsettling of both poles that exposes their mutual 
dependency and contamination. Derrida describes this undecidable im-
passe in terms of survival, or “living-on”:
Life is survival. To survive means to continue to live, but also 
to live after death All of the concepts that have helped my 
work, especially those of the trace or the spectral, were linked 
to ‘survival’ as a structural dimension. Survival constitutes the 
very structure of what we call existence. We are structurally 
survivors, marked by the structure of the trace, of the testa-
ment. Everything I have said about survival as the complica-
tion of he life-death opposition proceeds in me from an un-
conditional affirmation of life. Survival, this life after life, life 
more than life, the most intense life possible.4   
In a moving obituary published in a special issue of the arts journal 
Grey Room, Cadava marks this passage as an exemplary deconstructive 
lesson concerning the memory of deconstruction itself. According to Ca-
dava, if deconstruction is to survive, or better, if deconstruction qua sur-
vival is to survive beyond its academic entombment, if it is to have stakes, 
claims or effects in the future, it would be necessary for us, Derrida’s sur-
vivors, to move the “multiple legacies” of deconstruction in new direc-
tions, requiring that articulate them unforeseen histories, discourses, and 
problem-sets including “politics, religion, economics, ideology, rights, 
nationalism, racism, colonialism, genocide, torture, the media, univer-
sity institutions, capitalist imperialisms of all kinds, rogue states, the war 
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on terror … ” (“Derrida’s Futures” 77). Collectively, these problem-sets 
constitute what Cadava calls “the signature of ‘our time’,” the ethico-polit-
ical urgency of which he signals by putting the phrase “our time” in quo-
tation marks in order to mark the non-self-identity of both the “we” and 
that “time” that such a putative collective subject would share. Cadava’s 
litany of topoi closely echoes that put forth by Derrida himself in Spec-
ters of Marx, including what appears from our current vantage point to 
be a conspicuous absence: the question of ecological crisis in general and 
planetary climate-change in particular.5 While it is beyond the scope of 
this paper to account for this strange silence, survival can nevertheless be 
“set to work” in thinking climate change and the conflicts surround it as 
precisely as an unhinging or disjoining of what Cadava calls “our time.”6
The setting-to-work of survival entails, among other things, a consider-
ation of the histories within which the word has been inscribed. In par-
ticular, it is relevant to note the ubiquity of survival as an ideologeme in 
Northern discourses of environmental crisis since the late 1960’s, when 
books, conferences, and reports with titles such as The Crisis of Surviv-
al, Science and Survival, Blueprint for Survival, and Ecological Conscience: 
Values for Survival began to proliferate. Appealing to a general precari-
ousness of the human species preceding any merely political interest or 
partition, survival has long functioned as a transcendental imperative 
concerning the potentially suicidal disjuncture between the inhuman 
temporality of technological evolution on the one hand and the redemp-
tive cultural, moral, or spiritual self-awareness of humanity on the other.7
As Al Gore put it recently in the first annual “Green” issue of Vanity Fair,
“What is at stake is the survival of our civilization and the habitability of 
the Earth. As one eminent scientist has put it, “the pending question is 
whether an opposable thumb and a neocortex are a viable combination 
on this planet.”8
Left-wing thinkers such as Wolfgang Sachs have over the past two de-
cades made an important point of critically exposing the depoliticizing 
implications of what he calls “survival as the new raison d’être of planetary 
management”—i.e. the positing of the bare biophysical existence of hu-
manity qua species as an unquestioned basis on which to make decisions 
concerning economic development and environmental regulation on the 
part of global elites.9 While such critiques have proven indispensable in 
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establishing ecology as a site of antagonism rather than taken-for-granted 
consensus, survival can be productively re-mobilized as both a figure of 
reading and an ethico-political imperative aligned with the concerns of 
critical climate change put forth in the current volume.
Rather than a mere semantic frill to be sanctimoniously invoked or 
critically demystified, the survival would need to be recognized in its 
aporetic structure, which is to say, its suggestion of a fundamental depen-
dence or indebtedness on the part of life for its own endurance in time 
on a set of sustained and sustaining conditions that are irreducible to the 
being-present of the life in question.10 Judith Butler has recently brought 
the quasi-transcendental aporia of survival—“the very structure of ex-
istence” as Derrida calls it—into dialogue with an analysis of what she 
calls the “uneven allocation of precarity” in an expanded global frame of 
biopolitics. For Butler, the “survivability” of lives depends not only on 
the reliable allocation of material life-support networks, but also, and 
perhaps more primordially, the conditions of the “representability of life 
itself: what allows a life to become visible in its precariousness and its 
need for shelter, and what is it that keeps us from seeing or understanding 
certain lives in this way? This problem concerns the media, at the most 
general level, since a life can be accorded a value only on the condition 
that it is perceivable as a life” (Frames of War 51). In other words, crucial 
among the conditions of non-life on which life depends for its continua-
tion—the “sustained and sustaining conditions of life”—are those medi-
atic practices and aesthetic frames through which lives are able to appear 
as livable, grievable, and thus worthy of protection. As Butler puts it, “in 
this way, media and survival are linked” (Frames of War 181).
Banerjee is concerned with precisely such a relay between media and 
survival, which he stages in terms of the specific formal and historical 
problems pertaining to photography as a medium. The images exemplify 
Cadava’s axiom that “there can be no image that is not about destruction 
and survival, and this is especially the case in the image of ruin” (“Lapsus 
Imaginus”). Banerjee’s images are “images of ruin” in several overlapping 
aspects—in their general status as photographic traces, in their pictur-
ing of the destructive effects of climate-change, and in their unground-
ing of the humanity routinely held accountable in mainstream ecological 
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discourses for its own suicidal undermining of the life-support systems 
of the planet.
Banerjee stages this ungrounding in part by photographing the very 
ground of the Arctic region itself, a ground that is rapidly losing its physi-
cal stability and life-support capacity as it is exposed to the ever-intensi-
fying quantity of solar energy trapped in the Earth’s atmosphere by the 
residual traces of two hundred years of fossil-fuel capitalism. Specifical-
ly, many of Banerjee’s photographs are concerned with the ruination of 
permafrost, the frozen layer of compacted soil, decaying vegetal matter, 
and living vegetation that underlies much of the Arctic terrain and acts 
as an essential support to regional life-forms. Banerjee’s photographs of 
the dissolving ground simultaneously perform a kind of second-order al-
legorical meditation on the relay between the disjunctive historical tem-
porality of climate change, on the one hand, and that of photography on 
the other. Indeed, Banerjee’s images are structured by a play of freezing 
and unfreezing in which the photographic immobilization, displacement, 
and public witnessing of otherwise ephemeral physical transformations 
to the landscape becomes among the conditions of possibility for the 
preservation of the life-forms depending upon it—“survival and media 
are linked.”
Banerjee’s photographic project at once insists on the centrality of vi-
sual media to addressing climate change while complicating visuality it-
self, suggesting that a certain encounter with invisibility if not blindness 
is the condition of any responsible engagement with climate crisis. In 
Banerjee’s photographs it is in what we do not see and cannot be seen that 
the most important work is done.11 In other words, the evidentiary trac-
es of climate-change phenomena that appear in Banerjee’s photographs 
only do so on the condition that they resist being reduced to sheerly vi-
sual images; rather, the photographs speak to a certain non-self-evidence 
of evidence, calling out to be read as texts and in relation to other texts 
that are not confined to the images themselves as considered in an ide-
alist vacuum. Indeed, Banerjee forcefully emphasizes the importance of 
supplementary elements to the operations of his photographs, asking us 
to read the formal structuring of color and light, figure and ground, de-
tail and prospect, scale and perspective, framing and cropping at work 
“inside” the image in relation to the social, discursive, and institutional 
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conditions that mark the circulation, display, and reception of the photo-
graph on the other.
3.
In Caribou Skeleton a desolate shoreline appears to recede into the dis-
tance and curve back towards us at the same time. This circular curving-
back is interrupted, however, when the landscape meets a kind of ter-
minal-point in the upper-left-hand corner of the image, giving way to a 
seascape in which the horizontal dividing-line between water and sky has 
been all but effaced in a formless expanse of grey. The incomplete recur-
sivity of the shoreline is thrown into relief by the darkness of the sand 
immediately at the water’s edge, the first of several succeeding bands of 
chromatic saturation and accumulated detritus indicative of the natural 
ebb and flow of the tide. But the rhythmic patterns of the tidal residue 
are unsettled by the striking presence of a bleached spinal column and 
rib-cage lying adjacent to the sea, the zoological identity of which is sug-
Figure 2: Subhankar Banerjee, Caribou Skeleton, Barter Island 
in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, 2006
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gested by the title of the photograph. In an earlier era of the arts and 
humanities, we might have been content to read these skeletal remains 
as an allegorical reminder of transience. Such a reminder would keep in 
check the arrogant aspirations to timeless monumentality on the part of 
a humanity in denial of its own exposure to the ruinous finitude it shares 
with other mundane creatures, undercutting any aesthetic idealization of 
nature as a realm of enduring plenitude: et in arcadia ego. Yet when read 
in relation to the extensive caption Banerjee insists on attaching to it, 
these photographic remains function less as ciphers of a worldly finitude 
as such than as an occasion for politico-ecological reading of the ever-
intensifying derangement of seasonal and atmospheric dynamics in the 
polar region for both human and nonhuman populations:
Nearly a thousand caribou from the Teshepuk Lake herd 
came over to the ANWR, making a 240 mile journey in the 
winter of 2006. Robert Thompson, my Inupiat friend from 
Kaktovik stated that this had never happened before, and that 
the tundra froze and that the caribous came looking for food. 
The tundra also froze around Kaktovik, resulting in the death 
of several hundred animals that winter. I photographed the 
skeleton of such an animal the following summer. The Arc-
tic is experiencing rain during autumn and winter months, 
a severe climate change phenomenon. The rain is causing 
ice-crust on the tundra…Ice crust formation resulting from 
freeze-thaw events affects most Arctic land mammals by en-
capsulating their food in ice, severely limiting foraging abil-
ity and killing plants…dramatic population crashes resulting 
from ice crusting due to freeze-thaw events have been report-
ed and their frequency appears to have increased over recent 
decades. (Caption, “Caribou Skeleton”)
In other words, the altered migratory trajectories of the Caribou is it-
self an index of global warming, as is their “unnatural” expiration on ter-
restrial grounds over which the creatures would not usually pass—in-
cluding the unseasonably wet lands in which their tracks are impressed 
in a photograph such as Caribou Tracks on Wetland. Banerjee thus insists 
that we read these remains and traces as in some way anthropogenic, as 
Of Survival 85
self-portraits of humanity. Yet he also questions the putative unity of that 
humanity in its own self-induced risk by conjuring the voice of Robert 
Thompson, his “Inupiat friend” who provides the artist with a local as-
sessment of the ecological implications of freeze-thaw dynamics not only 
for caribou populations, but also for the indigenous populations whose 
cultural and economic practices revolve around the relatively predictable 
patterns and dynamics of the caribou as a source of material sustenance.
Banerjee’s attention to the concerns and claims of indigenous commu-
nities unevenly exposed to the effects of climate change should be un-
derstood in relation to his critical transformation historical genre of land-
scape photography. In his numerous statements and interviews, Banerjee 
has acknowledged an originary complicity with this legacy by way of a 
biographical fable that functions as one among many contexts in which 
we should read his images. Emerging from a middle-class post-colonial 
Indian background, Banerjee immigrated to New Mexico in 1990 to 
study theoretical physics, and then computer science, and later took up a 
job as a research scientist in Seattle in the late 1990s, where he developed 
an amateur interest in photographing the governmentally-protected “wil-
derness preserves” of the Pacific Northwest. Banerjee soon set his sights 
on Alaska—not the mere touristic landscapes observed from luxury 
cruise ships, but rather the rugged wilds of the “Far North” in the Arctic 
region, areas only accessible with the hired assistance of Native-American 
guides. According to Banerjee, “In late 2000, when I started planning for 
my Arctic journey, my main motivation was to go to a place untrammeled 
by tourism or industry, a so-called pristine wilderness or ‘last Ameri-
can frontier.’” Having gone in search of a pristine wilderness, Banerjee’s 
contact with native guides, initially confined to the level of a sheer eco-
nomic exchange quite familiar to colonial and postcolonial tourist sce-
narios around the globe, soon became a form of ecological re-education. 
According to Banerjee, “After eight years of intense engagement with the 
Arctic land, animals, and peoples I now think about the Arctic very dif-
ferently. I no longer see the Arctic as the ‘last frontier’; instead I see it as 
the most connected land on earth,” as evidenced in phenomena ranging 
from the melting of permafrost to the migration of “Persistent Organic 
Pollutants” from the exhaust-pipes and power plants of U.S. cities into 
the bloodstreams of human and nonhuman Arctic populations, to the 
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more visually dramatic activities of transnational energy companies pros-
pecting in the region for fossil-fuel deposits that will further intensify the 
dynamics of global warming.
Banerjee situates his account of this transition from a naive desire for 
“wilderness” to an ecologically informed post-colonial approach to the 
region in terms of the history of U.S. landscape photography dating back 
to mid-19th century era of imperial expansion through to the formation 
of the National Parks systems and beyond. Rather than merely depict 
preexistent Western landscapes, according to Banerjee, “photography has 
played a critical role in the American land conservation movement from 
its inception. The medium not only helped preserve many important 
lands but also helped define how we relate to these lands, how we imag-
ine them, and our place in them.” Banerjee cites the work of Timothy 
O’Sullivan and William Henry Jackson, both of whom worked for the US 
geological survey in 1860s and 1870s to survey the lands along the trans-
continental railroad in terms of their possibilities for capitalist resource-
extraction and settler-colonization.12 Banerjee notes that, ironically in 
light of the mandate of the geological survey with which he was working, 
Jackson’s photographs of the Yellowstone plateau became key points of 
reference for the US Congress declaring Yellowstone to be a “National 
Park” in 1872, with numerous other Western sites to follow thereafter. 
According to Banerjee, Jackson’s photographs canonized a “strategy of 
picturing land-as-scenery, something to be seen and appreciated from a 
distance and for its aesthetic beauty.” Effacing both the preexistent his-
tories and ecologies of native American peoples as well as the photogra-
pher’s own role in colonial expansion, these “iconic images introduced 
Eastern viewers to the idea of vast, open, and majestic landscapes further 
in the westThrough these photographs, a viewer could imagine himself in 
that space—with a tourist’s sense of belonging or entitlement. This voy-
euristic and distanced relationship to the land, this idealized notion of 
landscape, practiced with great success by artists such as Ansel Adams, 
characterized much [landscape] photography of the 20th century.”
In one fell swoop, Banerjee at once testifies to the rhetorical and ideo-
logical power of this photographic legacy as an active historical force in 
its own right, and indicts this legacy for its complicity with an “idealiza-
tion” of landscape that implicitly contributed to the ecological crises that 
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we confront today. In an exemplary analysis, Banerjee writes, “this photo-
graphic approach … did as much to destroy the land as it did to preserve 
it.” First of all, such a fetishization of isolated sites of aesthetic beauty 
contributed to the intensification of touristic visitation of these very sites, 
thus contributing to the further disintegration of the putative purity that 
made them attractive to visitors in the first place. More urgently, however, 
the fetishistic isolation of such “natural sites” enforced an ideology of wil-
derness as a sacred zone of purity set over and against the realm of the 
human, thus implicitly marking such places as outside history, and other 
places as “unnatural” and thus unworthy of consideration in ecological 
terms. Echoing the environmental historian William Cronon, Banerjee 
suggests that this ideological framing of wilderness resulted in more than 
two decades worth of environmentalist campaigning devoted to the pres-
ervation of wilderness as an aesthetic amenity defined over and against 
the menace of “human intrusion” while ignoring the intensification of lo-
cal, regional, national, and global ecological crises related to unsustain-
Figure 3: Subhankar Banerjee, Exposed Coffin, Barter Island 
in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, 2006
88 Yates McKee
able patterns of capitalist development and the uneven allocation of envi-
ronmental risk for differently situated human populations.13
Banerjee contests hegemonic visions of the region as historically “un-
touched” in a number of ways. For instance, in a remarkable photograph 
entitled Exposed Coffin that inversely echoes the compositional layout 
of Caribou Skeleton, we see a narrow strip of vegetated land situated a 
few feet above a beach bearing the regularized marks of tidal protension 
and recession. Appearing prominently in the foreground is a crudely 
fashioned rectangular wooden box surrounded by an outline of eroded 
soil; scattered around this eroded recession are bleached-out members 
suggestive at once of disturbed skeletal remains and the arbitrary drift-
wood otherwise cast across the beach. Banerjee writes that, according to 
an Inupiat friend, the coffin would not pertain to an indigenous inhabit-
ant—who would have been buried according to culturally specific pro-
tocols and markers in established funerary zones—but rather an North 
American or Russian whaler from the late 19th century, which is to say, 
a primitive precursor to contemporary energy-industrialists looking to 
the Northern region as a site of resource-extraction. The buried coffin 
emerged from the frozen ground as a result of anthropogenic thawing; 
according to Banerjee’s interlocutor, it is likely that the skeletal contents 
of the coffin were disturbed and scattered by a polar bear displaced from 
further North searching for food as Caribou herds move further south 
due to the drastic flooding/freezing of their traditional foraging areas.
Exposed Coffin and its caption are exemplary for Banerjee’s practice 
overall. Banerjee records the insidious feedback loops between energy-
extraction and the very carbon-based climate-change processes that make 
such extraction possible through the thawing of Arctic ground; yet this 
thawing of the ground also inadvertently brings forth a kind of historical 
testimony as to the irreducible imbrications of the region in transnational 
geoenomic processes, thus undermining any appeal to the simple “pres-
ervation” of the Arctic as a pristine wilderness that would be set over and 
against “man-made” effects.
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4.
As Banerjee has often noted, among the most effective ideological strat-
egies mobilized by the energy industry and its advocates has been to 
portray ANWR as a “barren, frozen wasteland,” awaiting capitalist invest-
ment to bring forth its full productive potential. For decades, liberal ac-
tivists and legislators in the US have countered this image of the region as 
a “wasteland” by emphasizing its aesthetic beauty and ecological fecun-
dity as an “untouched” wilderness in the lineage of John Muir and Ansel 
Adams. While opposed at one level, these two images converge in their 
occultation of the historical covalence of the region with the processes 
and contradictions of capitalist modernity, including “climate change, re-
source wars, and migrations of toxins [that] makes the region a reminder 
of the consequences of our carbon footprint.”
Banerjee’s invocation of the ecological trope of “our carbon footprint” 
returns us to the enigma of the vestige at work in Caribou Tracks on Wet-
land.14 According to Jean-Luc Nancy, the vestige is “just a touch right at 
the ground … the vestige is the remains of a step, a pas. It is not its image, 
Figure 4: Subhankar Banerjee, Known and Unknown Tracks, Teshekpuk Lake Wetland, 2006
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for the step consists of nothing other than its own vestige” (Nancy, “Ves-
tige” 96). Rather than preserve a determinate presence, the vestige marks 
an irrecoverable passage that cannot be resolved into an identifiable im-
age that would enable us to secure a position of cognitive mastery in re-
lation to the traces in question. The vestige testifies to an irrecoverable 
passage that nonetheless leaves behind a kind of anonymous signature 
severed from any limited identity, agency, or responsibility: “a vestige 
shows that someone has passed but not who it is” (Nancy, “Vestige,” 94).
The condition of non-identity and non-knowledge associated by Nan-
cy with the vestige resonates closely with Banerjee’s photograph Known 
and Unknown Tracks. Taken from an elevated but non-vertical aerial per-
spective, the photograph records the infinitely receding procession of 
three mechanically straight parallel track lines across a flat, greenish-tan 
plain bordered near the top of the image by indeterminate bodies of wa-
ter. Vanishing into the distance, these lines intersect at a perpendicular 
angle near the bottom of the picture with an equally mechanical track 
line that proceeds horizontally, thus suggesting the parameters of a kind 
of calculative grid that could in principle extend itself in all directions 
across the surface of the earth. Traversing this rectilinear configuration 
of mechanical tracks, we witness the faint tracework of infinitesimal trails 
proceeding in a haphazard but determinate direction toward the horizon-
line as a kind of counter-inscription that recalls the vestiges that simulta-
neously appear and disappear in Caribou Tracks on Wetland.
Even more overtly than in the latter photograph, however, the identity 
of the being responsible for the tracks in this photograph is rendered un-
certain. While at first glance the photograph might appear to put forth a 
binary opposition between the rectilinear gridwork of the “human” track 
and the “natural” meandering of the migratory pathways of animal popu-
lations, the title of the photograph deliberately puts any such opposition 
in question—which are the “known” tracks, which are the “unknown”? 
Far from indulging a aesthetics of mystery for its own sake, Banerjee is at 
pains to mark the specific agencies at work in the physical creation of the 
mechanical lines to which we bear witness in the photograph: “transna-
tional energy companies have for years lobbied the US congress to gain 
access to the fossil-fuel deposits underlying the Arctic regions of Alaska.” 
The intensifying exploitation of such energy-resources, indexed by the 
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trails left behind by extraction-equipment in the increasingly soggy tun-
dra of the Arctic, both benefits from and exacerbates the phenomena of 
climate change. As permafrost and glaciers thaw due to the centuries-long 
accumulation of greenhouse gases, new deposits of long-frozen energy-
resources (especially coal and natural gas) become more easily available 
for corporate exploitation, thus creating a massively unsustainable feed-
back-loop between profit-driven resource-extraction and the biospheric 
life-support systems of the planet. The “ground zero” of such effects is 
the very Arctic region now being targeted for energy-development, and, 
more specifically, the politico-ecological networks linking human and 
nonhuman populations in that region.
Thus, the animal tracks that faintly appear in both Known and Un-
known Tracks and Caribous Tracks in Wetland are not “natural” in any 
simple sense; though physically created by animals passing over the ter-
restrial surface of the Arctic, the trajectory of these animals is marked by 
anthropogenic forces, as indirectly evidenced by the encroaching inun-
dation of the shore line at the top of the photograph and the complex 
alteration of migratory patterns related to the freezing and thawing of 
permafrost explained in the caption above. Should these “known and un-
known tracks” thus be regarded as a kind of anthropogenic self-portrait? 
Should the “unknown” dimension of the tracks be assimilated back into 
the self-consciousness of “humanity”? To reiterate, Banerjee does not 
aim to create ambiguity as to the immediate cause of the physical marks 
he documents in the landscape for its own sake; but he puts the immedi-
acy of this causality into question, expanding the scope of responsibility 
from the specific machines and companies involved in the exploitation of 
Arctic territories to the broader policy architectures which enable such 
activities to go forward, the ideological tropes that support such policies, 
and ultimately the citizenry that has either actively supported or passive-
ly acquiesced to the corporate colonization of the Arctic for the purposes 
of fossil-fuel extraction. The boundaries of the “we” implied by Banerjee’s 
invocation of “our carbon footprint” are thus deliberately open-ended, 
implicating any and everyone who views his images, but especially those 
of us who uncritically partake of and legitimize contemporary fossil-fuel 
capitalism and the uneven allocation of ecological risk it entails
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5.
While throughout his work over the past decade Banerjee has used his 
photographs and their supplementary frames (discursive, institutional, 
presentational) as a platform from which to amplify the political claims 
of indigenous peoples unevenly effected by climate change, he has un-
til recently avoided creating figurative images of such groups. This is in 
part due to reluctance to overtly engage the legacy of so-called “salvage 
ethnography” running through US landscape photography, in which the 
visible presence of indigenous people in the landscape is only registered 
in terms of a melancholic meditation on their inevitable, if tragic, demise 
with the “progress” of capitalist modernity.
Banerjee is well-informed about the problematic “refusal of covalence” 
operative in traditional anthropological documentary, in which the “over 
there” of a so-called remote location is coded as pertaining to the “back 
then” of a pre-historic temporality set apart from the global moderni-
ties of both the artist and audience. In his photographic series Gwich’in 
and the Caribou (2007), for instance, Banerjee scrupulously documents 
Figure 5: Subhankar Banerjee, Gwich’in and the Caribou—Charlie 
Swaney and Jimmy John, near Arctic Village, 2007
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the hybrid technological apparatus comprising contemporary Gwich’in 
hunting practice, in which snowmobiles, polar-fleece gear, radio-systems, 
and rifles cooperate with skinning knives and inherited tracking tech-
niques in killing and preparing Caribou for both economic and cultural 
purposes. Rather than an idealized harmony with nature, Banerjee fore-
grounds the sacrificial violence of indigenous people’s hunting practices 
through the chromatic intensity of caribou blood against the snow-cov-
ered arctic landscape.
Banerjee considers these portraits, and his photographic project more 
broadly to involve a displacement of “land as scenery” by what he calls 
“land-as-home.” However, home for Banerjee ceases to be a matter of a 
spatially bounded and ontologically grounded place and becomes instead 
a meditation on the undecidablity of the boundaries of the oikos and the 
identity of those who dwell therein; on the one hand, the phrase “land-
as-home” insists that we read the landscapes in question as sites of inhab-
itation for intersecting human and nonhuman populations, rather than 
either empty wastes or pristine wilderness. On the other hand, Baner-
jee’s phrase also suggests that the polar region in question is “our” home 
as well. Indeed, the polar ice caps are the fundamental climate-control 
mechanism of the earth, having served for millennia as a kind of axial bal-
ance of the atmospheric, oceanic, and meteorological patterns that made 
life possible throughout the planet.
Faced with an unprecedented anthropogenic unbalancing of this polar 
axiality, however, Banerjee’s evocation of “land-as-home” does not sim-
ply bring together the “here” and the “there” in an all-encompassing glob-
al oikos, or household. Rather, Banerjee asks us to read planetary ecology 
in general and the “Near North” in particular in terms of the unhomely, 
or the uncanny.15
Jean-Luc Nancy’s reflections on the enigmatic logic of the vestige, 
referred to above, are echoed in slightly later paper entitled “Uncanny 
Landscape.” According to Nancy, landscape as a modern Western aes-
thetic genre emerges from a logic of what he calls “depopulation” over 
and against the “country” as a space of dwelling and cultivation for the fig-
ure of the peasant. While marking “the peace of the cloud and the order 
of the oak, the uncultivated earth on which the deer passes,” landscape 
qua genre is marked by a certain “uncanny estrangement [that] occurs in 
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the suspension of presence.” Nancy continues, “this suspension is always 
a question of passage, or a passing on. A landscape is always a landscape 
of time, and doubly so: it is a time of year (a season) and a time of day 
(morning, noon, or evening), as well as a kind of weather [un temps] rain 
or snow, sun or mist. In the presentation of this time … the present of 
representation can do nothing other than render infinitely sensible the 
passing of time, the fleeting instability of what is shown” (Nancy, “Ves-
tige” 94). Among other things, what is “shown” in its fleeting instability 
is depopulation itself, the voiding of human presence as the condition 
of landscape—a point echoed by Banerjee in his attention to the com-
plicity of traditional landscape photography with a dialectic of colonial 
expansion and aesthetic preservation of “untrammeled wilderness.” Thus 
depopulated, landscape projects itself as a realm of purely natural tem-
porality; but it is nevertheless frozen or suspended into a singular mo-
ment by artistic representation, arresting the very temporality to which 
it would bear witness in its claim to be devoid of human presence. The 
uncanniness of landscape identified by Nancy in the very origin of the 
genre—both its originary “depopulation” of the country and its paradox-
Figure 6: Subhankar Banerjee, Storm over Kasegaluk Lagoon, along the Chukchi Sea coast, 2006
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ical freezing of natural temporality—is exacerbated by Banerjee through-
out his oeuvre, but its apogee is arguably the photograph Storm over Kas-
egaluk Lagoon.
Like Caribou Tracks on Wetland and Known and Unknown Tracks, the 
photograph is taken from an aerial elevation, but nevertheless provides 
enough perspectival orientation for the establishment of a horizon line 
vis-à-vis some modicum of a landscape. However, in this image, any ter-
restrial land-mass has all but succumbed to inundation, and the horizon-
line between sea and sky has itself has begun to dissolve into the faint 
monochromatic grey of an all-encompassing storm cloud. A few patches 
and swathes of solid ground appear to persist in the right portion of the 
image, and some residual resistance between water and land is indicated 
in a series of faint bands of surf that proceed out into the seascape in an 
echo of the eroding shoreline. As they curve around the shoreline and 
down into bottom section of the photograph, these surf-lines begin to 
mingle with a smattering of white fragments, some of which cling precari-
ously to the shoreline in the bottom right-hand corner.
The undecidablity between the tossing of surf and the clinging of ice 
might suggest an immemorial seasonal transition; but by now we know 
to read such climactic phenomena in terms of this irreducible, though 
still uncertain, relay with anthropogenic processes. To paraphrase Walter 
Benjamin’s remark on Eugene Atget—Banerjee photographs every single 
inch of the Arctic as if it were the scene of a crime. To reiterate, the culprit 
of this crime is not identified in any finite way, thus preserving a certain 
structural anonymity that both implicates and exceeds the specific culpa-
bility of capitalist energy developers, their deliberate advocates, and their 
unwitting accomplices in everyday energy consumption. And, while the 
victim of such crimes is also in principle indeterminate, Banerjee is em-
phatic as to who will—and already is—bearing the brunt of such clima-
tological disequilibrium.
In the caption to Storm over Kasegulak Lagoon, Banerjee writes:
With climate change the Inupiat people of the Alaskan Arctic 
Coastal Region in recent years have been experiencing more 
frequent and severe-intensity storm than anytime before they 
can remember [M]ore open water open water on the ocean 
… combined with severe storms are making traditional hunt-
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ing more dangerous. The international scientific commu-
nity has stated that rising temperatures are altering the Arc-
tic coastline and much larger changes are projected to occur 
during this century as the result of reduced sea ice, thawing 
permafrost, and sea-level rise. Thinner less extensive sea-ice 
creates more open water, allowing stronger wave generation 
by winds, thus increasing wave-induced erosion along Arctic 
shores. Sea-level rise and thawing coastal permafrost exacer-
bate this problem. The village of Shishmaref, located on an 
island just off the coast of Northern Alaska and inhabited for 
two thousand years, is now facing the prospect of evacuation.
Combined with this caption, the temporal traces of erosion and dis-
solution frozen in Banerjee’s photograph place Nancy’s trope of “depop-
ulation” in a new light; depopulation would thus no longer encompass 
simply an ideological operation of landscape as an aesthetic practice, but 
rather, or also, the physical effacement of the life-support systems of in-
digenous people and the creation of a new biopolitical category of the 
“climate refugee.”16 Banerjee rearticulates these two senses of depopula-
tion, presenting a landscape apparently devoid of humanity that we can-
not help but read in terms of the ever-intensifying dissolution of the very 
ground upon which communities such as Shishmaref depend for their 
existence. Banerjee chooses not to picture Shishmaref and its inhabit-
ants directly, but rather to evoke the memory of their potential loss—and 
resistance to that loss—in advance. Far from the imperial nostalgia of 
the 19th century frontier-painter George Catlin and early 20th century 
photographer Edward Sheriff Curtis, who presented indigenous people 
as melancholic specimens of a “doomed race,” Banerjee’s depopulated, 
uncanny landscape acts as a “gesture of address [that] affirms the right to 
memory of a future survival, a reste, where it might otherwise be effaced 
and its effacement silenced” (Keenan 159).
Such a “right to a memory of future survival,” informs the claims of 
contemporary Inuit activists such as those put forward at Klimaforum09, 
the nongovernmental counter-summit shadowing the 2009 Copenha-
gen climate negotiations. If in mainline ecological discourse survival has 
historically involved a narcissistic appeal to humanity as perpetrator, vic-
tim, and savior of the climate crisis—epitomized by the Save Our Selves 
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campaign associated with the Live Earth concerts and its accompany-
ing Global Warming Survival Guide—indigenous activists have recoded 
survival as a biopolitical rights-claim that seeks redress for the uneven 
allocation of climate-related vulnerability along already-existing lines of 
marginality and disenfranchisement.17 As Banerjee himself puts it during 
a presentation of his work with Gwich’in activist Sarah James at Klimafo-
rum09, “climate change is a great human rights issue… right to survival is 
one of the first rights people should have—access to their food, access to 
their water—and that’s being seriously threatened up in the Arctic” (In-
terview with Amy Goodman). The right to survival invoked by Banerjee 
is irreducible to a question of sheer material resources, for the latter—
hunting for instance—are themselves inscribed in specific cultural reper-
toires, technical practices, and ecological knowledges that make up a kind 
of ethnomnemonic archive that is itself threatened by climate-related dis-
placements such as that with which Shishmaref is currently undergoing 
(Sutter). Thus a certain survival of historical memory is inextricable from 
the survival of living beings. However, historical memory is not only a 
matter of a cultural tradition in the limited sense; it is also a kind of bear-
Figure 7: “Climate Justice or Chaos?”
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ing-witness to the incalculable violence of colonialism as it lives on in the 
present, making any “tradition” a kind of remnant or survival that must 
be kept alive by something other than itself.
Such an avowal of the accumulated burdens of colonial and postcolo-
nial history is the starting point for the discourse of climate justice as ar-
ticulated by indigenous and other activists at Klimaforum09, including 
three members of a youth delegation from Shishmaref who traveled to 
Copenhagen as “witnesses to the impact of climate change” (Sutter).
Climate justice demands that any response to climate crisis take into 
account the historically disproportionate responsibilities for greenhouse 
emissions on the part of corporations, governments and consumers in 
the Global North, and the uneven allocation of the environmental costs 
involved among already-vulnerable communities—including those with-
in the Global North itself.
Climate justice thus entails a kind of reparations program that goes far 
beyond the calculus of emissions-reduction, calling in addition for sub-
stantial financial assistance with systems of mitigation, protection, adap-
tation, and sustainable, equitable development for those already exposed 
to catastrophic climate change or who will be exposed to it in the near 
future.18 However, climate justice cannot be reduced to a series of spe-
cific grievances and proposals, even though the latter are obviously es-
sential to it. Informed by the polyvalent imperative of survival, claims for 
climate justice also have the power to introduce a kind of disjunction in 
our sense of time and history analogous to the alteration of environmen-
tal cycles and horizons effected by climate change itself. Etymologically, 
climate is already a matter of “the tendency of incline or drift away from 
understanding … what falls from the sky and what falls away from under-
standing” (Cadava, Emerson 4). Climate justice, then, would not entail a 
simple regulative ideal known in advance that would stabilize horizons 
and restore a harmonious domestic balance to the planetary oikos. Like 
climate itself, in the radical sense, climate justice would open onto an in-
calculable future that would nonetheless be structurally haunted by the 
injustices and violences of the past. Marked by traces, trails, and vestiges 
of a global ecological history in which the self-destructive activity of “hu-
manity” is put under erasure, Banerjee’s uncanny landscapes speak to a 
project of climate justice that “carries life beyond present life or actual 
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being there…not toward death but toward a living-on, namely a trace of 
which life and death would themselves be traces and traces of traces, a 
survival whose possibility in advance comes to disjoin or disadjust the 
identity to itself of the living present” (Specters of Marx x).
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from their homes and land—by rising temperatures, sea-level change and 
extreme weather events. Many will be among our planet’s poorest and most 
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uncontrolled climate change. People, who without international help and 
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assistance and a fair claim to our shared world EFJ contends that the formal 
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climate change.”
17. Live Earth/David de Rothschild, The Live Earth Global Warming Survival 
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The cover of this book features the ubiquitous icon of a polar bear set 
afloat in a sea of melted ice, in this case buoyed by a life raft. As the most 
charismatic and photogenic animal of the North pole, the polar bear has 
functioned as a somewhat insidious object of both aesthetic appreciation and 
anthropomorphic projection at the expense of historically informed politico-
ecological analysis. However, this creature might be rethought with reference 
to the etymology of the word Arctic, which derives from the Greek word 
arktos—bear—which was used to refer to the astral constellation ursa major. 
Rather than a sheer natural life standing apart from humanity, the arktos was 
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a tropological figure for reading the orientation of the planet via the stars. 
Starlight, having traveled thousands of light-years from its now-exhausted 
source, is always a matter of oblivion—but also survival. As Eduardo Cadava 
puts it, “Like the photograph that presents what is no longer there, starlight 
names the trace of a celestial body that has long since vanished. The star is 
always a kind of ruin. That its light is never identical to itself, is never revealed 
as such, means that it is always inhabited by a certain distance or darkness” 
(Words of Light 30). Of course, ursa major and arktos are both inscribed in 
a certain European cosmological tradition, making the very name “Arctic” 
a cipher of colonial expansion and the occultation of indigenous place-
naming systems.
18. See the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, “Inuit Call to Global Leaders: Act 
Now on Climate Change in the Arctic” released November 13, 2008. http://
www.inuitcircumpolar.com/files/uploads/icc-files/PR-2009-11-13-call-
to-action.pdf
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Chapter 4
Global Warming as a Manifestation of Garbage
Tian Song
In the ancient times, there were ten suns over the sky. The 
land was burnt. 
Rivers and lakes were dry, trees did not grow, and animals were dying. 
A hero appeared. 
This is Houyi, a talented archer. He had a strong bow and sharp arrows. 
Houyi shot down nine suns and kept one. The land survived and 
flourished again.
– The Book of Mountain and Sea
When Svante Arrhenius published his idea in 1896 that “As human activ-
ity puts ever more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, global warming 
becomes ever more likely,”1 his contemporary scientists thought it was 
a joke. After the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
and Al Gore won the Noble Peace Prize in 2007, global warming became 
accepted as a fact rather than a theory or a hypothesis. This award may 
have even shaken former president George W. Bush from his intran-
sigent denial.
By looking at the first and second law of thermodynamics—the law of 
the conservation and transformation of energy and the law of increasing 
entropy—we can skip the complex technological details of the green-
house effect and interpret global warming as a direct manifestation of 
something more basic: garbage and a consequence of human behaviors 
in industrial civilization.
The earth is a closed system that exchanges energy with the outside: 
it absorbs solar energy and emits thermal radiation; but it has almost no 
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mass to exchange with the outside. Normally, the earth absorbs and emits 
equal amounts of energy in order to remain a system in a state of heat 
balance. The temperature of the earth basically depends on the energy it 
receives from the sun. In the course of natural history, the plants on the 
earth have retained a certain amount of solar energy, in turn decreasing 
the energy emitted by the earth. There are, of course, many natural activi-
ties that release energy from inside the earth, such as volcanic eruptions, 
but these cannot be modulated by human behavior, and we could view 
them as a constant. Undoubtedly, humans have released more and more 
energy since industrial civilization, especially after World War II. The 
coal and oil we are using right now, according the orthodox theory, were 
the solar energy of ancient times that were stored by plants and organ-
isms. Hence, when we burn coal and oil, it is just like hanging the ancient 
suns in the sky again.
The final state of energy after its usage is heat, which, when radiated, 
will increase the average temperature of the earth. If the earth still emits 
the same amount of energy into outer space, and if the earth tries to keep 
the same level of temperature, it must emit more energy to outer space. 
Yet as an isolated body in space, the only way it can release energy is 
through radiation. But ironically, as an approximate black body, the ener-
gy it radiates only depends on its black body temperature to the 4th pow-
er. We are then faced with a jarring dilemma: if the earth wants to radiate 
more energy, it has to increase its temperature. This is just the problem 
we are facing, global warming.
Now let’s see how much extra energy humans release every year, or 
how many more suns we put in the sky.
The energy that the sun radiates to the earth can be regarded as a con-
stant, the Solar Constant. On average, since 1978, it has been measured 
at 1367 Watts per square meter by satellites outside aerosphere.2 Given 
that the section area of the earth is 127,400,000 square kilometers, the 
overall energy the earth accepts from the sun is 1.740×1017 watts. For 
one year, it’s 1.740×1014×365×24 kilowatt hours, i.e., 15,242.4×105 bil-
lion kilowatt hours. In 2006, the world total net electricity consumption 
was 16,378.62 billion kilowatt hours.3 All these kilowatt hours will ul-
timately be transformed to dissipated heat. It is approximately one ten-
thousandth of 15,242.4×105 billion kilowatt hours, the energy released 
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by a sun every year. One ten-thousandth seems to be a small number. 
However, let’s consider other factors, such as: 1) because of absorption 
and reflection, only ten percent of the solar energy can reach the surface 
of the earth; 2) on the earth surface, only 25 percent is land, and only a 
small part is habitable for humans; 3) even in societies, humans are not 
the only species to live on the energy from the sun. Thus, by a rough es-
timate, the energy that humans have used is close to or even greater than 
the amount humans could have from the sun. This means that not even 
one sun is enough to support the human lifestyle, if we can somehow col-
lectively curb fossil energy use. But, if humans keep expending fossil en-
ergy, the temperature of the earth will continuously increase. As a result, 
global warming becomes an unavoidable consequence of industrialized 
civilization.
As long as humans continue their contemporary ways of life, more 
and more energy will be used, and global warming will become increas-
ingly severe.
Now clean energy, or green energy, is a buzzword, and many people 
pin their hopes for humanity’s future on it, but no matter what kind of 
energy is used, its ultimate state is heat. There is no kind of energy that 
can be named clean energy. The central issue is not what kind of energy 
humans use, but how much energy. If they surpass the limited amount 
one sun can bestow, any kind of energy will be “dirty.”
The Economic Chain is a Transforming Chain of Matter and Energy
Let’s start with a simple question: why can we drink a bottle of mineral 
water coming from some remote mountain on any street corner of any 
city whenever we want to? Such a thing happens so frequently that we do 
not feel anything strange about it; the experience is part of daily life. Only 
20 years ago when bottled water first appeared in supermarkets most 
Chinese viewed it as weird: who would be so rich and so silly as to buy it? 
How things change. What does it mean?
The simple answer is this: we are able to buy it, and we are able to af-
ford it. Why can we buy it and afford it? Because of economic develop-
ment, we can exploit mineral water from the source at a low cost, then we 
can bottle it and transport it all over the globe. This is the upper link of 
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the transformation chain of mineral water. The consequences of the up-
per link are the following: 1) a large amount of water is taken away from 
its original place; 2) the water will no longer play its original ecological 
role for humans, animals, and plants there. The water companies obvi-
ously do not pay their workers enough compensation, since if they did 
the bottled water would be too expensive to afford.
But only considering the upper link of the economic chain is not 
enough to answer my question: why can we drink a bottle of mineral wa-
ter on any street of any city? Answer: because we can throw the empty 
bottle into any garbage can in the streets. This thoughtless action con-
cerns the latter half of the economic chain. Why can we throw the empty 
bottle into any garbage can? Because the garbage in the can will be trans-
ported to some garbage dump outside the city by a large group of clean-
ers employed by the city. Why can the city build garbage dumps outside 
the city? Because the city is able to buy land for its garbage dumps at a 
low price, given its economic and political power. If we continue asking 
questions in this way, we can trace the rest of the economic chain, and 
reach its lower link.
Similar to the upper link, the consequence of the lower link is that hu-
mans, animals, and plants living in the location of the garbage dump can 
no longer live there as before, and the ecological system at the site of the 
garbage dump is destroyed.
The importance of this lower link is no less than the upper link. If you 
were not allowed to throw the bottle into a garbage can, you would have 
to keep it in your bag or take it home. If that were the case, would you 
drink bottle after bottle without hesitation? In industrial civilization, 
when we drink a bottle of mineral water in a city we indirectly harm the 
ecological systems at the very source of our water and the place of the 
garbage dump.
Bottled water is, for me, a symbol for everything in modern industrial 
cities—from TV sets, to cell phones, computers, handbags, cars, build-
ings, highways, and other commodities that do not cease existing when 
we have used them. Where did they come from? Where will they go? 
When we trace back the source of everything in a city, we eventually ar-
rive at places such as forests, natural bodies of water, and mines (includ-
ing coal and oil). When we follow the path, we end at garbage dumps. 
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Here, I generalize the concept of garbage—but it should be understood 
as the opposite pole of all discussions of vanishing resources such as 
high-quality petroleum or water. In general, garbage includes solid gar-
bage (the original meaning of this term), liquid garbage (waste water) 
and gaseous garbage (waste gas), as well as dissipated heat (waste heat), 
the final state of all types of energy after usage. Viewed from a thermody-
namic perspective, the term “garbage” can be defined as matter and en-
ergy in a higher entropy state. Viewed thusly, global warming becomes a 
manifestation of the garbage problem. Everything in modern cities goes 
through the same economic chain, which is also a chain of transforma-
tion of energy and matter.
An Additional Explanation of Limited Earth
“We have only one earth,” seems the consensus of humans across the 
globe. The slogan can even be seen on a wall of a small village in China. 
It is usually interpreted in this way: the earth is limited, energy and re-
sources are limited, and we must economize on energy and resources so 
that we can develop continuously. This is the scenario of so-called sus-
tainability. But this interpretation considers only the upper link of the 
chain through which matter and energy are transformed, i.e., the former 
half of the economic chain. Considering the lower end of this chain, i.e., 
its economic process, we need to add: the capacity for containing garbage 
is limited too.
As a dynamic system for keeping its body in order, a living person has 
to: 1) take food in, and 2) discharge waste out. Similarly, as a bigger dy-
namic system a city has to: 1) take in energy and matter in a lower-entro-
py state, such as food, vegetables, water, coal, oil, natural gas, electricity, 
etc. from the outside, and 2) discharge that energy and matter in a high-
er-entropy state to the outside.
Viewed as a dynamic system, a city behaves like a heat engine. The 
more powerful it is, the more energy and material it needs to import and 
the more waste it must discharge to the outside. Garbage, or waste, is not 
avoidable in the operation of a heat engine. This is a simple application 
of the second law of thermodynamics. No heat engine has 100% efficien-
cy. Otherwise, it would be a perpetual motion machine. A modernized 
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city, like a huge heat engine, connects the two ends of the transformation 
chain of energy and matter: at one end are forests, minerals, and natural 
water, the energy and matter of lower-entropy states; at the other end is 
garbage, the energy and matter of higher-entropy state.
Industrialized civilization engine inputs natural water, mines, and for-
ests, and outputs garbage. The more highly developed a city becomes, the 
more powerful the engine is, and the faster it transforms nature into gar-
bage. Therefore, in the countryside around every big city, there must be 
many great garbage dumps. Even if the size of the city does not expand, 
and the living standards are not raised, new land for dumping garbage 
is still necessary. Beijing is an example of a city besieged by garbage. An 
aerial survey in 1983 showed that, within the city’s 750 square kilome-
ters, there were 4,699 garbage dumps! An official said in 2009, in Beijing, 
that the annual rate of increase for garbage had reached 8%, and that all 
available garbage-treating facilities had been working in excess of their 
maximum capacity. The daily municipal garbage production had reached 
18,400 tons, and the corresponding capacity for waste treatment was 
10,400 tons. As Xu Nan indicates in “To Look for the Way out of Gar-
bage Dumps Besieging the City,” within four to five years, there will be no 
place to dump the garbage.
Most substances in garbage are not produced by nature, but by hu-
mans. Many of the different materials in garbage never occurred together 
in nature, and we hardly know what kind of chemical reactions can re-
sult, what kind of compounds will be produced, and what consequenc-
es will result. It’s not rare for garbage to explode, or for leakage on the 
scale of Love Canal to escape. Only a few of these potential catastrophes 
were explored by laboratory experiments. Garbage dumps have become 
the most mysterious and dirtiest places on earth. Even if we were to dig 
pits with steel or concrete walls to confine the solid waste for millions of 
years, the situation would still be horrible. The contents of these garbage 
coffins cannot be part of any natural ecological system of the earth. In the 
crazy tide of modernization and globalization, these coffins will eventu-
ally cover the earth.
What is discussed above is only solid garbage. It seems that solid gar-
bage can be treated most easily and relatively locally. As for liquid gar-
bage (waste water) and gaseous garbage (waste gas), they directly join 
112 Tian Song
into the global flow of matter. Wastewater is ceaselessly discharged into 
rivers, lakes, and seas; and waste gas is interminably sluiced into the sky. 
They aggravate air pollution and water pollution on a global scale, regard-
less of how they are treated. In this way, environmental pollution can be 
viewed as garbage in a dispersed state.
For the fourth state of garbage, dissipated heat, there are no stopgaps.
Generalizing from a human body to a city, and from a city to the globe, 
one conclusion is that in any modernized area on a global scale, modern-
ization is based on two premises:
1. Energy and resources are transported continuously from non-
modernized or sub-modernized areas.
2. Garbage is discharged ceaselessly to these same areas.
Modernization is therefore like a “food chain.” The upstream nations or 
areas not only take the resources from the downstream, but also discharge 
their garbage into the downstream. Furthermore, any country engaged in 
modernization has to situate and hold its own “downstream.” Not all na-
tions or areas can control and maintain the downstream as their own.
In the Age of Limited Earth, Industrialized 
Civilization is Non-Sustainable
Throughout most of human history, Terra was almost infinite in relation 
to the human deployment of nature, and the potential for development 
was regarded as unlimited, too. During these earlier times, the level of 
development a nation was able to reach ultimately depended on readily 
available energy and resources. In those times, technology worked in two 
ways: 1) to exploit energy and resources in greater amounts and more 
quickly, and 2) to make use of resources and energy more efficiently. Be-
cause of the seemingly limitless Earth, new places could always be found 
and used as garbage dumps. So the garbage issue was only a simple and 
relatively insignificant issue related to saving or thrift; it was piddling 
and insignificant, while the energy and resource issues were tied to na-
tional policy.
Classical capitalistic economics is based on the very premise of an un-
limited Earth. According to Adam Smith, the founder of classical capi-
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talistic economics, through commercial exchange, different regions can 
interchange goods with each other and achieve a win-win result. Even 
under an unfair distribution system, every part in the economic system 
can obtain more production. That is so-called enlarging the pie. To ex-
pand the economic pie, it is necessary to develop new markets, to find 
new business partners, to exploit new resources, and to find new places to 
dump garbage. In this way, the pie can be made bigger and bigger, and the 
standard of living can be improved in every region. This win-win model is 
still espoused by most countries; more and more join the global capitalis-
tic matrix, whether by design or default.
We have now entered a new period of history; I call it the Age of Lim-
ited Earth. We have only one Earth, and the Earth is limited. In the Age 
of Limited Earth, the capitalistic economy meets its upper limit immedi-
ately, i.e., the Earth itself.
To overcome the limits at the systematic ceiling, many people still pin 
their hopes on future science and technology. They hope that unlimited 
science and technology can break through the Earth’s limitations. In fact, 
the validity of our contemporary life is based on future technologies that 
are not yet invented. Like a credit plan, we are spending technological 
and intellectual capital that we do not yet possess.
The belief in science and technology has a long history. Optimists 
imagined and expected many future technologies to solve the problem 
of energy and resources. It is often said that when wood was nearly ex-
hausted, a new technology for using coal was invented; when coal was 
far from exhausted, a new technology for using oil and natural gas was 
invented. By this line of reasoning, humans will invent alternative energy 
and resources in the future again, and enlarge the pie again. This way of 
thinking considers only the upper link of the transformation chain of en-
ergy and resources. Considering the lower extreme of the chain, we find 
that, no matter how highly developed the technology, human-generated 
garbage may only be cut quantitatively but not eliminated; otherwise, 
the second law of thermodynamics is violated. The energy problem can 
probably be solved by new technology. For example, if cold fusion is real-
ized, theoretically, we will possess infinite energy. But, this will make the 
garbage and resource problems all the worse. The more energy an engine 
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uses, the more raw materials it needs to take in, and the more garbage 
it generates.4
The garbage crisis will therefore exceed the crises in energy, food, and 
finance; it will become the most pressing geo-ecological threat of the 
near future. The next large-scale war will not be waged over taking some-
thing in, but over spewing something out.
Humans have overdrawn on the energy and resources of the entire 
globe; on the very spatial terrain for containing garbage. The Age of Lim-
ited Earth, of globalized monolithic modernization, is obviously doomed 
to failure. Simply speaking, if only half of the Chinese lived in a compara-
ble way to Americans, the resources of the earth would not be sufficient. 
It will be problematic, to say the least, to isolate space for the garbage be-
ing generated as we speak.
Industrialized civilization is definitely non-sustainable. This provides 
the framework in which we ponder the problems of modernized global-
ization and globalized modernization.
Modernization is a “Food Chain”
Because of terrestrial limitations, globalized modernization means a con-
test for global resources. To maintain and lift their modernization level, 
the upstream nations and areas must ensure that they can obtain energy 
and resources from the downstream, and also discharge their garbage to 
the downstream. The unification of the global economies means that the 
energy and resources of the earth converge into one chain of transforma-
tions. The Washington Consensus, promoting the unification of global 
economies, can be viewed as a means that opens the flow of energy and 
resources transporting and transforming on a global scale. Contempo-
rary international policies are surely profitable to the upstream countries 
because the policies were initiated and made by them.
If a traditional area wants to or is forced to join the modernization 
“food chain” and become a link in it, it can only join from downstream. 
This means that it has to provide energy and resources upstream, and ac-
cept garbage from there.
The “Guiyu garbage phenomenon”5 is a good example for illustrating 
the “food chain” of the global economic system. Guiyu (贵屿) is a small 
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county in Guangdong province, China. Its main industry has been treat-
ing and recycling e-waste since 1990s. Millions of pounds of e-waste is 
shipped to Guiyu every year, mostly from North America, and to a lesser 
degree from Japan, South Korea, and European countries. Thousands of 
workshops of different scales manually treat the e-waste, using a range of 
primitive techniques. Copper, steel, aluminum and some other profitable 
materials are distilled from the e-waste. In terms of thermal dynamics, 
lesser amounts of low-entropy-state matter are distilled from the mat-
ter in a high entropy state, consuming large amounts of power and clean 
water (low-entropy-state energy and matter). At the same time, the land, 
water, and air in Guigyu are severely polluted, and people’s health is seri-
ously harmed.
“Chemicals, including mercury, fluorine, barium, chromium and co-
balt, which either leach from the waste or are used in processing, are 
blamed for skin rashes and respiratory problems.” In “In E-Waste Heart-
land, a Toxic China,“ Christopher Bodeen has bemoaned that “Contami-
nation can take decades to dissipate, experts say, and long-term health ef-
fects can include damage to the kidneys and nervous system, weakening 
of the immune system and cancer.”
Such a garbage recycling industry positively thrives on the pollution 
and deterioration of the environment.
The “yew-stripping event” is another good example to illustrate the 
“food chain.”6 At the beginning of the 1990s, a patent for making breast 
cancer medicine, paclitaxel, which is distilled from yew bark, was ap-
proved in North America. Then, more than 3 million “red bean yews” 
in the Northwest of Yunnan Province, China, were stripped completely 
from 1992 to 2001, and left dead or dying. Lijiang (丽江), a city in Yun-
nan Province, inhabited by the Naxi ethnic group (纳西族) who histori-
cally have had a special tradition of environmental sustainability, suffered 
the most serious damage. The economic chain-reaction was as follows: 
Local Lijiang peasants stripped the yew and sold the yew bark to pack-
men; packmen sold the yew bark to small companies; small companies 
sold it to the Hande company (汉德公司) in Kunming, which is sup-
ported by the government of Yunnan province; Hande distilled pacli-
taxel from the yew bark with technology provided by Kunming Botany 
Institute, Chinese Science Academy; Hande sold paclitaxel to medical 
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corporations in North America, which produced cancer medicine. In this 
chain, all links made money. But the later the link in the chain, the more 
money it earned. The peasants stripping the yew gained the least money; 
and the medical corporations, the most. Which link, however, will bear 
the biological consequence of stripping yew? Of course, it is the local 
peasants, the lowest link of the “food chain.”
In this food chain, the medicine company is the upstream, and the lo-
cal people are the downstream. But, we should not ignore that the yew, 
the local ecological environment, is the bottom link of the chain.
As a downstream area, Lijiang provides a resource to upstream coun-
tries; while Guiyu accepts garbage from almost the same upstream coun-
tries. Viewed from the perspective of the transformation chain of energy 
and matter, the “yew-stripping event” shows the uplink of it, and the 
Guiyu garbage shows the downlink of it. In the contemporary unification 
of global economies, all countries in the world are involved in the same 
chain, the economic “food chain,” i.e. the transformation chain of matter 
Figure 8: Lige peninsula in Lake Lugu, October, 2000. 
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and energy. Being located in the downstream or mid-stream of the global 
modernization “food chain” is the background of all problems in non-
modernized or sub-modernized countries and areas.
A Case Study: Garbage of Lake Lugu, Yunnan Province
Development is a big word in contemporary China. For traditional areas, 
are there other ways to develop, which neither provide energy and re-
sources to the upstream, like yew-stripping in Lijiang, nor accept garbage 
from the upstream, like Guiyu? Tourism seems such an ideal way. But the 
garbage problem in Lake Lugu tells us that the so-called “ecological tour-
ism” is hardly ecological.
Lake Lugu (泸沽湖) is a great and beautiful lake at the boundary 
of Yunnan and Sichuan Province, in the Southeast of China. Since the 
1980s, more and more tourists have been visiting there.
In September 2003, I met Zhao Hua (赵画), an anthropological pho-
tographer. She took many pictures of the Nari people on the boundary of 
Sichuan Province and Yunnan Province. In January 2004, Zhao Hua told 
me that she would spend the spring festival with the Nari people close to 
Figure 9: The entrance of Lige. Note that there is a garbage can in the center of the photo. October 2000.
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Lake Lugu. I asked her to find the places where Lige and Luoshui (落水) 
dump their garbage. Luoshui is another Nari village close to Lige. It is the 
first village there that developed tourism, and therefore is the richest vil-
lage around Lake Lugu. It had Internet bars even before 2000.
One month later, Zhao Hua informed me that she had located the gar-
bage dumps of Lige and Loushi. Outside the latter village, a hill hundreds 
of meters long was covered by six years’ worth of garbage. There were 
plastic bottles, drinking packages, shoes, glass bottles, and batteries in-
side. Almost nobody from the village visited there; hence, nobody knew 
how bad the garbage problem had become.
As I stated above, the garbage problem in Lake Lugu is the internal 
problem of the industrial civilization. There are no industries around 
Lake Lugu, so there is no directly industrial garbage there. But they 
nonetheless had to deal with the garbage of industrial civilization. When 
they joined the “food chain” of modernization, the garbage problem was 
not avoidable.
The garbage there had two origins: that left by tourists, and that pro-
duced by villagers themselves after their living standard was raised. They 
Figure 10: Garbage can at the center of the previous photo.
Global Warming as a Manifestation of Garbage 119
made more and more money, and they began to use more and more in-
dustrial products in their daily lives, such as washing powder, shampoo, 
plastic shoes, etc., which are signs of civilization, development, progress, 
and so on. As a consequence, more and more non-biodegradable gar-
bage appeared. The villages are at the bottom of “food chain”; they can’t 
find their own downstream for dumping their own garbage, and can only 
dump their garbage on their own mountain.
A CCTV crew saw the pictures by Zhao Hua, and they made a TV pro-
gram. I saw it when it aired. They did not consider an explanation such as 
the one I have provided above; rather, they framed it in a conventional 
way: that the garbage dumps happened because some certain officials 
were not dutiful. After its broadcast, the mayor of Lijiang government 
asked the county to solve the problem immediately. The garbage hill was 
closed for several days, the garbage was burnt and moved, and it disap-
peared from the hill. Then, interesting things happened. As garbage was 
still produced every day in Luoshui, but officers dared not allow the vil-
lagers to dump it in the original hill, they had to find a brand-new place. 
At first, they wanted to dump the garbage in the mountain of another vil-
lage, but that village refused to accept it. At last, they had to dig a pit the 
Figure 11: Garbage dumped by Liege Village.
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size of a basketball court, on the land of the party secretary of the village, 
as a temporary garbage dump.
In 2006, a formal garbage dump was established in a mountain val-
ley tens of miles from Lake Lugu by the county government, which was 
designed by Tsinghua University. This is the only formal garbage dump 
in the area, and it was designed for the garbage from Luoshi, Youngn-
ing Township, and from a hotel run by the government. Some workers 
charge to burn some of the garbage, and compact the rest. This garbage 
dump was designed for a 20-year lifespan. The garbage dump looks like a 
white tinea on the mountain and can be seen from far away.
Readings taken of water visibility over a period of time in Lake Lugu 
can give us information about liquid garbage. Lake Lugu is very clear. In 
2000 when I visited there, the visibility of the lake water could reach 11 
meters. 1n 2004, when Zhao Hua visited there, the visibility was down to 
9 meters. A journalist friend for Yunnan TV told me that the number was 
14 meters in 1984. Obviously, the lake is becoming dramatically more 
polluted. Nari people have lived around Lake Lugu since the Han Dy-
Figure 12
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nasty, and they always drank lake water directly. But in 2000, I was told in 
Luoshui that the water close to shore was not drinkable, and people had 
to draw a boat to the center of the lake to take drinkable water.
Lige and Luoshui are symbols of traditional indigenous homelands. 
We can also view them as the boundary between traditional areas and 
industrial civilization. It is often argued that people in the village should 
pursue advancement, and that they have the right to advance or develop. 
It seems that tourism is an ideal way for the downstream to develop: it 
doesn’t require people to cut trees, dig mountains, or bottle water, but 
instead just sing and dance, row boats for the tourists, and make money. 
But, what are the consequences after they have made money?
There is an internal paradox in so-called ecological tourism that takes 
biodiversity and cultural diversity as resources to be exploited in “devel-
opment.” Any “resource” will be consumed and exhausted. With respect 
to culture diversity, the indigenous patterns of singing and dancing were 
Figure 13: Garbage hill: six years of garbage from Luoshui village. 
Photographed by Zhao Hua, May 21, 2004. 
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originally people’s way of life. When these were made into the resources 
of tourism, people began singing and dancing for money, with the result 
that these activities became not life itself, but a performance of life. When 
people make money, they want to live in increasingly modern ways; they 
no longer live as before, but as people in modern areas far from the village. 
Their singing and dancing lose authenticity and become a staged perfor-
mance. This means that the deepest resources they used for development 
are actually lost. This is a palpable shrinking at the “spiritual” level.
Considering development merely from the material point of view, de-
velopment means making more money. It is a way of lifting the standard 
of living, of being able to use more products emanating from industrial-
ized civilization. In the meantime, however, the village must accept gar-
bage from the industrialized sector. The garbage problem would definite-
ly accelerate, as in the villages considered above. The garbage problem is 
intrinsic to industrialization.
In the transformation chain of matter and energy within industrialized 
civilization, both the territory for resources at the upstream and the terri-
tory for garbage at the downstream, the original ecological system will be 
destroyed after the resources are lost and garbage is dumped. This is not a 
Figure 14: The garbage dump of Yongning in a mountain valley 
near Lake Lulu. Photographed on August 19, 2008
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win-win situation, but a lose-lose situation. In the case of Lake Lugu, the 
two links happened in the same territory.
When the traditional people have used up their tourism resources (i.e., 
the clean water, the green mountain, the native and local culture), the 
temporary modernization will disappear immediately. But they cannot 
go back to their original “primitive” life again, because they have lost their 
original environment and culture.
At the very beginning, when people in Lake Lugu chose their path to 
development, they did not foresee they would develop a severe garbage 
problem. If they had known, would they still have chosen this way?
From “How” to “Why”
All human economic activities are no more than links of matter and en-
ergy within the transformation and transportation chain. Science and 
technology are currently the engine of the chain. The advancement of 
science and technology can only accelerate and strengthen the chain, 
but can’t change the chain. Mineral water is a relatively simple product 
of industrial civilization. Turning on a TV, one can see more and more 
new products being advertised, all of which prove bewildering to people’s 
eyes and minds, and ruinous insofar as they ceaselessly prompt the cre-
ation of new desires. All economic activity, such as updating a computer 
or renewing a cell phone, accelerates the chain-reaction to convert more 
forest, minerals, and natural water into garbage. Modern civilization is es-
tablished on the remains of nature, constructed at the side of a garbage 
dump. As I discussed at the beginning of this paper, all the energy will 
turn into heat, the fourth state of garbage. Global warming is a byproduct 
of industrial civilization, of our modern way of life.
Why can we drink a bottle of mineral water on a city’s streets? Because 
there is still natural water that can be exploited, there is still land that 
can be used for dumping garbage. But this lifestyle is not sustainable. We 
should think about not only “how”: how to find and make use of more 
natural water, or how to increase the capacity for dumping garbage on 
certain land; but also “why”: why must we drink a bottle of mineral water 
from a remote mountain in a city street?
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What we need now is a new hero to shoot down the extra sun over the 
sky of industrial civilization, inside the mind of industrial civilization.
Notes
1. Spencer R. Weart, “The Discovery of the Risk of Global Warming.”
2. Claus Fröhlich, “Construction of a Total Solar Irradiance (TSI) Time-Series 
from 1978 to Present.”
3. “World Total Net Electricity Consumption, 1980–2006. Statistics gathered 
and furnished by the U.S. Government, Energy Information Administration.
4. I have discussed the legal dimension of these issues in my “The Third Class of 
Perpetual Motion Machine.”
5. Greenpeace China conducted an investigation in Guiyu in 2001 and 
published some Chinese-language reports. An English-language publication 
incorporating the Guiyu case study is Exporting Harm: The High-Tech Trashing 
of Asia, prepared by the Basel Action Network (BAN) and Silicon Valley 
Toxics Coalition. See, in addition, reportage furnished by He Hainang, 
Chien-Min Chung, and Christopher Bodeen. The Guiyu phenomenon 
was reported in an expose in the well-known Chinese newspaper, 
Southern Weekend.
6. Zeng Lin, “The Red Bean Yew Being Barked are Weeping.”
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Chapter 5
The Physical Reality of Water Shapes
James H. Bunn
“There is no doubt that that our body is a moulded river.”
– Friederich Novalis1
“Life is animated water.”
– Vladimir Vernadsky2
Among the several environmental energies, water seems most tangible 
and yet still elusive as it slips through your fingers in a wash, lovely to 
touch but impossible to hold, while it trickles to its lowest level. Water 
composes or “molds” most of our bodily substance into shapes, and yet 
its liquidity reminds that all of its living shapes, with their lofty composi-
tions and complex systems, are utterly riverine and will necessarily slip 
and twist into other renewable life forms along the way.
In “Proverbs of Hell,” William Blake wrote: “The cistern contains: the 
fountain overflows.”3 Although Blake may have been allegorizing reason 
versus the imagination, his primal insight about the liquid nature of water 
allows for his point of departure. Even the most up-to-date scientifically 
designed landfill, designed to contain toxic wastes, must eventually over-
flow and seep into adjacent ground waters. As the huge spill of toxic ash 
from a Tennessee Valley Authority landfill demonstrated recently, there 
is no containing its seepage. As we shall see in the section about Rachel 
Carson’s work, the flow of water enables life but it also can transport kill-
ing poisons. Because water twists away, its elusiveness makes it impossi-
ble to hold and contain, both in times of drought and in times of excessive 
moisture. You can contain it for a while, but it will overflow eventually.
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All over the world, in India, in the Tigris River of Iraq, in Kenya, in 
California’s great Central Valley, drought is killing plants and animals 
and humans in huge numbers. In lowland contours, where water flows 
down inevitably, rising waters from melting glaciers and much more vio-
lent storms are drowning people, plants, and animals. As Orrin H. Pilkey 
and Rob Young caution us in The Rising Sea, rising waters from the seas 
are changing the topography of the land and are forcing islanders in the 
South Pacific and lowlanders from Alaska to Bangladesh to migrate away. 
What is to be done, even if we pledge to become global stewards? No-
body knows for sure, because there are no quick fixes to climate change. 
Certainly the most graphic descriptions of rising waters and overheated 
lands can be found in Al Gore’s vivid illustrations in An Inconvenient 
Truth: The Planetary Emergence of Global Warming and What We Can 
Do About It.
In The Sacred Balance, David Suzuki reminds that the human need for 
fresh water is the crux of the history of civilizations: “Human beings lived 
along waterways that were used for food and travel long before there was 
history. We can infer this fact from prehistoric middens and sites of habi-
tation. And it was on the great flood plains that humans first established 
settlements, exploiting for agricultural use the regular floods that fertil-
ized the deltas. At the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in Mes-
opotamia the first civilizations arose, followed by settlements along the 
Nile River” (66–67). But if the Tigris River is drying up, does its demise 
condemn not only the way of life of the Marsh Arabs who live in its delta, 
but also Iraq’s civilization at large?
Clearly, the great cycles of air and water and heat energy that compose 
the living forms in the biosphere are no longer balancing. The dynamic 
equilibrium of all of these cycles is imbalanced because of accelerating 
expenditures of energy by human civilizations. For instance, according 
to a United Nations report issued in March, 2009, the relatively small 
amount of fresh water available to the present human population, about 6 
billion people, will be even smaller by 2050, when the number of humans 
is predicted to leap to 9 billion. This present and future demand makes 
water “more precious than oil or gasoline, but we take it for granted.”4
World agriculture consumes most of the water, followed by industrial 
and energy uses, and followed by domestic consumption. “Now climate 
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change and its effects on the hydrologic cycle pose new challenges to wa-
ter management and water availability” (Audubon 12).
In these times of unpredictable incidents of climate changes, finding 
the right equity between too little water and too much is the increasingly 
difficult question of dynamic equilibrium. According to Herbert Read, in 
his The Philosophy of Anarchism, “The most general law in nature is equi-
ty—the development of balance and symmetry which guides the growth 
of forms along the lines of the greatest structural efficiency. It is the law 
which gives the leaf as well as the tree, the human body, and the universe 
itself, an harmonious and functional shape, which is at the same time ob-
jective beauty” (41).5 I fully agree with this large claim about a natural 
law of balance and symmetry, so in this paper I pursue the question of 
the shapes of water and the living shapes in water, both in small scales 
and in large scales, not because we can easily solve the questions of an eq-
uitable distribution of water, but because I can say something about the 
morphology of water, which would be a beginning. That is, if we want to 
contribute to a re-balancing of the hydrological cycle and its place in the 
biospheric cycle, we need to begin to know the physical realities of water 
and its shapes.
In Books and Islands in Ojibwe Country, Louise Erdrich describes her 
companion’s upbringing within the influence of Lake of the Woods. Of 
the spiritual leader, Tobasonakwut, she says: “I have just decided that he 
and the lake are one person” (32). Is this a metaphor? Is it something 
more than an unapparent similarity? Is it a physical reality?
His people were the lake, and the lake was them. At one time, everyone 
who lived near the lake was essentially made of the lake. As the people 
lived off fish, animals, the lake’s water and water plants for medicine, they 
were literally cell by cell composed of the lake and the lake’s islands. To-
basonakwut’s father once said to him, ‘The creator is the lake and we are the 
waves on the lake’ ” (34).
By way of her italics, Erdrich asserts that the water waves are some-
thing more literal than a metaphor for the Ojibwe people. As the narra-
tion continues, she and her companion were maneuvering through the 
waves and cross-currents of the lake, so the setting invisibly influences 
her narrative. Energy waves may flow through all things and may trans-
port energy, but how do they mold animal life into streamlined mobile 
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forms? Are we, too, waves of the lake? What are the symmetrical shapes 
of the water that mold living forms, atom by atom, and cell by cell? How 
are large bodies of water like lakes similar in shapes to small puddles and 
even smaller molecular compounds of water? How are the shapes linked 
across scales from smaller to larger components?
Biosphere
Everyone knows that life forms cannot do without water, and many peo-
ple know that water makes up 60–80% of tissues in the body (Cycles of 
Life, 11). So most of us, cell by cell, are eventually composed from the 
water we drink in our neighborhood, whether Lake of the Woods or Lake 
Erie. We are, largely, the lake. Most students of the environment know 
the hydrological cycle. Here is Vaclav Smil’s summary:
More than 97% of the Earth’s water is in the ocean, and almost 
90% of all water evaporated comes from its surfaces. About 
half of all solar energy absorbed at the Earth’s surface is trans-
ferred to the atmosphere through the evaporation and con-
densation of water. The evaporating water absorbs heat as it 
changes from liquid to gas, then releases heat into the atmo-
sphere when it condenses into droplets. (Cycles of Life 11)
But those droplets of fresh water comprise only about 3% of the water 
on the earth. The rest is salty water. Of that 3% fresh water, about half is 
consolidated in glaciers or locked underground, so the world’s peoples 
gather mainly around lakes and rivers, which carry water from place to 
place.6 Because water is not equably distributed around the geographies 
of the world, much of the histories of peoples involve the migrations and 
quarrels over those places where potable water flows. As populations in-
crease over the next 50 years by one third, migrations will make the fight 
over arable land an intense squeeze play.
Environmentalists continuously seek to rephrase and redirect the 
question about the organization of the invisible forces flowing through 
an environment that sustain or kill us animals. Here is an epigraph taken 
from one of the earlier books featured in the environmental movement: 
“The flow of energy through a system acts to organize that system.” This 
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is a sentence from Harold Morowitz’s Energy Flow in Biology, and Stuart 
Brand put it at the head of his Whole Earth Catalog.7 Furthermore, Mo-
rowitz says, “The major component of all functioning biological systems 
is water” (Energy Flow in Biology 46).
The very concept of a systemic biosphere first relies upon the spheri-
cal nature of the earth’s rotation, and it implies further that the cycles of 
energy—water, air, light, and other visible and invisible energies, such as 
infrared and sonar frequencies of wave forms—are being organized and 
distributed in patterns around the globe. The sphere cycles because the 
earth rotates, together with the orbits of the sun and moon, and because 
the planet is held in mobile equilibrium with the other planetary bodies 
by means of gravity. The bio-sphere, where life forms congregate, cycles, 
because life forms also convert these energies, mainly induced by the 
sun’s radiant hydrology. The great ocean currents that swirl around the 
continents are crucial carriers of life energy, from the basic element car-
bon and its compound carbon dioxide, to all the infinitesimal and huge 
forms of life within the sea’s food chain (Cycles of Life 49–50).
Suzuki entitles his chapter on water, “The Ocean Flowing through Our 
Veins,” in order to reinforce his large thesis that our bodies are necessar-
ily connected to the earth by water, as well as the other primal elements. 
In his section on the oceans he describes the ways that ocean currents, 
together with the sun, induce the various climates and temperatures 
around the globe. While the air temperature of the globe changes rapidly, 
the oceans absorb huge amounts of solar energy, and their depths create 
a huge reservoir that discharges this energy very slowly. Hence the oceans 
stabilize the globe’s temperature (Sacred Balance 70). As for the currents 
themselves, he says, “In the mid-latitudes, huge wind-driven gyres (circu-
lar systems of currents) transport heat polewards from near the equator, 
ameliorating terrestrial temperatures and weather. The warm Kuroshio 
Current flowing from the western Pacific Ocean south of Japan across 
to North America affects weather as far inland as the Midwest and from 
California to Alaska” (70). Suzuki also describes the ways that animal lar-
vae and eggs have evolved to ride these currents. Elvers, small eels, also 
ride them to their local habitats around the world. Humans have also rid-
den these currents for migration and trade. Here is his eloquent summa-
tion about ocean currents: “… when we use the currents, we are in touch 
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with the great forces of the planet—its rotation in space, the prevailing 
winds, the slow, curling drift of ocean water transporting heat, maintain-
ing the earth’s atmospheric equilibrium. Connecting continent to conti-
nent, pole to pole, the currents are like a living web, moving and winding 
and mixing, wrapping itself perpetually around the whole world” (71). 
Currents, too, are shapes in water, and we necessarily live within them.
The Shape of the Water Molecule
The structure of a water molecule is peculiar, and its structural qualities 
make it remarkably sufficient for the support of the life forms in water 
(Anthropic Cosmological Principle 524–41). The study of water under both 
heated and frozen conditions is a complicated branch of thermodynam-
ics that extends into related disciplines such as geology and geography.8
Any biology or chemistry textbook will describe the water molecule’s 
basic structure, and there are plenty of images available on the World 
Wide Web. The three atoms that make up H2O have two hydrogen atoms 
bonded to the oxygen atom in a structure like a tetrahedron, in which the 
hydrogen atoms are always located at about 105 degrees to one another, 
much like a V or Y shape. A slight negative charge on the oxygen end 
of the molecule, combined with a slight positive charge at the hydrogen 
end, which makes for the Y symmetry, make it almost infinitely attractive 
to other water molecules. As Suzuki notes, the numberless symmetries 
of snowflakes derive from this dipolarity of water molecules (Sacred Bal-
ance 64–65). Under different conditions—such as vapor, as liquid, or as 
solid ice crystals—water molecules have different symmetrical cluster-
ings, but all share that off-angular structure. For instance, the tetrahedral 
bond is to be found in hexagonal ice. Now the peculiarity of watery ice is 
that it is lighter in its solid state than in its liquid state, because its crys-
tal structure contains more widely spaced lattices, where there is nothing 
but space between the lattices. Ice floats because there is nothing in the 
latticed spaces except space. Although we might assume that ice is more 
closely packed than water, it is in fact less densely composed. If ice were 
heavier than water, it would sink to the bottom upon freezing. But on the 
surface, ice protects and insulates life forms underneath it. Furthermore, 
surface ice insulates water from increasing vaporization by the sun’s heat. 
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When global warming decreases the ice area on the surface of the Great 
Lakes during the winter, for example, water levels drop and life forms suf-
fer from the decrease in habitat.
There is a lot more to the study of angular flow patterns. Without trying 
to diagram the possible molecular bonds of a water molecule, I can never-
theless quickly show how a symmetrical Y shape can lead algorithmically 
to a tree pattern. Draw a Y shape on a piece of paper. Add two shorter and 
thinner lines to each branch that make a smaller Y. Keep repeating. You 
get a tree diagram. The fractional Y is a fractal, and the repetitive instruc-
tion is an algorithm. The structure of the water molecule is pregnant with 
the possible replications of the leaves and trees, the model for Thoreau’s 
famous progression in the sandbank scene in Walden. But notice that if 
we insist that the Y shape is driving the composition, as in the algorithm 
for drawing it, then it is seen as a derivative of the argument from design, 
with a humanoid designer or creator, just as Dr. Pangloss insisted that 
noses were invented for the purpose of holding spectacles.
In his classic work about the shapes of organisms, On Growth and 
Form, D’Arcy Thompson describes the symmetry of a tetrahedron, and 
more specifically of the atomic angle at which particles come together in 
three-space. The angle is always about 109 degrees, and it is usually called 
the tetrahedral angle:
It is an angle of statical equilibrium, an angle of close pack-
ing, an angle of repose. In the simplest of carbon-compounds, 
the molecule of marsh gas, (CH4 ), we may be sure that this 
angle governs the arrangement of H-atoms; it determines the 
relation of the carbon-atoms, one to another in a diamond, 
the simplest of crystal lattices; it defines the intersections of 
the bubbles in a froth, and of the cells in the honeycomb of 
the bee. (498)
What an inclusive sentence about the tetrahedral angle, with its triple 
succession of “an angle.” An angle of repose is used in geology to describe 
the off angle at which particles cohere on a slope. And it also appears as 
the title to Wallace Stegner’s best novel. Again, what does the tetrahedron 
structure have to do with water? “The bond angle of the free water mole-
cule (104.5°) is only slightly less than the ideal tetrahedral angle (109.5°), 
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so water molecules tend to polymerize to form a tetrahedral structure. 
This structure is rigid in ice, but water polymers exist even in liquid wa-
ter” (Anthropic Principle 528).
So the off-angled Y symmetry is not so much an archetypical design 
that is itself singly shaping the pattern; that would imply Thoreau’s Cre-
ator extravagantly strewing Y designs. Instead it is a human urge towards 
seeing symbolic shapes, so it can be seen as a sign of a conservation prin-
ciple of close-packing atoms in optimal symmetries that conserve energy. 
That is, the Y shape, and all other such branching shapes, derive from the 
junction of molecules, atomically composed together in atomic bonds, 
and more or less closely packed, as in the shapes of clustered soap bub-
bles or ice crystals or honeycombs or leaf and tree runnels. Here again is 
the real-world convergence of conservation and symmetry in large units, 
not just the atomic spin of quantum mechanics.
One recalls that soap bubbles are also least-resistant examples of spher-
oid symmetries that dilate in optimal shapes, but their inner air is an ar-
rangement of expanding gaseous molecules. So too with ice and snow; 
their latticed spaces are dilated into symmetries of free beauty. With soap 
bubbles one sees the round shapes and not the Y junctions that denote 
their squeezed distortions. With rivers and capillaries, one sees the Y 
junctions and not the pressures from the surrounding plate tectonics that 
squeezed and shaped them into mountains and valleys.9
It depends on one’s point of view. When one looks at Y junctions, one 
is seeing, either implicitly or explicitly, a sign of connection, of relation. 
In Mind and Nature, Gregory Bateson calls this kind of pattern that con-
nects, a “metapattern” (11), asking, “What is the pattern that connects 
all living creatures?” (8). The answer is symmetry. A Y-shaped junction 
is a sign of orderly connection, found in nature, not a designed sign, that 
relates one pattern to another similar pattern. A series of Y junctions may 
be seen as an energy network of transporting wave forms that allows for com-
munication along its interconnections.
It was Benoit Mandelbrot, in his 1972 book called Fractals: Form, 
Chance and Dimension, who first described these watery Y-shaped junc-
tions in river networks as fractal eddies. In order to describe the “self-
similarity” of fractals across different magnitudes of scale, he cites a 1917 
study by Lewis F. Richardson—“over a wide range of scales turbulence is 
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made of self-similar eddies” (17). Sym Van den Lyn and Stuart Cowan 
introduce their book Ecological Design with an assertion about the dif-
ferent scales of water: “Jumping in scale a thousandfold at each step, we 
encounter a drop of water at a scale of one millimeter, a puddle at one 
kilometer, and the Antarctic ice at one thousand kilometers” (33). The 
great natural cycles link these scales of water through their flows of en-
ergy, from the small shape of the water molecule to the shapely currents 
in the biosphere.
Here is an example of a wave form from traditional art that makes their 
point visually. They use Katshushika Hokusai’s woodcut The Great Wave 
Off Kanazawa (1829–1830) to illustrate a fractal image: “The similarity 
of forms, built up by self-similar patterning is a fractal, which is geom-
etry of scale linking from smallest to largest…” (Ecological Design 38). 
Hokusai’s The Great Wave is so illustrious that it appears on the covers 
of engagement calendars and memorandum books. Claude Débussy ap-
parently was inspired by it in composing La Mer. There are many images 
of it, appropriated for different reasons online, and I invite you search for 
one. You can see in any reproduction that even Mount Fuji, looming in 
the background, is an inverted wave form, which is repeated in the small 
mountainous sea wave in the foreground. The print may be said to be 
composed of lots of different wave forms, from the very small to the very 
large. In an earlier version of the print, Hokusai did not draw froth forms 
at the tips of the breaking waves; instead he drew and inscribed flocks of 
small birds whose very abstract forms curved like the spume of wave tips. 
Wave and wing have the same torque and angular inclination. Are watery 
wave forms to be thought of as fractals, or are fractals not symptoms of 
the transfer of momentum by waves?
Across several magnitudes of scales of water, one can find self-similar 
forms of branching—from crystals to tree branches to river flow pat-
terns. The first popularizer of the concept of fractals was James Gleick 
in his 1987 book entitled Chaos.10 Later he wrote the text for one of El-
liot Porter’s books of nature photographs called Nature’s Chaos. There he 
describes the structure of a river as being treelike. I quote it completely 
because of its summary inclusiveness of Y–shaped networking, repeated 
across different scales of magnitude:
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A river is, in its essence, a thing that branches. So are most 
plants: trees themselves, bushes, ferns. So is lightning, con-
trary to our common lightning-bolt stereotype, which is a 
sort of stretched Z. So is a human lung, a tree of ever-smaller 
tubes: bronchi, bronchia, and bronchioles, intertwining with 
another tree, the network of blood vessels.
North America’s largest river actually spans thirty-one Ameri-
can states and two Canadian provinces. It embodies without 
discrimination the great tributaries we think of as separate 
rivers; it is the Mississippi-Ohio-Tennessee-Arkansas Except 
in human perception and language, nothing separates its few 
wide and deep stretches from its small and narrow ones. Al-
though it flows inward toward its trunk, in geological time 
it grew, and continues to grow, outward, like an organism, 
from its ocean outlet to its many headwaters. In the vernac-
ular of a new science, it is fractal, its structure echoing itself 
on all scales, from river to stream to brook to creek to rivu-
let, branches too small to name and too many to count. (Na-
ture’s Chaos 13)11
The Y-shaped structure of a water molecule keeps being repeated 
across several levels of scale. Suzuki says similarly, “Across continents, the 
network of waterways resembles the circulatory system of the body. And 
in fact, that is the role that lake and river systems perform…. Patterns of 
rootlets, roots, and branches; rivulets, creeks, and rivers; veins and capil-
laries in living tissue—they all reflect the same physical realities and bind 
us all together in the Earth’s vital processes” (Sacred Balance 57). This 
physical reality, too, is what Erdrich was learning about the lake and its 
people. The river flows through us and helps to shape us. If we want to 
understand climate change, and if we want to contribute to a re-balanc-
ing, we must understand these physical realities.
In his chapter on “Branches,” Ball features the fractal dimensions of 
networks, and he summarizes a number of scientific studies that compare 
the arterial networks of blood capillaries and the branching patterns of 
trees; they both branch by a conservation principle of least work, a vari-
ant of the principles of least action, or least resistance (Self-MadeTapestry 
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127–128). In the section called “A River Runs through It,” he features the 
work of geomorphologists, those who study the shape of landscapes. He 
describes the work of Luna Leopold and others who gauge the role of 
randomness in the shapes of meandering river channels and their distri-
bution and buildup of sediment (153–155). Leopold analyses the scour-
ing and filling of sediment in the creation of river meanders, and he uses 
both mathematics and geometry to measure river bends. The shapes of 
river meanders are too large a topic for this essay, but suffice it to general-
ize that the shapes of meanders slow down a straight-down rush of water 
to a large sink, and in so doing delay and trap morsels of life that enrich 
the surrounds.
Nature Fights Back
As a national issue, the environmental movement really began with the 
outcry that ensued following the publication in 1962 of Rachel Carson’s 
magnificently instructive book Silent Spring. As Al Gore wrote in his In-
troduction to a new edition of the book, before its publication “there was 
virtually no public dialogue about the growing, invisible dangers of DDT 
and pesticides and chemicals…. Without this book the environmental 
movement might have been long delayed or never have developed at all” 
(Silent Spring, xv). Its publication, and the public outrage about its argu-
ments, marks Silent Spring as one of the most effective teacherly instru-
ments in the history of environmental writing.
Carson’s entire thesis is that invisible poisons flowing through the envi-
ronment cannot be limited to one specific purpose, nor to one exclusive 
locale, nor can they be finally contained, but these poisons are uninten-
tionally spilling over and killing off birds and plants and animals, includ-
ing us. Truly, a river runs through us. She arranges her chapters around 
earth, air, and water ecological cycles. Life forms flow through these cy-
cles, but forms of death also build up and physically circulate back, pri-
marily by the transportation of flowing water. Everything in nature cycles 
back because the globe spins on its own axis and because the globe ro-
tates around the sun. All energy cycles interconnect even as one form of 
energy converts into others. If we want to do something about climate 
change, we need to cope with these physical realities.
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Carson’s entire book is an elegant fusion of technical know-how and 
know-whether. The book begins simply with an animal fable, about the 
death of birds, and the silent spring when no birds sing, but it follows 
immediately with a rigorously straightforward explanation of carbon as 
composing both the building blocks of life and “agents of death” (18). 
What is that peculiar atomic structure? Nowadays every rigorous envi-
ronmentalist understands the conservation/symmetry principle of car-
bon as a building block of life. At the outset of their education, all stu-
dents of biology and organic chemistry learn the structure of the carbon 
atom, but Carson wants a general audience, mostly uninformed in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, to learn about these building blocks. Nowa-
days there are many excellent popular science writers who know how to 
describe with rigor and clarity the workings of an arcane topic. For in-
stance, Smil describes extensively the ways that an airborne element like 
sulfur, spewing emissions from coal-burning power plants, contributes 
to the acidification of northeastern lakes and to an accelerating decline 
in forests (Cycles of Life 154–165). But Carson had to do much of that 
spadework for herself. She demonstrates over and over again that the 
chemical elements are destined to flow through all the interconnected 
energy cycles of water, air, and soil. So her large thesis, never before so 
persuasively argued, is that all life forms are interlinked through the cir-
culation, and the cycling back, of chemical elements in the environment. 
Truly, a river runs through us.
Towards the end of Silent Spring, Carson rounds off her argument in a 
chapter called “Nature Fights Back.” Carson’s thesis is in keeping with her 
main argument about the rotation cycles of earth that flow and cycle back 
upon us as perpetrators. As she says, they boomerang back. “We can no 
more control nature than we can control the sun coming up.” Or as Mo-
rowitz says, “In steady-state systems, the flow of energy through a system 
from a source to a sink will lead to at least one cycle in the system” (Ener-
gy Flow 33). That is a story about equal and opposite rotations. All energy 
cycles involve feedback loops. How so? The short answer is that the globe 
rotates and returns together with the other planets in the solar system.
Although nature cannot be ultimately controlled, its resources can 
be drastically diminished, especially those from the sea. Age-old fishing 
banks all over the world are being overfished—from the early example 
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of the shrimp fishery in Monterey Bay to the great cod fisheries off the 
Grand Banks, which have been fished since the 16th century by Euro-
peans. Called by economists the law of diminishing returns, the fishing 
example is that bigger and bigger trawlers, accompanied by huge factory 
ships that are floating refrigerated processing plants, with more and more 
sophisticated equipment, are fishing deeper than ever for increasingly 
smaller catches. And yet we still consume Chilean sea bass, a deep dwell-
ing fish that can no longer escaper the deeper nets. This is an example of 
positive feedback where the equilibrium cycle is disrupted. Some say that 
this fishing example is also a “tragedy of the commons,” the idea that free 
gifts from the sea and the land and the air are unprotected by internation-
al laws because they are commonly shared but not privately owned and 
therefore unprotected. Suzuki says that air is truly a “global commons,” 
and so are the oceans, but they need to be protected by new international 
environmental laws.
Washing Up
Suzuki shows that the molecular structure of water makes it a “universal 
solvent.” Its dipolar electric charge allows it to break down both inorganic 
and organic compounds. We use it to wash up. We use it to break up dirt 
on our hands and on our dishes. We live at the junctures of rivers and 
lake, but we spill our liquid wastes so that the folks downstream suffer. 
As Carson showed, water can carry life forms, but it can also transport 
deathly chemical compounds. We use water to help dissolve oil spills, 
like the Exxon Valdez, and the more recent potash spill in Tennessee. 
The tanker was a container ship, and the embankments in Tennessee 
used state-of-the-art containment principles, but all liquids will eventu-
ally spill over. The ultimate sink for holding water is of course the ocean, 
and it is becoming more and more polluted by our spills of chemicals and 
plastics and other wastes. As David Bellido indicates in his “Truth on the 
Half Shell,” oceans absorb at least ¼ of the CO2 that humans load into 
the air through fossil burning.
In the practice of Engaged Buddhism, the Vietnamese monk, Thich 
Nhat Hanh, teaches mindfulness: both mindfulness in ordinary everyday 
chores, like washing dishes, as well as more extraordinary acts, like prac-
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ticing peace or deep ecology.12 When practicing to be mindful, he says, 
the most commonplace things in life can be seen as extraordinary. Wa-
ter sustains all the species of life, yet it is common as dishwater. So when 
we open the water tap to wash up, he says, it helps to breathe a gatha 
like this one:
 Water flows over these hands.
 May I use them skillfully
 To preserve the planet. 
Once you understand the shapes of flowing water, you can begin to see 
that the morphology of hands and fingers, with their Y junctions, that 
hands—like fins and wings—stroke through the fluid they are made of. 
We are truly connected to water in peculiar ways, but the work of hands 
in solvent water makes the difference.
Notes
1. Friederich Novalis, Aphorisms. Quoted by Schwenk, Sensitive Chaos, 58. My 
essay is part of a book project about the balance and symmetries of animals 
moving in their environmental energy channels.
2. Vladimir Vernadsky founded the systematic study of the biosphere. Quoted 
by David Suzuki, The Sacred Balance, 59. Vaclav Smil introduces Cycles of Life: 
Civilization and the Biosphere with Vernadsky’s work.
3. William Blake, “The Marriage of Heaven and Hell,” in The Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, 36.
4. See David Gallo, quoted in “Drinking Problem,” Audubon (July–
August, 2009): 12.
5. The Philosophy of Anarchism (London: Freedom Press, 1940, 41. For Herbert 
Read’s source see Sir Henry Maine’s chapter. “Law of Nature and Equity,” in 
his Ancient Law, amply quoted in Read’s English Prose Style (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1950), 92–93.
6. For a more complete and precise discussion of these percentages, see Smil, 
The Earth’s Biosphere: Evolution, Dynamics, and Change, Chapter 5, “Water and 
Material Flows.”
7. Harold Morowitz, Energy Flow in Biology; Stewart Brand, The Last Whole Earth 
Catalog, inside front cover.
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8. See the chapter on “Fluids” in Phillip Ball, The Self-Made Tapestry, Pattern 
Formation in Nature.
9. For a similar analysis, that demonstrates these kinds of junctions in nature are 
a natural syntax, see my Wave Forms: A Natural Syntax for Rhythmic Language.
10. James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science. For excellent summaries of recent 
work about fractal patterns in crystals, growing things, and river networks, 
also see Ball’s chapters “Branches” and “Breakdowns” in Self-Made Tapestry.
11. In his chapter “Branches,” Ball summarizes a number of twentieth-
century scientificstudies of arterial networks and tree branches  (Self-Made 
Tapestry 128–33).
12. Thich Nhat Hanh, “Look Deep and Smile: The Thoughts and Experiences of a 
Vietnamese Monk,” collected in Buddhism and Ecology. Also see Dharma Rain: 
Sources of Buddhist Environmentalism.
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Chapter 6
Sacrifice Mimesis, and the 
Theorizing of Victimhood 
(A Speculative Essay)
Rey Chow
In his provocative study, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 
Giorgio Agamben brings attention to the notion of biopolitics as ex-
pounded by Michel Foucault in the first volume of The History of Sexual-
ity and elsewhere, to argue an originarily juridico-political basis for the 
relationship between sovereign power and naked human existence, what 
Agamben refers to as “bare life.”1 This basis, understood by Agamben as 
the near indistinguishability or irreducible connection between law and 
violence, is also described by him as “the single real content of law” (65). 
Few readers, I suspect, would detect in Agamben’s book any substantial 
link to the subject of mimesis. In the context of the twentieth century, 
it would certainly seem more logical to explore such a link in more well-
known classics on art, literature, representation, and cultural politics—as 
for instance Walter Benjamin’s discussion of technical reproducibility, 
which destroys auratic distance and enables the replication of things on 
an unprecedented scale; Erich Auerbach’s ruminations on the historically 
evolving relationship among fiction, temporality, and humanity; Fou-
cault’s description of the decline of language’s capacity for corresponding 
to the world’s plenitude; or Edward W. Said’s criticism of the ideological-
ly suspect, fantastical caricatures of the East by Western scribes, artists, 
and imperialists alike.2 My own indebtedness to all these studies notwith-
standing, what interests me about mimesis is a specific problem, namely, 
the manner in which mimesis has figured in certain kinds of theorizing 
about victimhood and what may be loosely termed subordinated or stig-
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matized existence. Given the massive unresolvable conflicts that shape 
the contemporary world, this problem is likely to remain topical in the 
twenty-first century. In order to follow the conceptual paths around it, it 
is necessary, I have noticed, to push against the limits of what is accepted 
as commonsensical thinking (humanistic, moral, or ethical). This essay 
is, essentially, an attempt at such “following” and “pushing”—hence its 
speculative, rather than conclusive, nature.
Since he has not discussed mimesis per se, the relevance of Agamben’s 
book is, as I will go on to show, surprising and convoluted: it lies dormant 
in a part of his argument that, with a kind of suggestiveness that can only 
result from the kinship of ideas, alerts me to what I’d like to argue as mi-
mesis’ conceptual double or conjoined twin—sacrifice.
Sacrifice as a Mythologeme; or, the Aesthetics/
Ethics of the Unrepresentable
Agamben’s use of Foucault’s work is intriguing in at least two respects. 
First, he sees sovereignty as residing in the relation of what he calls “ban”: 
“He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and 
made indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it, that is, exposed and 
threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, be-
come indistinguishable The originary relation of law to life is not applica-
tion but Abandonment. The matchless potentiality of the nomos, its origi-
nary ‘force of law,’ is that it holds life in its ban by abandoning it” (29). 
This emphasis on ban suggests that Agamben’s understanding of power 
is, unlike Foucault’s, essentially negative and prohibitive in orientation. 
Whereas Foucault’s major intervention has been to shift this traditional 
understanding of power to the positive, indeed enabling and progressive, 
capacities in which power thrives in modernity, for Agamben power re-
mains the power to taboo, exclude, withhold, and annihilate (despite his 
nuanced articulation of the paradox between exception and rule).3 Hence 
his pronouncement, on a universal scale:
Everywhere on earth men live today in the ban of a law and a 
tradition that are maintained solely as the “zero point” of their 
own content, and that include men within them in the form 
of a pure relation of abandonment. All societies and all cul-
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tures today (it does not matter whether they are democratic 
or totalitarian, conservative or progressive) have entered into 
a legitimation crisis in which law (we mean by this term the 
entire text of tradition in its regulative form, whether the Jew-
ish Torah or the Islamic Shariah, Christian dogma or the pro-
fane nomos) is in force as the pure “Nothing of Revelation.” 
But this is precisely the structure of the sovereign relation, 
and the nihilism in which we are living is, from this perspec-
tive, nothing other than the coming to light of this relation as 
such. (Homo Sacer 51)
By its definitive tone—“Everywhere on earth,” “All societies and all 
cultures today”—this passage not only reinforces the negative and pro-
hibitive notion of power but also asserts that such power applies in all 
societies and all cultures regardless of their actual systems of government 
(and, by implication, regardless of their histories of political evolution). 
As is the case throughout his book, Agamben names this power “law” 
(in a move that goes in the opposite direction from Foucault’s explicit 
warning that law is an inadequate model with which to deal with ques-
tions of power).4 Agamben holds that power-as-law is facing a legitimacy 
crisis because its basis is increasingly revealed to be “nothing.” For him, 
however, this nothingness, which may be understood as the non-exis-
tence of any concrete justification/grounding for whatever happens to 
rule, is, precisely, the heart of the matter, the truth about politics based on 
law. Accordingly, the “nihilism” we are experiencing everywhere today is 
simply the “coming to light”—the deconstructing illumination, shall we 
say—of this fundamentally vacuous “structure of the sovereign relation.”
Second, in keeping with his formulation of power as ban, Agamben’s 
argument also seems to overlook—inevitably perhaps—the attempt 
Foucault made at historicizing. For Foucault, biopolitics, with its dedi-
cation to the proliferation of apparatuses for the management of bodies, 
took shape as the older notion of sovereignty premised on the power 
to kill evolved into more “lenient” and “gentle” forms of governance in 
the modern period. As in the case of his other studies of the processes 
of institutionalization and socialization of the modern subject, Foucault’s 
overall intellectual interest in biopolitics was directed, to invoke his 
memorable phrase, at “the entry of life into history” (History of Sexual-
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ity, I 141). Agamben’s emphasis is quite different—and contrary: he is 
interested rather in articulating the meanings of a modern and contem-
porary Western world in which bare life, even when reduced to seemingly 
mere biological existence, is nonetheless entirely enmeshed in sovereign 
power—a world in which, in other words, biological survival itself must 
be recognized as always already political—political as defined in the 
aforementioned terms of a definitive nihilism. (He therefore holds that 
there is no outside to the law.) In order to argue this absolute—and thus 
timeless—relationship between sovereign power and bare life, Agamben 
must of necessity sidestep the historicity of the transition (from premod-
ern to modern times) that Foucault clearly introduced into his argument. 
And, because sovereignty (power as ban) remains the only viable form 
of agency Agamben envisages, bare life itself, instead of being histori-
cized, is implicitly eroticized by him in the form of an obscene spectacle, 
in which the subject that matters is not only one that has been totally 
crossed out (violated) but also one that has been crossed out (violated) 
by denudation.
Even if Foucault’s mode of historicizing is considered questionable (a 
point that can certainly be made), it seems to me that Agamben’s argu-
ment of a continuous biopolitics that runs, conceptually, from Europe-
an antiquity to European modernity, culminating in the catastrophe of 
the Nazi concentration camps of the 1930s and 1940s, has still funda-
mentally neglected the critical dimension of Foucault’s work that fore-
grounds the supremacy of life as the biopolitical imperative in the mod-
ern age. It is in this sense of a coercive imperative to live/stay alive that 
Foucault’s work resonates most readily with the high tech, medical, and 
political manipulations of contemporary human existence, from the os-
tracism and incarceration of the insane and the criminal, to the surveil-
lance of sexual practices, to the ever-generative forms of discipline and 
production of docile subjects in our civil institutions. In the twenty-first 
century, as such manipulations of human existence are brought to un-
precedented levels of sophistication and efficiency through intersecting 
global networks of communications and trafficking, Foucault’s point that 
biopolitics is a matter of governing the living, of regulating/normalizing 
how populations should live, remains incontrovertibly on the mark. For 
Agamben, on the other hand, the coercive imperative at stake is a mat-
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ter of extermination: his transformation of Foucault’s biopolitics into a 
thanatopolitics in this regard is justified by his primary example of the 
Nazi camps. In the finality of the slaughter of the Jews, the Gypsies, the 
communists, and the homosexuals, as well as the euthanasia imposed on 
those who were mentally deficient or physically handicapped, there is, he 
suggests, little leeway for considering life other than as “bare”—stripped 
of all supplemental attributes that would render it “more” human. His 
real point, however, is that even such bare, reduced life, life shorn of all 
human decency, needs to be returned and restored to its due human con-
nection, a connection that he reiterates as fundamentally juridico-politi-
cal, in the double sense of law-cum-violence and law-cum-nothingness.5
Being aware of the fact that his subject of study can easily—indeed has 
often been—approached through the notion of sacrifice, Agamben takes 
pains to distance his own argument from such sacrificial logic. Referring 
to the sacred as a “mythologeme” that originated from William Rob-
ertson Smith’s Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (1889) and passed 
quickly into French sociology, Agamben rejects the sacrificial logic on 
account of its imputed ambivalence—that is, its capacity for holding 
together and making interchangeable two opposed categories, the holy 
and the profane. This is a capacity that fascinated thinkers from Sigmund 
Freud and Marcel Mauss to Émile Benveniste, Émile Durkheim, and 
Claude Lévi-Strauss. Precisely what these thinkers considered to be the 
attractive conceptual resilience of the sacred—its potential for a certain 
duplicity, for shuttling back and forth between the polarities of high and 
low, consecrated and filthy—becomes for Agamben a kind of “veil,” an 
“aura” whose spell needs to be broken: “The wish to lend a sacrificial aura 
to the extermination of the Jews by means of the term ‘Holocaust’ was, 
from this perspective, an irresponsible historiographical blindness The 
truth—which is difficult for the victims to face, but which we must have 
the courage not to cover with sacrificial veils—is that the Jews were exter-
minated not in a mad and giant holocaust but exactly as Hitler had an-
nounced, ‘as lice,’ which is to say, as bare life” (114).
Its morally austere nature notwithstanding, this argument leaves open 
an important question: what if the notion of sacrifice is subscribed and 
adhered to by the victims and their community, as an inalienable part of 
their belief? In other words, what if sacrifice is part of an effort to (re)
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imagine and (re)narrativize an otherwise lost, because inaccessible, 
past—a collective, retrospective striving for coherence? True, such striv-
ing often leads to the (problematic) monumentalization of catastrophes, 
but on the basis of what moral authority should such striving be invali-
dated and repudiated? Another well-known example from Judeo-Chris-
tian history may help clarify the problem at stake: to the Roman officials 
in occupied Judea, the execution of a political dissenter such as Jesus, 
too, probably meant little more than the routine extermination of “lice,” 
but for the followers of Christianity, that execution (together with the 
its horrendous instrument, the cross) has carried a definitive symbolic 
significance of sacrifice over the centuries.6 For these followers, it is the 
subject that bears the cross, rather than the subject that has been crossed 
out, that remains ever noteworthy.
Agamben’s critique of the sacrificial logic can, of course, be seen as 
an eminently post-Enlightenment, secularist gesture. To this extent, his 
question “In what, then, does the sacredness of the sacred man consist?” 
is a rhetorical one (72). The answer is obvious: such sacredness consists 
not in any (residual) religious sense of the sacred but rather in the inex-
tricable link between sovereign power and human existence. Just as this 
link manifests itself in bare life—the “life that may be killed but not sac-
rificed” (a phrase Agamben repeats numerous times in his book)—so 
too would sovereignty become groundless were it not for the existence 
of such bare life and its potential to be killed (114). At the same time, as 
more and more people get killed in our contemporary world without rea-
son, justification, or representation—as the lives of the innocent pile up 
like wreckage against the precarious grounds of sovereignty—the sover-
eign relation itself is increasingly exposed for what it is: an arbitrary con-
figuration of power that has immense potential for abuse and that has, 
indeed, been thoroughly abused.
The ambivalence of sacrifice is unacceptable in Agamben’s analysis 
because for him, ultimately, there can be no room to imagine—to imag-
ine, for instance, that the victims were sacrificed for some transcendent 
purpose or meaning. Nor is there room to imagine a kind of politics that 
would involve a struggle for hegemony in the form of a resistant or antag-
onistic confrontation with tyrannical dominance. All relations of substi-
tution and exchange—and by implication all possibilities of redemption 
148 Rey Chow
understood in a broad sense—came to a halt with the acts of cruelty (and 
exercise of sovereign power) in the camps, rendering the ambivalence in-
herent to the sacrificial logic an illusion and a lie.
This said, there is a further dimension embedded in Agamben’s rejec-
tion of sacrifice that is worth considering, perhaps less for the reasons 
he offers (on secularist moral grounds) than for the affinity that sacrifice 
shares with another order of thinking—mimesis. In this light, Agamben’s 
emphasis on the absolute finality of the Nazis’ thanatopolitics may be 
seen to have its precedents in a well-known (though debatable) aesthetic/
ethic approach to the Holocaust, whereby, notwithstanding the represen-
tational materialities and mimetic effects involved, the artist or critic in-
sists that the Holocaust is unrepresentable. One thinks, for instance, of 
documentary film classics such as Alain Resnais’s “Nuit et Brouillard” 
(“Night and Fog”) and Claude Lanzman’s “Shoah,” in which the histori-
cal weight of the catastrophe is “shown” or given to us through the mute-
ness of the most ordinary of scenes, such as a lush green landscape or a 
decrepit empty building, even as the directors emphasize how difficult—
or impossible—it is to represent the enormity of what happened. In this 
kind of aesthetic/ethical approach, the most natural or unadorned sight 
(much like Agamben’s “bare life”) is understood not only as that which 
has been divested of all cultural accoutrements but also as that which, in 
its so-called nothingness, reveals the basic, yet utterly ruthless and nihil-
istic, reality of a juridico-political relation.7 It is in this connection—what 
may be termed an anti-mimetic aesthetics and ethics—that I believe 
Agamben’s stringent critique of the notion of sacrifice with regard to the 
Holocaust should finally be grasped: recast in terms of mimesis-as-repre-
sentation, this critique would seem akin to none other than the familiar 
assertion that the Holocaust is an unrepresentable—that is to say, inimi-
table and intransmissible—experience.8
Ironically, such a critique of sacrifice is, in the end, operating fully 
within the bounds of sacrificial logic, the logic that something must be 
forfeited or cast off. This sacrificial logic is, of course, also a version of 
the notion of ban that Agamben stresses as essential to the way juridical 
power functions. By prohibiting the sacrificial logic, therefore, Agamben 
has in effect taken on himself the capacity for banning (a particular form 
of ban), and put himself in the place of the (arbitrary?) sovereign, ruling 
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against the nobody who wants to hold on to the myth of sacrifice in his/
her history.
What Follows (or Remains after) Sacrifice: Mimesis as Substitute
Appearing as it does in the context of contemporary political philosophy 
debates, Agamben’s anti-sacrificial, anti-mimetic aesthetics/ethics reso-
nates with certain strands of what may be schematically called poststruc-
turalist theoretical thinking. For some time now, since the arrival of post-
structuralism in the mid-twentieth century, mimesis has been viewed in 
some contemporary theoretical sectors with suspicion and disdain, as 
the legacy of a rigid and conservative representational politics with its 
demand for realism—that is, for the reproduction, in art or literature, 
of a replica of what supposedly exists beforehand. As Martin Jay writes: 
“For … theorists normally labeled, for better or worse, poststructuralist, 
a conventional aesthetic privileging of mimesis or what is taken to be its 
synonym, imitation, is an ideologically suspect recirculation of the ready-
made, a false belief in the fixity of meaning and the possibility of achiev-
ing full presence, a language game that fails to see itself as such.”9 This 
anti-mimetic stance notwithstanding, one notices, on reflection, a curi-
ous paradox embedded in poststructuralist maneuvers in general: even as 
the mimetic is distrusted as an ideology of mechanical duplication, copy-
ing, and re-presentation (one that assumes the presence of some original 
determinant), poststructuralist theory nonetheless tends to depend for 
its deconstructive work on acts of substitution, alternation, and differen-
tiation—acts that, in the terms of our present discussion, may in fact be 
seen as part and parcel of the entwined logics of sacrifice and mimesis.
This close kinship between sacrifice and mimesis informs the argu-
ments of some of the authors who have had the strongest influences on 
poststructuralist writing. In his well-known theory of the gift, for in-
stance, Marcel Mauss dispels the idea of the free, innocent gift by shifting 
attention to relations of exchange and reciprocity as the rationale behind 
gift-giving: understood precisely, the giving of a gift, as Mauss argues, al-
ways carries with it the significance of a gesture of retaliation—of a return 
of something. Similarly, by introducing the distinction between the penis 
and the phallus in his semiotic rewriting of Freud’s discussions of ana-
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tomical differences, Jacques Lacan clarifies the indispensable exchange 
principle that underpins Freud’s argument about sociality: in order to 
be socially acceptable, an individual must learn to give up, to trade in as 
it were, his own solipsistic or narcissistic pleasures. Closer to our time, 
in her theory about the social origins of gender, Judith Butler, too, con-
firms the function of exchange in the construction of an intimate part of 
our identities—the way we go about picking our objects of desire. Butler 
argues that gendered identities, in particular for those who “are” or who 
think of themselves as heterosexual, are a matter of learning to relinquish 
the type of love object that is socially prohibited (as for instance a person 
of the same sex as oneself). Gender is haunted by melancholy because, 
whether or not one is conscious of it, it is a matter of negotiating and per-
forming the effects of a pre-mandated and internalized loss.
I have brought up these few examples of influential frames of thought 
simply as a quick reminder of the indispensability in representational 
politics of the mutuality of loss and gain, and of surrender and redemp-
tion—a mutuality that, I would contend, may be reconceptualized as 
the twin logics of sacrifice and mimesis. To this extent, I’d like to spec-
ulate that mimesis has retained its relevance to this day less because of 
its persistence as imitative representation (which no doubt remains the 
case in many circles) than because of its potency as part of an inescap-
able structural relation—the relation of exchange and substitution, ab-
sence and presence, disappearance and appearance, and so forth, without 
which the acts of thinking and writing would simply be impossible. Un-
derstood in these terms (and not merely in terms of a secondary dupli-
cation of a primary event), the mimetic-as-representation, even when it 
takes the positivistic form of appearing as/like something else, should be 
described more precisely as the accessible portion of a certain foregone 
transaction, a transaction, moreover, during which something was for one 
reason or another lost, given up, or surrendered—in other words, sacri-
ficed. Rather than being a static replication or re-presentation of a preex-
isting plenitude, mimesis, one may argue, is the sign that remains—in the 
form of a literal being-there, an externalization and an exhibition—in the 
aftermath of a process of sacrifice, whether or not the sacrifice has been 
witnessed or apprehended as such. Mimesis is the (visibly or sensorially 
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accessible) substitute that follows, that bears the effects of (an invisible or 
illegible) sacrifice.
Reformulated in this manner, sacrifice and mimesis would seem a dou-
ble epistemic passage underlying all acts of signification, a passage that 
tends to become acute in contexts of dominance and subordination, in 
which loss and gain are existentially palpable phenomena impinging on 
individual and group identity formation. Is this perhaps the reason mi-
mesis has figured so prominently in scenarios which carry the charge of 
victimization (and by implication, the charge of voluntary or involuntary 
sacrifice)? I am thinking, for instance, of the scenarios of patriarchy and 
colonialism, in which the status of those whose lives are compromised 
and demeaned has been explored, often, via the tropes of mimesis.
As I mentioned, biopolitics, as Foucault discusses it, is not necessar-
ily or exclusively about the mandating of death but more often than not 
takes the coercive form of an imperative to stay alive. Would adhering to 
Foucault’s conceptualization (with its emphasis on life) bring about an 
alternative understanding of the implications of Agamben’s discussion, 
by allowing us to localize the latter as simply one possible method of 
theorizing victimhood—a method in which the anti-mimetic resistance 
to sacrifice (and with it, representation) amounts to a particular aesthet-
ics/ethics, based implicitly on a specific way of (re)distributing the sensi-
ble?10 Conversely, in other scenarios of violence—such as patriarchy and 
colonialism—in which the goal has not been extermination tout court but 
rather the multifaceted governance and subjection of live bodies, what 
would happen to the logic of sacrifice—discredited in no uncertain terms 
by Agamben—and with it the mimetic?
Mimesis as a Coping Mechanism and Survival Tactic
Luce Irigaray, for instance, has offered a well-known reappraisal of femi-
ninity by distinguishing between two forms of mimesis—the productive 
and the recuperative. Putting it in deliberately simple terms, she writes: 
“there is mimesis as production, which would lie more in the realm of mu-
sic, and there is the mimesis that would be already caught up in a process 
of imitation, specularization, adequation, and reproduction” (131). Refer-
ring to the latter kind of mimesis as “masquerade,” Irigaray allows for the 
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recognition of femininity as a type of social sacrifice, whereupon women 
must imitate or reproduce—at their own peril—the feminine norms that 
have been prescribed in advance by patriarchal mores:
I think the masquerade has to be understood as what women 
do in order to recuperate some element of desire, to partici-
pate in men’s desire, but at the price of renouncing their own. 
In the masquerade, they submit to the dominant economy of 
desire in an attempt to remain “on the market” in spite of ev-
erything. But they are there as objects for sexual enjoyment, 
not as those who enjoy.
What do I mean by masquerade? In particular, what Freud 
calls “femininity.” The belief, for example, that it is necessary 
to become a woman, a “normal” one at that, whereas a man is a 
man from the outset. (133–34)
At the same time, Irigaray asserts that the mimetic also contains the 
possibility of a different relation, one in which women, precisely because 
they understand what has been prescribed for them, may set out con-
sciously to perform these prescriptions in such ways as to turn them into 
subversive acts. She calls this kind of mimesis “mimicry”:
…mimicry. One must assume the feminine role deliberately. 
Which means already to convert a form of subordination into 
an affirmation, and thus to begin to thwart it …
To play with mimesis is thus, for a woman, to try to recover 
the place of her exploitation by discourse, without allowing 
herself to be simply reduced to it. It means to resubmit herself 
… to ideas about herself, that are elaborated in/by a mascu-
line logic, but so as to make “visible,” by an effect of playful 
repetition, what was supposed to remain invisible … “to un-
veil” the fact that, if women are such good mimics, it is be-
cause they are not simply resorbed in this function. They also 
remain elsewhere (76)
This association of the mimetic with feminist cunning and, in particu-
lar, with a playful, self-conscious repetition, made to resemble and con-
jure the normative image of femininity yet simultaneously undermining 
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this image from within, is perhaps one of the most important instances in 
contemporary thought in which mimesis is attributed with the potential 
to exceed, rather than simply to compensate for, the sacrifice which pre-
cedes it. This potential enables mimesis to take on the value of a type of 
behavior—a camouflage conformism—which, even if it does not exactly 
set women free, allows them (to imagine) a utopian space/time of alter-
ity from within the bounds of patriarchal subordination.
In the discussions of colonized existence, mimesis has likewise played 
a significant role in theorists’ attempts to configure a breathing space 
for those who have been subjected to injustice. In the contexts in which 
cross-cultural encounters entail the imposition and enforcement of one 
group’s (typically, Westerners’) superiority over another (typically, the 
“natives” of African, Asian, American, Australian, and New Zealand cul-
tures), mimesis is a routine rite of initiation: those from the so-called 
“inferior” group, the colonized or semi-colonized, are bound to want to 
imitate their “superior” aggressors as part of their strategy for social sur-
vival and advancement. Under these circumstances, the question is how 
agency can be assessed: must agency be understood to lie only with the 
so-called original (the “superior” group, the one being imitated), or can 
it also be understood to reside in the act of imitation—in those who imi-
tate? What kind of agency?
As I have discussed in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 
various levels of mimesis traverse this kind of situation. I will concentrate 
on two here. A first level, probably the most obvious, is a direct legacy 
of Western imperialism and colonialism of the past few hundred years—
the mimesis with the white man as the original. The logistics involved are 
time-proven: the white colonizer, his language, and his culture stand as 
the model against which the colonized is judged; the colonized must try 
her best to become like her master even when knowing full well that her 
efforts at emulation will be deemed less than satisfactory. As I have noted, 
the values involved—“superior” and “inferior”—are hierarchically deter-
mined and tend to work in one direction only: the “original,” so to speak, 
exists as the authentic standard by which the imitator is judged but not 
vice versa. The colonized subject, condemned to a permanent inferiority 
complex, must nonetheless try, in vain, to become that from which she 
has been excluded in an a priori manner. Try as she may, she will always 
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remain a poor copy; yet even as she continues to be debased, she has no 
choice but to continue to mimic.
At a second level, as theorists no longer feel comfortable dismissing 
the colonized as merely inadequate, mimesis takes on a more complex 
set of connotations. As exemplified by the work of scholars such as Homi 
Bhabha, who follow the rationale of Frantz Fanon’s impassioned argu-
ments about black subjectivity in works such as The Wretched of the Earth 
and Black Skin, White Masks, one important feature of the colonized’s 
subjectivity that was previously ignored—the ambivalent, contradicto-
ry emotions embedded in her identitarian plight—now assumes center 
stage. As Fanon writes, for the person of color (in his case, the black man) 
“there is only one destiny. And that is white.” With insight and foresight, 
he also suggests that “only a psychological interpretation of the black prob-
lem can lay bare the anomalies of affect that are responsible for the struc-
ture of the complex” (Black Skin, White Masks, 10). Fanon’s critical con-
tributions to the dissection of colonized subjectivity are summarized by 
Bhabha in this manner: in Fanon’s work, Bhabha tells us, “The ambivalent 
identification of the racist world … turns on the idea of man as his alien-
ated image; not Self and Other but the otherness of the Self inscribed in 
the perverse palimpsest of colonial identity” (Location of Culture 40, 44).
In psychological terms, what Bhabha, taking the lead from Fanon, in-
troduces to the colonial scenario is desire (and its irrational, often un-
conscious, modes of working). As in the case of Irigaray’s endeavor to 
reclaim femininity for women, desire in this instance serves as the very 
grounds on which to reappraise the value of dominated subjecthood. In-
stead of being written off as the inferior partner in an asymmetrical his-
torical encounter with the West, the colonized is now understood, with 
much more suppleness and sympathy, in terms of a desire to be white 
that exists concurrently with the shame and resentment accompanying 
the inferior position to which she has been socially, culturally, and racial-
ly consigned. Between the (positive) condition of wanting to imitate the 
white man and the (negative) condition of self-loathing and self-abate-
ment, lies what may be seen as an entire range of epistemic and represen-
tational possibilities, possibilities that infinitely enrich the theorization of 
postcolonial subjectivities. Whereas at the first level of mimesis, relations 
between the colonizer and the colonized remain immobilized in a static 
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hierarchy, the introduction of desire transforms the entire question of mi-
mesis into a fluid, because vacillating, structure, in which the entangled 
feelings of wanting at once to imitate the colonizer and to eliminate him 
become the basis for a new kind of analysis, with the tormented psychic 
interiority of the colonized as its center. Much like Irigaray’s mimicry, the 
colonized’s desire here makes way for a flexible, because mobile, frame-
work for imagining alterity from within subordination.
By focusing on the colonized person as an indeterminate, internally 
divided subject, a subject that is not self-identical, Bhabha and the crit-
ics influenced by him thus enable what may be called a poststructural-
ist redemption of colonial victimhood that is thoroughly humanistic in 
implications: it is the failure, the incompleteness or incomplete-ability 
of the mimetic attempt (a point on which the second level of mimesis 
in fact concurs with the first) that makes the nonwhite subject theoreti-
cally interesting—indeed salvageable (one might say, in the aftermath 
of colonial sacrifice). Consciously or unbeknownst to herself, and oscil-
lating between black and white, the subjectivity of the colonized is now 
dispersed, pluralized and multiplied across the many possible circuits 
of desire. No longer rigidly polarized/dichotomized against each other, 
black and white can now be considered as mutually constituted and mu-
tually constituting. The question remains as to how this liberalist render-
ing of victimhood can ultimately distinguish itself from the productivity 
of colonial power. In both cases, it would seem, it is the ambivalences, the 
contradictions, and the fissures, always already inherent to the act of ar-
ticulation, that are considered to contain the potential for opening things 
up, so to speak. How to draw the line in between? Or—to push Bhabha’s 
reasoning to its limit—is that not so important?
Concomitant with the issue of mimesis in these gendered and racial 
scenarios of violence, then, reemerges in a different guise exactly the 
problematic of sacrifice at which Agamben has directed his skepticism. 
Recast in sacrificial terms, the paradigm shift that poststructuralist fem-
inist and postcolonial criticism has brought about is none other than a 
suspension, and thus a revaluation, of the substantiality and non-negotia-
bility of victimhood through behavioral and psychic buoyancy—playful 
mimicry and fluctuating desire—so that, even if it seems degrading and 
humiliating (involving the sacrificing of one’s autonomy and dignity), the 
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very act of imitating one’s victimizer may yet be an aperture to a different 
kind of future. Mimesis amounts in these cases to a creative repackaging 
and repurposing of the givens of dominated existence for survival—in a 
situation that is not about to improve any time soon.
On balance, much as this survival kit of mimetic tricks (with mimesis 
either as subversive performativity or as ambivalent desiring) has been 
greatly influential in contemporary cultural criticism, as a coping mecha-
nism it still by and large leaves in place the inequities of the situation—
one that remains governed by man or the white man as the original, with 
the important proviso that the playful imitation by women or the not-
quite-right imitation by colonized subjects is now deemed, at least by 
some, to be equally deserving of critical attention. Insofar as it is a cop-
ing mechanism, moreover, mimesis seems to have retained the quality of 
a secondary phenomenon whose raison d’être is derived from something 
external to itself. Although what is at issue is no longer so-called art’s 
imitation of life, the fact that mimetic behavior and psychology are con-
strued as a response, a reaction to fraught ideological conditions suggests 
that mimesis continues to be accorded a subaltern and instrumentalist 
status. Obviously, this conclusion is not very satisfying.
Mimesis as Originary Force, and a Different 
Hypothesis about Victimhood
A useful, if controversial, interlocutor at this juncture is René Girard, 
whose work offers many remarkable insights into the bondage between 
sacrifice and mimesis. Given that Girard has explicitly referred to the 
double meanings of the Latin word sacer, which, as he points out, has 
been translated alternately as “sacred” and as “accursed,” and that he, like 
Agamben, is clearly skeptical of the ambivalence of the sacred as dissemi-
nated by French sociology, the absence of any reference to Girard’s work 
in Agamben’s book is conspicuous.11 Can this be because, as I have been 
suggesting, a rejection of sacrifice (as in Agamben’s case) is not only a re-
jection of sacrifice but in essence amounts to a rejection also of mimesis, 
the very basis of Girard’s theory?
Like many mid- to late twentieth-century thinkers, Girard too has 
been influenced by Freud, and the psychological vocabulary of desire is 
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eminently present in his readings. His understanding of desire is, how-
ever, quite unique. For Girard, desire is not some kind of original hu-
man nature which for historical or cultural reasons (such as patriarchy 
or colonialism) adapts itself into a desire for something (such as a desire 
to imitate). Instead, desire is always learned, and can be borrowed and 
transferred. Rather than the commonsensical question “What does X 
want?”, then, Girard asks: how does X come to “want” this or that? As 
he has famously argued, the answer to this latter question is mimesis: to 
desire means not simply to desire an object but also to imitate a model’s 
way of desiring. In this manner, the model one tries to imitate inevitably 
becomes a rival:
Rivalry does not arise because of the fortuitous convergence 
of two desires on a single object; rather, the subject desires the 
object because the rival desires it. In desiring an object the rival 
alerts the subject to the desirability of the object. The rival, 
then, serves as a model for the subject, not only in regard to 
such secondary matters as style and opinions but also, and 
more essentially, in regard to desires. (145)
In his classic Violence and the Sacred, Girard illustrates his bold argu-
ment by providing readings of numerous texts, often from myths, clas-
sical Greek tragedies, psychoanalysis, and anthropological studies of 
tribal beliefs and practices, but his reading of Freud’s Oedipus complex 
offers perhaps the most economical example of his logic. Girard traces 
the shadowy presence of a mimetic understanding in Freud’s description 
of the little boy’s desire for his mother. As Freud points out, this desire 
has something to do with the boy’s special interest in his father, to grow 
like and be like him, and take his place everywhere. His cathexis to his 
mother, then, can be seen as an effect of a primarily mimetic impulse to 
identify with his father; only thus, Girard writes, does it make sense to 
see the father, who is the boy’s model, become a rival, a hindrance, and 
a nuisance standing in the way of the boy’s attainment of gratification. 
Notwithstanding his own intuition of the potential held open by mimetic 
desire, Freud, however, according to Girard, turned aside and erased the 
effects of mimetic desire from his construction of the Oedipus complex 
so as to preserve the complex’s purity and validity:
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Although traces of the mimetic conception are scattered 
through Freud’s work, this conception never assumes a domi-
nant role. It runs counter to the Freudian insistence on a de-
sire that is fundamentally directed toward an object; that is, 
sexual desire for the mother. When the tension between these 
opposing tendencies becomes too great, both Freud and his 
disciples seem to resolve it in favor of the object-desire. (169)
What sets Girard’s conception of mimesis apart from many of his con-
temporaries’, therefore, is the epistemic status he grants it: mimesis is an 
originary force rather than a secondary phenomenon whose rationale/
justification comes from somewhere else.12 This conception has the ad-
vantage of freeing us from the common tendency to fixate on a predeter-
mined object as the source of desire (as is the case, arguably, of Fanon’s 
and Bhabha’s ruminations, in which whiteness exists as the object to 
which the black man becomes cathected in imitation). By making mime-
sis the first term, Girard shifts the emphasis away from the conventional 
assumption of desire as natural, autonomous, or originating: instead, de-
sire itself is now understood as the outcome of human social interaction. 
Mimesis, in turn, is no longer simply a derivative or instrumental act in 
response to a situation in which those who are underprivileged, envi-
ous, or malcontent find themselves obligated to copy whatever preexists 
them as “normal” and “superior.” With desire detached from all predeter-
mined objects, the mimetic process is here allowed to stand as a power 
dynamic, one that fuels, to return to Foucault’s term, the biopolitics of 
inter-subjective relations. Following Girard, one may go so far as to claim 
that mimesis is what activates the act of desiring; it is what gives desire its 
direction and trajectory as well as its objects.
This all-pervasive, mediating presence of mimesis means that to de-
sire is, behaviorally speaking, to compete with a rival in a vicious circle 
of reciprocal violence, in which the antagonists become increasingly in-
distinguishable from each other—become what Girard calls “monstrous 
doubles.” The only way in which the circle can be broken is through sacri-
fice—that is, through an artificial process in which someone who is, like 
everyone else, a member of the community becomes chosen as a scape-
goat—and expelled as a surrogate victim. Herein lies the crucial aspect of 
Girard’s theory: “Social coexistence,” he writes, “would be impossible if 
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no surrogate victim existed, if violence persisted beyond a certain thresh-
old and failed to be transmuted into culture. It is only at this point that 
the vicious circle of reciprocal violence, wholly destructive in nature, is 
replaced by the vicious circle of ritual violence, creative and protective in 
nature” (144).
This point, very much resonant with Freud’s arguments about human 
group behavior in works such as Totem and Taboo and Civilization and Its 
Discontents (and to some extent Moses and Monotheism), is reiterated by 
Girard in a succinct recapitulation of mimetic desire:
Mimetic desire is simply a term more comprehensive than vio-
lence for religious pollution. As the catalyst for the sacrificial 
crisis, it would eventually destroy the entire community if 
the surrogate victim were not at hand to halt the process and 
the ritualized mimesis were not at hand to keep the conflic-
tual mimesis from beginning afresh By channeling its energies 
into ritual forms and activities sanctioned by ritual, the cul-
tural order prevents multiple desires from converging on the 
same object. (148–49)
For Girard, the sacrifice that is collectively ordained and practiced is 
thus (the violence of) mimetic desire ritualized. Practices of culture such 
as art, literature, and religion are all instances of such “ritualized mime-
sis”—that is, a substitute violence—designed to enable human society to 
proceed against the blind destructiveness of the primal “conflictual mi-
mesis.” Girard speaks often of “a fundamental truth about violence”: “if 
left unappeased, violence will accumulate until it overflows its confines 
and floods the surrounding area. The role of sacrifice is to stem this rising 
tide of indiscriminate substitutions and redirect violence into ‘proper’ 
channels” (10).
Girard’s two-pronged formulation of mimesis—as both nature (con-
stant, primal antagonism among human beings) and culture (collective, 
artificial ritual) and thus irreducible to either—whose violence must be 
understood dialectically, as both internal and external, both pernicious 
and beneficial, may be one reason his thesis has not exactly been taken up 
with enthusiasm in the more left-leaning varieties of contemporary cul-
tural criticism. More specifically, Girard’s assertion of mimesis as an ab-
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solute/universal condition, an assertion that goes hand in hand with his 
refusal to account for violence by confining it within domains of cultural 
difference/particularism—such as religious fanaticism, nationalism, 
communism, patriarchy, Eurocentricity, U.S. imperialism, and so forth—
would obviously disturb those who believe in adhering to the supposedly 
tolerant, neoliberalist, and multiculturalist habits of thought. And since 
Girard’s frame of reference is literary, mythological, and religious rather 
than empirical or scientific, the validity held by his conception of mime-
sis in various disciplines, even those with obvious social and historical 
import, will likely have to remain a matter of conjecture and debate.13
Nevertheless, because it recognizes the unavoidability and universality 
of violence, Girard’s hypothesis ironically implies a basic, incontrovert-
ible evenness and equality among human beings that tends to be absent 
in other formulations. In the feminist and postcolonialist writings dis-
cussed above, for instance, in which it is typically the disparity between 
those with power and those deprived of it that provokes theorization, 
mimesis tends to be pursued, more or less, as just a means of address-
ing—that is, compensating, displacing, complexifying, and, it is hoped, 
transforming—such a disparity (and the sacrifices it has exacted). Gi-
rard’s emphasis is decidedly different—and clearly un-Rousseauian and 
non-utopian at that. In his hands, mimesis (in the raw, primal form) in-
volves rather the possibility, through an act of doubling, of leveling with 
the rival, in a world in which a “self ” as such is never alone (or sui generis) 
but always defined socially and antagonistically in relation to others, in a 
generalized state of competition. Hence the key to this form of mimesis 
is reciprocity—the “gift” of an eye for the returned “gift” of an eye, ad 
infinitum—in a kind of undifferentiated repetition that may go on for-
ever. If the violence thus generated is circular, it is also a violence that 
renders the antagonists structurally on a par with—indeed resembling 
and becoming indistinguishable from—one another. But this situation 
of equality, in which every person is literally like the other, is in fact a 
lethal situation to which human society cannot afford to return (or so it 
has convinced itself). Such equality, Girard implies, is the source of our 
greatest terror because anyone at any moment can find himself or herself 
the target of irrational violence and persecution.
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Meanwhile, when mimesis is (re)enacted as cultural ritual, Girard, by 
highlighting the indispensable role played by the victim—be it the sur-
rogate victim who is sacrificed on behalf (or in substitution) of the en-
tire group or the ritual victim who is sacrificed in imitation (or in sub-
stitution) of the surrogate victim—also offers a distinctly divergent way 
of thinking about victimhood. To put it bluntly, for Girard victimhood 
is more a matter of structural and social necessity—for the purification 
of pollution, and the restoration of peace and order—than one of hu-
manistic moral concern. The victim is the means with which a commu-
nity interrupts the otherwise unstoppable circle of (mimetic) violence 
through a representative act of exclusion and expulsion. Often selected 
randomly, the victim is sacrificed not because he is weak or inferior (or 
strong and superior), but paradoxically because he is like us, because he 
resembles the community of those who would otherwise be engaged in 
an endless frenzy of retaliations. His (lone) alienation and expulsion are 
thus the substitute offered in exchange for the preservation of the group 
as a whole—a substitute that serves in effect as a protective shield against 
the threat of immolation posed by the group’s own propensity toward mi-
metic contagion and annihilation.
Questions
In an age in which the phenomenon of homo sacer, of which Agamben 
has so solemnly reminded us, seems to multiply daily across the globe 
with the glaringly unconstrained proliferation of state violence and abuse 
of power, a consideration of sacrifice and mimesis—what I have been 
suggesting as a conjoined epistemic passage—would seem more than 
timely. The ramifications involved are immense and clearly beyond the 
scope of one essay. In lieu of a conclusion, let me offer a brief summary of 
the issues raised so far, in the form of questions.
Whereas Agamben (implicitly) argues victimhood in terms of bare life, 
which is the residue or remainder of an utterly inequitable juridico-politi-
cal relation between sovereign power and those it kills (in an increasingly 
arbitrary fashion)—a relation that renders mimesis altogether irrelevant 
because there is no room for confrontation and resistance; and whereas 
Irigaray, Fanon, and Bhabha alert us to the depths of ambiguity, neurosis, 
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and perversion that define the mimetic acts of underprivileged victims, 
Girard challenges us instead to think of victims not simply as victims but 
rather as the bearers of a systemic function. And, rather than speaking 
against violence as the unfortunate moral outcome of human social in-
teraction, Girard gives us a dialectics of violence, one that understands 
violence (or mimetic desire) both as a fundamental antagonism that de-
fines every confrontation among human individuals, and as what consti-
tutes cultural processes of reenactment that are aimed at warding off the 
original violence. As a result, he has also offered what might be called a 
dialectics of victimhood, wherein victimhood has no intrinsic quality to 
it but can be both horrendous and redemptive. Like sacrificial violence, 
sacrificial victims are surrogates, substitutes, or stand-ins whose destruc-
tion helps save others (like them) from some larger horror.
If, for the sake of speculative discussion, we were to disregard Agam-
ben’s dismissal of the sacrificial logic and rethink the Nazi camps in 
terms of Girard’s interpretation of sacrifice and mimesis, two very 
hard—and for some undoubtedly scandalous—sets of questions would 
probably arise.
First: could the extremism of the Nazi state apparatus be understood 
as a form of originary violence, a primal mimetic desire that had some-
how been allowed to run amok? (Did the Germans not, in a mimetic 
manner, consider the Jews their competitors—their rivals? Did they not, 
against their own denunciatory proclamations, actually want to become 
[like] the Jews—take the Jews’ place everywhere—by appropriating all 
that the Jews possessed? Could their violence have been reciprocated?) 
Second: alternatively, could such extremism be seen as a cultural process 
of ritualized violence/mimesis wherein those who were reduced to bare 
life in the camps could be considered surrogate/ritual victims? To follow 
Girard’s logic to its deeply unsettling conclusions, if the Jews, the Gyp-
sies, and other exterminated groups were surrogate/ritual victims, does 
it mean that genocide, however reprehensible it is on ethical grounds, 
should nonetheless be understood as a sacrificial ritual, a cultural pro-
cess—not unlike an extreme form of performance art, a theater of cru-
elty, or an obscene reality show—whose purpose is to forestall a worse 
form of disaster?
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But what could possibly have been a worse form of disaster than the 
Nazis’ willful murderous efforts, and what larger horror could they be 
preventing?—the disaster and horror of being victimized themselves, of 
being reduced to bare life, of having their own group unity disintegrate in 
the potentially unstoppable spread of mimetic violence: in other words, 
the disaster and horror of losing their monopoly on violence and with 
it their claim to (the Aryan) difference. It would be unthinkable for “the 
Germans” to become like everyone else. The status of the victim, structur-
ally indispensable in Girard’s formulations, must thus be further specified 
as the externalization—the banishment (to use a term that recalls Agam-
ben’s notion of ban) to the outside, in the form of a guilty adversary—of a 
group’s capacity for self-destruction. As a crowd whose members imitate 
each other’s behavior, the group derives an important benefit from the 
unanimous—that is, mimetically induced—hatred for the victim: this 
hatred unifies the members and creates the community. As “surrogate,” 
therefore, the victim is simultaneously the symptom of a group’s funda-
mental lack of cohesion—its fundamental non-identity with itself. As 
Girard writes in his study of The Book of Job: “In a world controlled by mi-
metic desire … the appetite for violence may grow and may be ultimately 
satisfied at that moment when the global tendency to uniformity focuses 
the mimetic substitutions and polarizations on some victim or other, or 
perhaps not so randomly but on a victim who is more vulnerable because 
of his visibility, one who is somehow predestined by the exceptional po-
sition he holds in the community—someone like Job.”14
On the other hand, if, in light of the atrocities committed by the Nazis, 
any rationalization of victimhood as such must be deemed outrageous re-
gardless of how sympathetic the critic might be with the victims—and 
this is certainly the point of Agamben’s fundamental expulsion (sacrifice) 
of the sacrificial logic—does it mean that mimesis, whether imagined 
as nature, as culture, or as both, must also be thoroughly expunged—
banned, banished, abandoned—as a concept because it is simply too per-
ilous to think with, because it is bound to lead to conclusions that will be 
found without/outside moral compunctions? Yet what is the defense of 
moral compunction—to return again to Girard’s logic—if not precisely a 
collectively ordained exercise of violence aimed at preserving our social 
order from crumbling—a ritualized mimesis, no less? Would not the ex-
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punging of mimesis turn it precisely into a symptom about us as a com-
munity, in the aforementioned terms?
Interestingly, this is also the point at which Girard’s seemingly amoral, 
religion-oriented argument of mimetic violence comes closest to Agam-
ben’s nihilistic, atheist understanding of law and power. As the funda-
mental vacuity of the sovereign relation is exposed by the increasingly 
arbitrary abuses by those in power, what is so-called law is revealing it-
self—and here is the logical transition from Agamben into Girard—to be 
nothing more than a collectively ordained exercise of violence, intended 
once upon a time to preserve the social equilibrium, perhaps, but now 
functioning as nothing more than a frenzied killing machine. Despite his 
adherence to the need for moral compunctions in his (anti-sacrificial and 
anti-mimetic) approach to the concentration camps, Agamben’s bleak 
depictions of political-power-gone-berserk the world over suggest that 
his grasp of the unmitigated, and perhaps intractable, actuality of human 
violence (defined by Girard as mimetic) is, in the end, not that distant 
from Girard’s.
One final question and speculation: insofar as any discussion of them 
seems ineluctably to arrive at these formidable—and terrifying—ques-
tions of freedom, violence, moral constraints, community, and bound-
aries-setting, are not sacrifice and mimesis perhaps the “surrogate vic-
tims” and “ritual victims” par excellence in the domain of representational 
politics today?
Notes
1. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. See in particular 
Part Two, Chapters 1–3. For Foucault’s discussions of biopolitics, see his 
The History of Sexuality: An Introduction; “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures 
at the Collège de France 1976–77; Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the 
Collège de France 1977–1978; The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de 
France 1978–1979.
2. See Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction” in Illuminations; Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation 
of Reality in Western Literature; Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences; Edward W. Said, Orientalism.
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3. Agamben’s elaboration of this notion of power, which is closely linked to 
Heidegger’s notions of concealment, withholding, and the open, can be 
philosophically provocative and suggestive. See, for instance, his sensitive 
discussion of Kafka’s “Before the Law” (Homo Sacer 49–62); also, his 
discussion of the status of the human in Western thought in The Open: 
Man and Animal.
4. These remarks by Foucault sound like a point-by-point refutation of 
Agamben’s project: “In order to make a concrete analysis of power relations, 
we must abandon the juridical model of sovereignty. That model in effect 
presupposes that the individual is a subject with natural rights or primitive 
powers; it sets itself the task of accounting for the ideal genesis of the State; 
and finally, it makes the law the basic manifestation of power ” (“Society Must 
Be Defended” 265).
5. Numerous scholars have discussed the distinctions and tensions between 
Foucault’s and Agamben’s views on biopolitics and sovereignty. For 
a sampling of these lively debates, see, for instance, Mika Ojakangas, 
“Impossible Dialogue on Biopower: Agamben and Foucault;” Lee Medevoi, 
“Global Society Must Be Defended: Biopolitics without Boundaries;” Didier 
Fassin, “Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life;” Malcolm Bull, “Vectors of the 
Biopolitical.”
6. For this interesting point, I am indebted to Yuan-horng Chu, “Dusk or Dawn: 
On Agamben Painted Exceptional Rule,” 197–219; see in particular 211–12. 
I should add that I am aware of the fact that the historical circumstances 
surrounding Jesus’ disappearance/death are a subject of great dispute among 
scholars; the point here is simply that being killed may hold very different—
yet perhaps equally valid—meanings for the victims (and their community) 
from the intentions harbored by the perpetrators of killing. However, this 
possible difference does not seem to matter in Agamben’s argument.
7. I should make clear that I do not at all find this aesthetic/ethical approach 
(which insists on the unrepresentability of the Holocaust) persuasive—
especially when the medium in question is a visual one such as film. For 
reasons of space, a detailed discussion of this point will have to be deferred 
until another occasion. For related interest, see Naomi Mandel, Against the 
Unspeakable: Complicity, the Holocaust, and Slavery in America.
8. Agamben’s reflections on the testimonies about Auschwitz are similar: he 
holds that survivors bore witness to something to which it is impossible to 
bear witness. See Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive.
9. Martin Jay, Cultural Semantics: Keywords of Our Time, 120. For examples 
of French writings that elaborate the theatrical dimensions of mimesis 
in complex manners, see Mimesis, Masochism, and Mime: The Politics of 
Theatricality in Contemporary French Thought.
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10. I borrow the notion of the distribution of the sensible from Jacques 
Rancière; see The Politics of Aesthetics: the Distribution of the Sensible, 12–34. 
For Rancière’s very different perspective on the politics of representability 
in the contemporary world (in contradistinction to those who hold that 
certain things are unrepresentable), see his essay “Are Some Things 
Unrepresentable?” in Rancière, The Future of the Image, 109–38.
11. See Girard on the word sacer in Violence and the Sacred, 257; see also his 
discussions on 263–65; 298. Regarding the ambivalence of the sacred, Girard 
puts it in this manner at the very beginning of his book: “Because the victim 
is sacred, it is criminal to kill him—but the victim is sacred only because he 
is to be killed. Here is a circular line of reasoning that at a somewhat later 
date would be dignified by the sonorous term ambivalence. Persuasive and 
authoritative as that term still appears, it has been so extraordinarily abused 
in our century that perhaps we may now recognize how little light it sheds on 
the subject of sacrifice. Certainly it provides no real explanation. When we 
speak of ambivalence, we are only pointing out a problem that remains to be 
solved” (Violence and the Sacred 1).
12. For this reason, Girard’s thesis has been critiqued by Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe as a type of foundationalist or essentialist thinking (that seeks 
to reveal the foundational or essential violence of sociality); see Lacoue-
Labarthe, Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics, 101–30. Unlike Girard, 
however, Lacoue-Labarthe does not simultaneously deal with sacrifice.
13. He puts it this way: “The apparition of the monstrous double cannot be 
verified empirically; nor for that matter can the body of phenomena that 
forms the basis for any primitive religion. Despite the texts cited above 
the monstrous double remains a hypothetical creation, as do the other 
phenomena associated with the mechanism that determines the choice of 
surrogate victim. The validity of the hypothesis is confirmed, however, by the 
vast number of mythological, ritualistic, philosophical, and literary motifs 
that it is able to explain, as well as by the quality of the explanations, by the 
coherence it imposes on phenomena that until now appeared isolated and 
obscure” (Violence and the Sacred 164).
14. Girard, Job the Victim of His People, 65. See also his essay “Job as Failed 
Scapegoat,” in The Voice from the Whirlwind: Interpreting The Book of Job, 
185–207. Girard’s analysis of the problem of evil—the problem that has 
preoccupied generations of interpreters of The Book of Job—parallels his 
critique of the object-centered understanding of desire. In discussing the 
enigma—the “why”—of Job’s unjust suffering, he shifts the emphasis from 
the canonical hermeneutics about divine providence to a reading of the 
mimetic contagion of collective human behavior. Because, rather than simply 
accepting his persecution by his community, Job fervently protests against the 
absurdity of such persecution, Girard sees his story as a text that consciously 
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reveals or demythologizes the scapegoat/victimage mechanism. He also 
suggests that Job is a prefiguration of Jesus.
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Chapter 7
Security
From “National” to “Homeland” … and Beyond
Samuel Weber
The establishment of a Department of Homeland Security in response 
to the attacks of September 2001 marked a sea-change not just in termi-
nology but also in the political policy of the United States. In the period 
following the Second World War—the period of the Cold War between 
the liberal-democratic “West” and its Communist adversaries, above all 
the Soviet Union—“security,” which has been probably the paramount 
consideration in modern politics, including its theories as well as its 
practices—had been defined essentially as the aim and attribute of the 
nation-state. Security, insofar as it was political, was first and foremost 
“national security.” And where it transcended individual nations, it did 
so in the spirit of the Treaty of Westphalia, which established politics as 
a system of nation-states, relating to each other through codified proce-
dures known in English as “international law,” but designated in other 
languages quite differently: in German, for instance, as Völkerrecht, literal-
ly the “right of peoples,” a translation of the Latin ius gentium from which 
(in the German-speaking world at least) the concept was held to derive. 
The supra-national entities founded in response to the two World Wars 
were both designed to serve as instruments of national security rather 
than providing an alternative to it, a fact that was clearly manifested in 
their names, whether the post-World War I League of Nations (once 
again quite different in German: Völkerbund, “alliance of peoples”), or 
the post-World War II United Nations. The basic and unchallenged unit 
of such international organizations remained the nation. Its adversary, at 
least in the post-World War II language of the “free world,” was therefore 
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appropriately designated as the “International Communist Conspiracy,” 
a term that implied that the “conspiracy” was directed against “national 
sovereignty” per se, through its emphasis on class struggle, which tended 
to challenge the supremacy of the nation-state. At the same time, how-
ever, anti-Communist discourse following 1945 redefined its adversary 
in national-state terms. The International Communist Conspiracy was 
presented as a thinly disguised instrument of the Soviet Union, which in 
turn was increasingly subordinated to the category of totalitarianism, as 
a perversion of the nation-state. The rise of the United States as global 
leader of the “free world” was accompanied by an anti-state rhetoric that 
tended to redefine the nation—and hence its security—as a function of 
liberal, non-state institutions: ultimately of autonomous individuals act-
ing in concert but also in competition with one another, and thereby at 
antipodes from the kind of collectivism under which the “totalitarian re-
gimes” of both left and right were increasingly subsumed. The individual 
consumer came to supplant the collective producer as the bulwark of na-
tional security.
The groundwork was thus laid for a political practice that was aptly 
summed up by President Reagan’s famous assertion that “Government is 
part of the problem, never the solution.” Of course, this did not directly 
challenge the one area in which government was still considered to be 
supreme: that of assuring a security still defined as “national security.” 
But national security only made sense as a response to the challenge of 
the International Communist Conspiracy: it was intended to valorize the 
nation not as a collective entity per se, but rather as a necessary bulwark 
against the collectivisms of totalitarian nations that threatened the sacred 
foundations of liberal democracy, which in the United States, at least, 
was increasingly identified with heroic individuals whose autonomy was 
manifest in the effectiveness of their will to accumulate power, wealth, 
and success.
It is against the background of this development that the sea-change 
(or climate-change) from “national” to “homeland” security must be in-
terpreted. Prior to 2001, the term “homeland” in connection with “se-
curity” was largely absent from political discourse in the United States. 
The term “homeland” had been used politically in two rather different, 
but perhaps related, ways. First, it was associated with the discourse of 
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Zionism, the political theory and program of a Jewish homeland. Second, 
and far more notorious, it was the term used by the South African regime 
to designate areas with limited powers of self-government, which were 
designed to serve the apartheid system by regrouping black South Afri-
cans in a contiguous and separate territory, thereby excluding them from 
citizenship in the Republic of South Africa.
What these two quite different uses of the term “homeland” have in 
common, and what contrasts with the traditional notion of nation-state, 
was already noted by Aristotle, who—as Giorgio Agamben in his recent 
Il Regno et la Gloria recalls—insisted on the distinction between the oikia 
and the polis and indeed, “criticized the Platonic conception of the polis” 
for assimilating the city too closely to the home:
I am speaking of the premise from which the argument of 
Socrates proceeds, “that the greater the unity of the state (po-
lis) the better.” Is it not obvious that a state may at length at-
tain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state?—since 
the nature of a state is to be a plurality, and in tending to great-
er unity, from being a state it becomes a family (oikia), and 
from being a family, an individual; for the family may be said 
to be more than the state, and the individual than the fam-
ily. So that we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if 
we could, for it would be the destruction of the state. Again, 
a state is not made up only of so many men, but of different 
kinds of men; for similars do not constitute a state. (1261a)
Although Jowett’s translation of oikia here as “family” is somewhat mis-
leading, since what is involved is rather a “household,” the familial ele-
ment does touch on what is at stake in his effort to distinguish the oikia 
from the polis: the nature of the appurtenance. And this, interestingly 
enough, is evaluated not in the abstract, since “the family may be said to 
be more than the state, and the individual than the family,” but rather in 
terms of their ability to endure, what Aristotle, in Jowett’s translation at 
least, calls their “self-sufficiency”:
This extreme unification of the state is clearly not good; for a 
family is more self-sufficing than an individual, and a city than 
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a family If then self-sufficiency is to be desired, the lesser de-
gree of unity is more desirable than the greater. (1261b)
In short, for Aristotle there is a tension between “unity”—which char-
acterizes the family vis-à-vis the city, and the individual vis-à-vis the fam-
ily—and “self-sufficiency,” which is greater in larger, more diverse, less 
unified political groupings.
If, then, one can say that for Aristotle already a certain “security” in-
forms politics, it is one that is radically divergent from the kind of securi-
ty that in the modern period has increasingly come to be taken for grant-
ed. For both Aristotle and more modern thinkers, “security” is defined by 
the ability to endure. But from the passages just quoted, it is clear that the 
notion of endurance is vastly different in each case. For Aristotle, “unity” 
and endurance—unity and “self-sufficiency”—are at odds with one an-
other. What endures is what is heteroclite, diverse, dissimilar. What en-
dures is a polis conceived to have a radically different structure from both 
the “individual” and the “family” or “household.” The latter are under-
stood as essentially unitary organizations, although as Agamben points 
out, such unity is by no means that of the nuclear or even extended fam-
ily, nor does it exclude a certain diversity (Agamben 31).
Aristotle, in this critique of the Platonic notion of “unity” based on the 
“household” as an ideal that the polis should strive to attain, touches on 
a problem that the recent terminological shift from “national” to “home-
land security” has finally made explicit, although its genealogy goes 
back, as Agamben suggests, to the origins of Christianity. For the chal-
lenge posed by the emergence of what can be called Christian culture is 
that of reconciling the singularity of the divine—of the One God who 
is infinite—with the individuality of a creation that is finite and insofar 
as it is living, mortal. Security—etymologically, “without care,” se cura, 
will henceforth and increasingly be linked to the task of resolving this an-
tinomy: that of reconciling a life that is embodied in finite living beings 
with a Creator God who is both singular and infinite, and who therefore 
implies the possibility of a life that is “self-sufficient” in the sense of being 
constituted independently of “death”—of finitude. It is the problem of 
“eternal life,” of that zoe aionios that Agamben discerns to be at the heart 
of the “evangelical message” and which, he asserts, “in the final analysis is 
informed by the paradigm of oikos and not by that of the polis” (15).
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For Aristotle, political “security”—a word of course that to my knowl-
edge has no close counterpart in attic Greek, and for reasons that are es-
sential—was linked to the separation of polis from oikos. For Christian 
culture—which continues to inform its “secular” modern continuation 
in what is called the “West”—“security” tends to imply “salvation” inso-
far as it is now indissolubly linked to the fate of the individual living be-
ing, and its most immediate organizational context, the “family” and its 
“household.”1
Perhaps this explains why there is no direct equivalent of the word “se-
curity” in Greek: for in that language there can be no question of elimi-
nating “care” but only of redistributing it through diversification. The uni-
fied individual, or homogeneous “household” cannot become the locus 
of long-term survival and this is precisely what disqualifies the domestic 
“paradigm” politically. What survives can only be a certain disunity, a cer-
tain diversity and heterogeneity. To be “secure” then cannot be to stay 
the same over time. And yet, this is precisely what the Christian message 
seems to suggest. Mortality is the result of a human action, and through 
human action and the grace of God its overcoming can, and must, be en-
visaged. The key to “security” thus is envisaged on the model of salvation, 
and salvation in turn on the model of redemption: redemption from the 
guilt of “original sin.”
Ultimate homeland security thus builds upon a long-standing tradition 
that enthrones the individual living being in view of a horizon that ap-
pears to span the distance that leads from guilt and mortality to redemp-
tion and salvation. In this perspective, it is not so certain that there is an 
unbridgeable gap separating bios from the notion of a zoe aionios, since 
the notion of a “bare” or “nude life”—vita nuda—that Agamben associ-
ates with bios—implies both a life stripped of everything external to it, a 
life that is both impoverished and also self-sufficient, a life that is intrin-
sically independent of death precisely by virtue of this immanence and 
self-containment. Such a life would necessitate a certain dis-individua-
tion of the Living, insofar as the latter remain irreducibly limited, finite 
and mortal. But is not this what is implied by the apocalyptic character 
of the Last Judgment: the destruction of the (sinful) world so that it can 
be saved, and then endure without limit: zoe aionios? And does not this 
apocalyptic destruction of the world echo the sacrificial nature of the 
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“death of God” in the form of the Crucifixion and the Passion of Christ? 
Security can only be envisaged, following this “paradigm as a result of the 
sacrificial self-destruction of life in the singular, in order to make room 
for the advent of life in general,” without limit and without end, individu-
ated and yet now finally immortal.
The practice of such “security” can therefore only be polemical. It is the 
War Against Terror, the War Against Drugs, the War Against Poverty—
but always the War Against that Other that is ultimately the Anti-Christ, 
in refusing the Good News of a Life that can be “redeemed,” which is 
to say, saved from its own finitude. The act of killing—the active side of 
“war”—thus comes to be regarded as the harbinger of that ultimate act of 
Salvation that aims at killing nothing less than Death itself.
The care from which the politics of security—most recently, of “home-
land security”—seeks to “free” its citizens is very much the care that Hei-
degger in Being and Time described as that of being ahead of oneself, in-
debted to a future that inevitably involves the disappearance of the Self 
qua individual, and of its “household.”
It is only when “politics” learns to accommodate the “unhomely”—
uncanny—nature of security—homeland, national, international—that 
the ecology of “renewable resources” will cease to be just another version 
of the vita nuda as zoe aionios, and instead will begin to make room for 
what Walter Benjamin called “the Living”—which is to say, for lives in 
the singular.
Notes
1. Needless to say, this is not the direction in which Agamben interprets the 
“paradigm” of oikonomia—“economic theology—in Il Regno e la Gloria.
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Chapter 8
Common Political Democracy
The Marrano Register
Alberto Moreiras
A Republican Passion of the Real
Could we offer a conceptual determination for a register of vanquished 
thought, of the thought and experience of the vanquished, in the name of 
common political democracy? Everything that has been historically sig-
nificant in the political articulation of equality in European thought has 
been offered not by the victors, not by the holders of power, but rather by 
those who have suffered under constituted power, under violence, and 
have had to live their lives in defeat. The history of Europe is an uninter-
rupted contest between domination and the claim of freedom. Defeat has 
secularly forced the defeated into hegemonic submission, and it probably 
could not have been otherwise. But conversion to hegemony is never the 
last word. Common political democracy is the result, wherever it appears, 
of the forcing of that conversion to hegemonic submission into some-
thing else, which is not quite victory. I am going to use a particular name 
for it—that is, not for common political democracy but for the forcing 
of the way to it: marranismo, which has of course a particular validity for 
the history of modernity. Marranismo is also a register of power; it is not 
impotence, but the register of a power for freedom.
What is the marrano register? It is the short name of what we should 
properly call a converso-marrano register. Converso references the aban-
donment of what was previously one’s own in order to embrace a social 
truth, a dominant state of the situation. And marrano is the state of re-
turn, or rather the melancholy state where the shadow of the lost object 
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falls upon the subject and splits it or destabilizes it. I am making obvi-
ous reference to Spanish and Portuguese Jewish history and its avatars, 
without question a point of torsion of a history of the practice of freedom 
that, as such, has never relented in its struggle against the logics of impe-
rial domination.
That Spain has been the historical ground for a dramatic rendering of 
this conflict throughout modernity almost goes without saying. In ¿Qué 
imperio? José Luis Villacañas touches upon the core of this struggle. With 
Charles as he lands in La Coruña in 1520 the patrimonial ideology of the 
Habsburg family finds itself in a predicament that seemed to make its 
political articulation possible. It must undergo Hispanization. His grand-
father Maximilian had realized that, from a merely German perspective, 
the empire could not be consolidated: Germany was not France; there 
was no unity in Germany. When Charles inherits his patrimony the pos-
sibility emerges of using Spain as a basis for a politics of imperial con-
solidation. Power is finally at the Hapsburg’s disposal. As Villacañas ex-
plains, “decisions were made about Spain, not from Spain, and they were 
a function of empire, not the opposite” (30). In the crucial year of 1521, 
through the “reduction of the Spanish cities” after the wars of Comuni-
dades and Germanías, through the “organization of the Council of State 
under bishops such as Fonseca and Tavera, and the creation of a ruling 
elite of aristocratic military men and governors that will spread through 
Europe” (35), the destiny of Spain is sealed. It was imperial domination 
with a European projection against the freedom of the cities, which in 
Spain was mostly converso freedom. This process “is imposed because the 
empire needs it, and it is designed as an imitation of the French model in 
order to confront French potential expansion. Spain evolves following a 
European logic that is in reality mimetic to France” (35).
Villacañas shows that, at every step of the way, there was a different 
ideological and practical possibility. Spain offered an alternative general 
intellect that was systematically undermined and finally destroyed by 
the evolution of imperial ideology. As Villacañas puts it, “if there was a 
representative thought in Castile, it was very hostile to the imperial idea” 
(41). Villacañas’s itinerary through the intellectual history of the Span-
ish sixteenth century moves from Alonso del Castrillo’s republican anti-
imperialism along the lines of a political Aristotelianism that is indebted 
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to the work that Pedro de Osma and Fernando de Roa had been doing 
in Salamanca, to the protodemocratic (in the sense that it was frontally 
opposed to aristocratic absolutism) politics of friendship of the Castil-
ian cities, based on converso republican thought; from Juan Luis Vives, 
another converso, who offers “the most complete doctrine of Republi-
can government produced by a Spaniard” in early modernity (105), to 
Miguel de Ulzurrum, whose secularizing notion of the administration 
of men evolves into an anti-papal position that Trento would reject; 
and about the Erasmian thought of Bernardo Pérez de Chinchón, who 
thought there was an opportunity for a true Christian, anti-racist, anti-
inquisitorial society in Spain. But the Dominicans and the high Castilian 
nobility would win the battle for the general intellect. Villacañas calls it 
the victory of the Fernandine party against the party of Philippe of Bur-
gundy, whose premature death thoroughly undid the possibility of a con-
verso victory.
Around 1535 the situation is settled, and it is settled for centuries to 
come. Freedom in Spain has become a dream. The Dominican Inquisi-
tion, the clerical orders, and the high Castilian nobility would not aban-
don their social and political hegemony until the late eighteenth century. 
The persecution of the conversos by Inquisitors Deza and Tavera now 
evolves into the persecution of the Erasmians by Tavera, Valdés, and 
Loaysa. When Charles experiences defeat and retreats to Yuste Spain has 
already been closed, but a number of people are still alive in whom the 
residue of a free intellectuality was burning. The Inquisition will take care 
of them as it moves with few restraints. Constantino Ponce de la Fuente 
will die at the stake, accused of Lutheranism even though he was only 
an Erasmian, and Bartolomé de Carranza will languish in jail for many 
years. Jesuitism, which is emerging, will become the absolute limit of a 
Spanish spirituality that is no longer a spirituality of freedom, but rather 
a spirituality of domination caught between the extremes of command 
and obedience for the greater glory of God. A shadow of terror has fallen 
upon the lands of Spain.
The notion of a marrano register represents a turn of the screw or a 
quasi-dialectical twist in this story which is now a story of European di-
mensions that will quickly spread through the Americas as well. Literal 
marranismo applies only to conversos who, tired, bored, or desperate with 
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the strictures of the Spanish or Portuguese atmosphere, decided to re-
turn to the Jewish fold with larger or lesser possibilities of success. I need 
a freer use of the term. The marrano register is not primarily interested 
in a relapse into Judaism. It concerns, rather, the pulsional drive to find 
strength in the subjective deconstitution caused by the fall of the shad-
ow. The marrano shadow ciphers the melancholy moment in the wake of 
which it becomes necessary to develop an affective position that would 
not simply be anti-melancholy. The game consists of embracing melan-
choly and its other. From its inception the marrano register is already a 
double register.
It is then a matter of establishing the conceptual possibility of a marra-
no register for thought. But in opposition to what? What is, in the history 
of thought, which is also the history of political action, the alternative 
register, that is, any register incapable of assuming the marrano name? Let 
me call it the identitarian register, so that the fact that this is the register 
of a multiplicity of registers is duly indicated. The marrano register is the 
abandonment of what was previously one’s own and the embrace of the 
dominant state of the situation, and at the same time the abandonment 
of the state of the situation without the recovery of what was previously 
mine. Whatever was mine, if anything ever was, is blocked forever. The 
identitarian register, by contrast, is the embrace of what was previously 
mine insofar as I identify it in the state of the situation, and the militant 
abandonment of the alien as non-dominant. Whatever was mine stays 
mine and will always be mine. The marrano register is double because it 
takes off from a double exclusion: from your own and from the alien. But 
there is no exclusion without at least a double exclusion: the first gesture 
of exclusion is always inclusive—you are excluded, and the very fact of 
your exclusion creates the illusion of a “we”—we, the excluded—which is 
the potential ground of immunitary excess. It is only the second gesture 
that opens to exposure. You are excluded a second time, and the exclu-
sion becomes infinite. The identitarian register is therefore a register of 
inclusion that excludes whatever is differential. But it only requires affir-
mative exclusion: it is thus not properly a register of exclusion, as it does 
not live on exclusion. It lives only on rejection.
The marrano register is always open to exposure, or rather: it requires 
exposure for its self-constitution. As to the identitarian one, we could talk 
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about the Nazis, or even about someone like Martin Heidegger as a Nazi 
philosopher and a philosopher of Nazism for an extended period of his 
life, as its paradigmatic embodiments for the twentieth century.
But let us choose a more difficult or less obvious example. Contempo-
rary multiculturalism understands itself fundamentally as a mechanism 
for inclusion. It does not seek or want the pure or uncontaminated pres-
ervation of previous cultural formations. It rather seeks the reduction of 
the cultural drive to an identity procedure. Identity procedures give the 
notion of multiculturalism content, and not vice-versa, since multicultur-
alism does not express the temporal coexistence of unconnected monads 
but rather looks for the formation of a chain of equivalences between di-
verse cultural formations under the ideological link of identity, which as 
such remains empty, merely formal. Multicultural identity is the empty 
place that can only be filled relationally, through other supplementary or 
antagonistic identities. Hence its necessary but paradoxical structural hy-
bridity. We are multicultural to the extent that we are hybrid, but we are 
hybrid insofar as our identity is constituted in a differential relation with 
every other identity. This differential relation is already the sign of hy-
bridity. The hybrid register is openly anti-marrano. It is still the identitar-
ian register. That it might in principle convoke subaltern segments of the 
population in their desperate need for recognition and integration is far 
from being a guarantee of its quality as political thought or of its potential 
contribution to common political democracy. It has just as good a pos-
sibility of finding itself working towards the very opposite. If and when 
the identitarian register refers to subaltern identity, which is far from be-
ing always the case, it marks an instance of hegemonic submission, and it 
fulfills a function similar to that of the converso moment in Spanish Jew-
ish history. Far from instituting equality, it reproduces and internalizes 
mechanisms of dominance that it is the function of the marrano inversion 
to deconstitute.
If the marrano register inscribes the possibility of freedom, would the 
identitarian register be the register of domination? Would it be an im-
perial register? Even if in the form of an inverted imperial register? No 
doubt the identitarian register upheld by the Nazis, or the utterly deper-
sonalized Stalinist demand for thorough communist subjectivation, were 
imperial. The challenge is to show that there are also imperial gestures 
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in the apparently bland allegiances to everyday identities, whether they 
come from the dominant or mimic it through its mere inversion. It is to 
show that every affirmation of identity, including the affirmation of hy-
brid identity, is always already an imperial gesture.
Let us call all political domination imperial. Is all freedom political 
freedom? Freedom is nothing but political—this might be controversial, 
but I remain too much of a Nietzschean Spinozist to claim otherwise. Im-
perial domination against political or republican freedom: if it is accepted 
that all domination is imperial and that all political freedom is republi-
can, then the choice seems neat. Faced with that choice, who in her or his 
right mind would opt for imperial domination against political freedom? 
We promote political freedom in order to defend ourselves from impe-
rial domination and we study imperial domination in order to promote 
the conditions for political freedom. There would seem to be no third 
choice, no third way: either freedom or domination. You cannot have a 
bit of freedom, you cannot have a bit of domination. If you have a bit of 
freedom and a bit of domination, you fall under domination. The history 
of third ways is the history of the attempts to establish a line of flight from 
the inconsistencies of a stark choice between two bad options, but when 
it comes to the choice between freedom and domination the choice that 
refuses the alternative has already sacrificed freedom and has therefore al-
ready given itself over to domination, no matter how partially. This third 
choice is thus not a third choice, but rather a choice for domination, even 
if confusedly, in the name of freedom. Or it is a choice for freedom but, 
confusedly, under an imperative for domination. The situation is similar, 
if in an inverted manner, to the situation undergone by someone who is 
confronted by a thief ’s demand: “your money or your life!” If you give up 
your life you give up your money as well. Here you cannot but refuse the 
choice. With “freedom or domination!” you can only choose freedom. 
Choosing domination is a contradiction in terms. Actually, freedom is 
the only choice. Which is the ultimate logical reason why there is no third 
choice, no third way. There isn’t even an alternative, because not choos-
ing is already choosing freedom, or exercising it. These might already be 
marrano thoughts, both melancholy and anti-melancholy.
In politics, you choose freedom, you always choose freedom, even 
when you are mistaken. Under concrete historical circumstances, howev-
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er, and there is never anything else in politics, things get murkier. Let me 
bring up the case of Julián Besteiro, an important member of the Span-
ish Socialist Party up until the end of the Civil War. He was a professor 
of logic at the University of Madrid, and it came to happen to him that 
he had to confront, existentially, a logical dilemma. As he himself put it 
in a speech to the PSOE Executive Committee given in Barcelona on 15 
November 1938:
The war has been inspired, directed and fomented by the 
Communists. If they ceased to intervene, probably the pos-
sibilities of continuing the war would be small. The enemy, 
having other international support, would find itself in a situ-
ation of superiority. I recognize that this [the removal of the 
Communists] is a grave step at this stage. As you know, this 
would not affect me personally—other than as something 
that would have an impact on everyone—because I do not 
believe that I have had any responsibility for the fact that we 
have reached this point. I cannot offer you the solution. It is 
for you to mark out the boundaries and to consider what it 
is opportune to do at this moment. I see the situation as fol-
lows: if the war were to be won, Spain would be Communist. 
The rest of the democracies would be against us and we would 
have only Russia with us. And if we are defeated, the future 
will be terrible. (Quoted by Preston 183).
You can’t win and you can’t lose: or rather, both winning and losing are, 
from Besteiro’s perspective, just about equally terrible. The intellectual 
choice is impossible, as one cannot choose domination. And freedom 
is not available. Yes, this is the marrano register, which must sometimes 
confront the impossible. We know what Besteiro did: he conspired for 
an internal coup that displaced the Communists and ended with the sur-
render of the Republican government to the National side. The surrender 
of the Republic to the Francoists was not a choice for freedom: Besteiro 
underwent trial, and was sentenced to death, although his sentence was 
commuted and he died in jail shortly afterwards. Others may have done 
the opposite—as Republicans, they stuck it out with the Communists. 
They also lost, and became subject to imperial domination. According to 
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Besteiro, they couldn’t but lose, although they might have become sub-
ject to Communist domination. For Besteiro, there was only fascism or 
communism, and neither of them was freedom. But who is speaking? A 
professor of logic, an obscure subject who saw himself forced to confront 
an impossible alternative.
What if he had been a fascist, or a communist? If a fascist chooses fas-
cism, he is choosing freedom; if a communist chooses communism, he 
is choosing freedom. They may be mistaken, but that is not the point. 
The point is that the choice is always for freedom, for the freedom of the 
one who chooses, even though that very affirmation of freedom may en-
tail the domination of others. In fact, the choice for freedom may be the 
choice for domination. When the choice for freedom entails the domina-
tion of others, then we are not talking about marrano freedom, and we 
are certainly not talking about republican freedom. The choice for repub-
lican freedom is the uncanny choice for the freedom of all. Every other 
choice is the choice for imperial domination. And there is no third way, 
as Besteiro’s choice pathetically testifies. Or is it the case that Besteiro’s 
choice is always the choice in politics, and the choice of politics? Perhaps 
politics is always already the need to betray the marrano register into an 
impossible option, which would place the marrano register on the side of 
the impolitical.
Was Besteiro mistaken? What if communism were precisely the un-
canny choice for the freedom of all? We can leave the behavior of the 
Spanish Communist Party under the watch of the Comintern aside, or 
the extraordinarily difficult circumstances under which every political ac-
tor had to move towards the end of the Spanish Civil War, and we can as-
sume that Stalinism is not communism, or even that it is a direct betrayal 
of communism. The key question, it seems to me, is of a pronominal na-
ture. The key question is whether the question of republican freedom is 
a question concerning a “we,” or rather a question concerning a “they.” If 
my freedom is the freedom of all, is “all” to be encompassed by a first per-
son plural or by a third person plural? Is political freedom a question of 
community or is political freedom a question of the multitude? It seems 
to me that the future of common political democracy hinges on the pos-
sible answer to that question. Common political democracy always al-
ready knows that domination is about the “they,” not the “we,” about the 
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multitude, not about community. And common political democracy has 
to make a choice: is there freedom in community? Or not?
Let me take a second example from the Spanish Civil War. In this case 
I want to refer to the “Y” that members of the Sección Femenina, the 
women’s Falangist organization, patched onto their blue shirts. I will fol-
low Paul Preston again:
The symbol of the Sección Femenina was the letter Y, and its 
principal decoration was a medal forged in the form of a Y, in 
gold, silver, or red enamel according to the degree of heroism 
or sacrifice being rewarded. The Y was the first letter of the 
name of Isabel of Castille, as written in the fifteenth century, 
and also the first letter of the word yugo (yoke) which was part 
of the Falangist emblem of the yoke and arrows. With specific 
connotations of a glorious imperial past and more generalized 
ones of servitude, as well as of unity, it was a significant choice 
of symbol. (Preston 129)
So you are a woman, but have subjectivized yourself in an affirmation 
of love to the Falange. Your choice for the Falange is your freedom, but 
that freedom is, first of all, imperial freedom, as it commits you to a path 
of domination of others, the non-Falangists; secondarily, it is also impe-
rial freedom to the extent that you sign up for your own domination, for 
your own servitude. As a member of the Sección Femenina, it was your 
duty to serve the man, the men of the Fatherland, those fascists that you 
loved. Again the question is: Is Pilar Primo de Rivera and, with her, all 
the colleagues who thought up the Y symbol to sum up the free presence 
of Spanish women in the National Movement giving us the conditions of 
possibility of all political subjectivation?
When it comes to political subjectivation, is the choice between free-
dom and domination or is the choice between domination and domi-
nation? Domination: the yoke that turns the third person into a “we,” 
the ground of community; or else the yoke that turns the non-we into 
slaves or enemies. The demand for political subjectivation is the thief ’s 
demand: “Your money or your life!” Community is always the Y on your 
shoulder. Republican freedom is the refusal of the Y. If republican free-
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dom is the refusal of the Y, then republican freedom is the refusal of po-
litical subjectivation.
The uncanny choice for the freedom of all, for the freedom of the third 
person plural, is a choice always to be made outside political subjectiva-
tion. It is adrift, as it refuses every orientation beyond itself, beyond its 
own gesture. It embodies no calculation, no teleology, no program. It is 
rare—rarer than the emergence of the subject itself, which happens every 
time there is a free choice for community. It stands outside every moral-
ism. This is the time to restitute republican freedom to the heart of the 
political. Everywhere we hear definitions of politics that presuppose po-
litical subjectivation as the goal. There is no doubt that political subjecti-
vation is ongoing in every political process. But political subjectivation is 
in every case a function of the history of domination. Political subjectiva-
tion is the object of the identitarian register, but the history of freedom is 
something else: a history of gestures, a haptic history of decisions for the 
“they,” a countercommunitarian history of the neuter, of the impersonal. 
The history of freedom is always the countercommunitarian enactment 
of the marrano register.
Spinoza’s Worm in the Blood
It is possible to elaborate on the notion of the marrano register as the pre-
condition of a conceptual renewal of the category of political democracy. 
Is this not what Baruch Spinoza himself tried to do, not only in his Theo-
logical-Political Treatise but even more resolutely in his unfinished Politi-
cal Treatise? Even more, isn’t Spinoza’s Ethics the systematic attempt to 
offer a philosophical ground for the thinking of the political as being-in-
common? Only antiteleological or, better, ateleological thought, against 
the kind of goal the identitarian register necessarily posits, can form the 
condition of possibility of a common democracy consistent with its own 
presuppositions.
First, the identitarian register in the history of thought is the very 
ground of the ontotheological tradition and of its corollary, political the-
ology. Both of them are teleological orientations for thought, and both 
of them are ultimately founded, as Reiner Schurmann has argued, in the 
concept of final cause developed by Aristotle in the Physics. The Aristo-
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telian final cause is the definitive model for metaphysics in the wake of 
an artisanal and productionist understanding of substance. Identity is the 
final cause of community under an equally productionist and substantial-
ist directive. Second, the marrano register, which is given its first proper 
philosophical foundation by Spinoza, insists on a non-ontotheological 
and also non-teleological exposure. It is, precisely, the abandonment of 
the notion of final cause as much as it is the abandonment of a presump-
tion of grounding as political procedure. And, third, our time, as Carlo 
Galli says, is the time of the explosion of the ontotheologicopolitical 
grounding concepts of modernity, the explosion of modern political te-
leologies, which means that, today, we find ourselves in a political world 
for which we have no concept. The task of a new conceptualization, for 
whose inscription I am obviously proposing the marrano register, must 
be carried out.
According to Galli, ontotheological history explodes in its political di-
mension with the social appearance of the category of total mobilization, 
effectively described by Ernst Junger, and applicable to fascist totalitari-
anism, to soviet totalitarianism, and to what Junger as well as Heidegger 
called technical Americanism. Galli’s notion of a political architectonics 
finds a dialectical torsion in the complementary notion that the political 
spaces of the history of modernity have never been stable. From Hobbes 
on, and that means, from the time of the English Revolution, its inter-
nal tensions, its points of pressure, its lines of flight were only barely con-
tained by structures of material force whose nihilistic background made 
them always already vulnerable. Political mediation throughout moder-
nity has always subsisted precariously. If globalization is the explosion of 
modernity it is because, in globalization, the structures of political medi-
ation have vanished towards unmediation. For Galli “immediate media-
tion” is the name of the new political game, but it is a game of which we 
ignore the rules. This unknowing gives political content to the culturalist 
concept of postmodernity.
Immediate mediation means, first of all, that our contemporaneity 
finds no restrainer, no katechon (Galli uses the Pauline notion of the kat-
echon as appropriated by Carl Schmitt: the katechon was the mediating 
force protecting the world from the arrival of final disaster in the form 
of the Antichrist.) Our last katechonta were the welfare states that fol-
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lowed in the wake of World War II. The containment of political evil is 
today overflown. Galli calls the present moment “global mobilization,” 
and says of it that it constitutes the end, by explosion, of the epochal mo-
ment of more or less successful constraint or restraint of political evil that 
we call modernity. In global mobilization politics is war, and war is the 
unity of being.1
What does global mobilization mobilize? Global mobilization mobi-
lizes first of all the identitarian principle. War is the practical corollary 
of an unleashed identity principle. If the marrano register could think of 
itself as offering the possibility of an exception to war, then the marrano 
register could still be prepared to offer a new articulation of political free-
dom. This is perhaps the challenge that Spinoza’s thought still guards for 
us. Spinoza’s thought is the guardian of the marrano register of thought. 
But this is perhaps a controversial view.
Marilena Chaui offers us a definition of the political implications, risks, 
and challenges of the marrano register. She says about Spinoza:
The image of the “Rijnsbur hermit,” of the solitary sage who 
enjoys exclusion, pays no justice to the work of Spinoza. The 
excluded one is not he who is outside the cultural, political, 
and social world, but he who was thrown out of a world that 
could not stand the risk of his presence. It is he who, on under-
standing the meaning of exclusion, retains the extraordinary 
possibility of making himself fully present, understanding the 
nature of powers that are unable to stand contradiction and 
difference, fabricating false harmonies and identities that re-
main indispensable to tyranny Spinoza does not speak from 
the same place as the power holders who, under the pretext of 
tolerance and of the uninterrupted search for consensus, feign 
to welcome liberty, proclaiming themselves their promoters, 
in the name of a good supposedly common to everyone. (41)
There is no question of enjoying exclusion: it is not something to be 
enjoyed or shunned, but rather a condition imposed on the marrano by 
a world that cannot take the chance of marranismo. The marrano regis-
ters inscribes in itself the meaning of its exclusion from identitarian pa-
rameters of practice. That there is tyranny in identitarianism is a function 
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of its need to fabricate false harmonies whose mission is not so much to 
erase as it is to kill contradiction and real difference. But this paradoxi-
cally gives the marrano register the ability, Chaui says, “to make itself fully 
present.” How? Through its radical negation of the position of those pow-
er holders that, under the pretext of consensus, by which what is meant is 
unanimity, the terror of the One, feign freedom in the name of the com-
mon. There is another freedom, there is another understanding of the 
common. This is the “extraordinary possibility” of the marrano register.
The marrano register is anticonsensual, as it does not seek the articula-
tion of hegemonic alliances. It dwells in the need to exist in the act, that is, 
to exist before or beyond the imaginary character of the type of existence 
fostered by the tyrannical articulation of power and non-knowledge. The 
full presence of the marrano register is accomplished in an act that, on 
producing itself, reveals in the identitarian act, as Chaui puts it, “the se-
cret presence of a servile cupiditas, of an insatiable and superstitious de-
sire to serve and obey that humans imagine as a source of strength when 
it is a sign of their individual and collective annihilation” (41). The mar-
rano register, and its first full-blown articulation in Spinoza’s thought, is a 
counterdiscourse “against that impotence imagined as force” (41). Chaui 
calls that power the “most terrible” in Spinoza’s thought. The marrano 
register is a register in the terrible. It is little wonder that Spinoza’s ad-
versaries would then move towards the inscription of the work and the 
life of the marrano as “pestilentissima, pestilentissimus … as an irremedi-
able and contagious disease, sudden and incontrollable, that spreads like 
a plague, through contact, killing and deforming forever. Criticism rises, 
thus, as the prophylaxis of the spiritual body of Christendom and of the 
‘people of the Nation,’ the Judaic body” (25). Criticism is prophylactic 
against every possible proliferation of the marrano register, understood as 
auto-immunitary trouble, collapse of the body of the human, collapse of 
what the identitarian register understands by the common.
Chaui also understands the marrano register as a double register. “It 
is necessary to accept the weight of strangeness in Spinoza’s thought … 
Spinoza innovates because he subverts, explaining his ideas in a simulta-
neous double register: in the discourse that names the new at the same 
time that it enacts itself as a counterdiscourse for the demolition of what 
has been inherited” (12). The double register in Spinoza’s thought has an 
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instituting character as deconstruction and a deconstructive character as 
instituting. From its very definition, the marrano register, which is also 
always at the same time converso-marrano, must deconstruct that from 
which it comes, affirmatively, in virtue of its double exclusion. The pro-
duction of the marrano register is already des-production of alternative 
options. What institutes always destroys. But is it most pestilent as insti-
tuting or as destructive? It is most pestilent in virtue of its double register, 
for essential reasons that are precisely the ones that led Spinoza to outline 
his own project, and to carry it out, along the double register.
The double register refers, according to Chaui, to a “double constitu-
tive movement” in Spinoza’s work based on imagination and intuitive sci-
ence. On the one hand, Spinoza studies the existence of singular bodily 
things. On the other hand, he studies the implication of every singular 
bodily thing in the unique substance. Spinoza’s thought is, for Chaui, an 
experience of thought “on the way that leads from the corporeal image 
of the singular existence to the idea of a singular essence” (46). Chaui 
finds in the Dutch new optics developed by Kepler and Huygens, already 
assimilated by Vermeer and Rembrandt’s painting, the possibility of the 
Spinozian synthesis. “The eye of the spirit is deep inside the universe”: 
this could be the motto of the new optics against the Italian perspectiv-
al canon. Spinoza will say: “like the worm in the blood.” “It is from that 
interior place that he acquires the knowledge that he is part of a whole, 
that is, of a system of necessary relations constituted by laws of coher-
ence between the parts and of concordance between the parts and the 
whole” (Chaui 52).
Like a worm in the blood: part of the blood and singularity or excep-
tion in the blood, a mode in the substance, a mode of the substance. For 
the marrano register “truth … lacks nothing extrinsecal to it to be known, 
because the true idea is the norm and the index of itself The human intel-
lect … is an innate force for the true” (57). This is the constitutive thrust 
of the marrano register: it does not return to what melancholy yields but 
seeks its force in desubjectivation. In the marrano double exclusion the 
presence of itself to itself emerges through its own withdrawal. This is 
the extraordinary possibility: the totality of what withdraws returns in 
counterdiscourse, but returns alternatively, under marrano not identitar-
ian register. True knowledge is the very deployment of the double con-
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stitution of thought: an intensification of the immanence of everything 
to everything, of the singular in the whole and the whole in the singular, 
a radical intensification of the common. Happiness, freedom, and truth 
are the same, they are the human essence as the finite expression of the 
infinite, and reaching it is to accomplish the immanence of individual sin-
gularity in the eternal substance. This is at the same time instituting and 
deconstructive. For Chaui, “in the Ethics it is a question of demonstrat-
ing the necessity of immanence as the only intelligibility of the real, and 
the irrationality of every image of transcendence, from the permanent ar-
ticulation of immanent efficiency and the critique of final causes” (Chaui 
71). The marrano register does not posit a for-what; it only embraces its 
own necessity. “Finalism is not just ignorance of the true causes of ac-
tions, causes that are always efficient, but also withdrawal of the agent 
into the autonomy of its acting, which transforms it into a patient, since 
it subjects it to something external, throwing it into heteronomy, since 
either the ends of action were not posited by it, in the case of humans, 
or, if posited by the agent, have become separated from it, in the case 
of God” (83).
Immanent and anti-finalist causality establishes the coherence of Spi-
nozian republicanism against every idea of providential history, whether 
Christian-ecclesiastic or Judeo-messianic, but also against the Helleno-
Roman disenchantment in view of the decline of the state (83). Neither 
progress nor a fall. The explosion of ontotheology in Spinoza’s thought 
establishes a new condition of empire—only democracy is imperium ab-
solutum insofar as only democracy is in a position to affirm the satura-
tion of the field of the real from the real itself, and not from its capture 
by the imaginary, which is the problem and the potential evil of every 
identitarian register. Spinoza is the first philosopher of common politi-
cal democracy.
On its deconstructive side Chaui observes four main targets of Spi-
nozianism. They are the demolition of the theologico-religious edifice 
where God and Nature are thought in their mutual analogy; of the very 
presupposition of analogy, which is the image of creation, of finality, of 
an omnipotent and unfathomable but visibly oriented divine will; of the 
theological-moral edifice based upon the identification of freedom and 
the will, in God, and of freedom and guilt in the human (with its chain 
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of consequences: predestination, election, final judgment, sin, remorse, 
salvation or damnation); and of the theologico-political edifice where a 
conception of God prevails without which politics cannot be thought 
(94; 96–97). This is marrano thought: God and Nature do not stand in 
an analogical relation; there is no analogical relation, and therefore no 
orientation of history; there is no abyss of guilt through which human 
freedom must be systematically coerced into obedient behavior; and 
there is no ontotheological subordination of the political, either to God 
the Master or to any of its surrogates, including the party of orthodoxy, 
whatever form it assumes. Those are all characteristics of the identitarian 
register. Would it be possible for us today, at the epochal moment of the 
end of ontotheological temporality, to give a concept to conditions of po-
litical constitution outside any debt to the analogical-transitive causality 
that determines the ( Judeo-Roman) political history of the West? Is the 
marrano register, as originally systematized by Spinoza, not our best bet 
against the political theology of modernity at the end of modernity?
The Taskless Task
Giorgio Agamben has remarked on the courage with which Emmanuel 
Levinas, in his “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” identifies in 
Hitlerism a number of categories that he himself is trying to elaborate in 
his own philosophical thought (Agamben 335). The politico-theological 
or secularizing element in liberalism had retained from Christianity “one 
of its essential elements in the form of the sovereign freedom of reason” 
(Levinas 66): “In the world of liberalism, man is not weighed down by 
a History in choosing his destiny. He does not experience the possibili-
ties open to him as a series of restless powers that seethe within him and 
already push him down a determined path. For him, they are only logical 
possibilities that present themselves to a dispassionate reason that makes 
choices while forever keeping its distance” (66).
Such is not the case for fascism. Marxism had already partially broken 
with the liberal view by endorsing the notion that being determines con-
sciousness, but the break was not absolute: “Individual consciousness 
determined by being is not sufficiently impotent not to retain, at least 
in principle, the power to shake off the social bewitchment that then ap-
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pears foreign to its essence” (67). For fascism, however, “the situation 
to which [man] was bound [is] not added to him but form[s] the very 
foundations of his being” (67). It is from this perspective that Levinas 
finds himself sharing a foundational point of departure with Nazism: 
“The body is not a happy or unhappy accident that relates us to the im-
placable world of matter. Its adherence to the Self is of value in itself. It is 
an adherence that one does not escape and that no metaphor can confuse 
with the presence of an external object; it is a union that does not in any 
way alter the tragic character of finality” (68). This is “the new concep-
tion of man”: “the mysterious urgings of the blood, the appeals of hered-
ity and the past for which the body serves as an enigmatic vehicle, lose 
the character of being problems that are subject to a solution put forward 
by a sovereignly free Self Man’s essence no longer lies in freedom, but in 
a kind of bondage. To be truly oneself … means becoming aware of the 
ineluctable original chain that is unique to our bodies, and above all ac-
cepting this chaining” (69).
The fascist choice is now open. “Chained to his body, man sees him-
self refusing the power to escape from himself. Truth is no longer for him 
the contemplation of a foreign spectacle; instead it consists in a drama 
in which man is himself the actor. It is under the weight of his own exis-
tence, which includes facts on which there is no going back, that man will 
say his yes or his no” (70). And the fascist “yes” is the constitution of a 
political procedure of truth that, as such, must find its way towards uni-
versality. Levinas’s elaboration of this problem is in my opinion his most 
important contribution, and one that, for us, marks the radical line of di-
vision between the marrano and the identitarian register. Levinas says: 
“How is universality compatible with racism? The answer—to be found 
in the logic of what first inspires racism—involves a basic modification 
of the very idea of universality. Universality must give way to the idea of 
expansion, for the expansion of a force presents a structure that is com-
pletely different from the propagation of an idea” (70).
Force expansion against idea propagation: the latter serves a process of 
equalization as it “becomes a common heritage” (70). But “force does not 
disappear among those who submit to it. It is attached to the personality 
or society exerting it, enlarging that person or society while subordinat-
ing the rest. Here the universal order is not established as a consequence 
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of ideological expansion; it is that very expansion that constitutes the 
unity of a world of masters and slaves” (70–71). There is no identitarian 
community to the very extent that a community of masters and slaves is 
not a community of the common. The identitarian community is always 
a community of subordination. Given this situation, Agamben wonders 
whether we still live, unawares, “in the margins of nazism” (337). That we 
are riven to our factical existence, that our universe is no longer the lib-
eral universe of the sovereign freedom of reason, Agamben says, throws a 
wrench into the political (Christian-liberal) tradition of the West. Spino-
za’s worm in the blood knew well that it could find no exit, and decided 
to live its destiny in the intensifying affirmation of its predicament. But 
embracing naked life as it is was also the Nazi solution. The Nazi vocation 
to turn “natural genetic inheritance into the historical mission of the Ger-
man people” (342) must be distinguished from the Spinozist “extraor-
dinary possibility” of democracy as imperium absolutum and saturation 
of the field of the real. It is the antifinalism of Spinoza’s project, the stub-
born restraint of the marrano register to the common intransitiveness of a 
life without analogical masters that marks the minimal difference. Com-
mon political democracy is not a democracy of the people to the extent 
that the people is always counted as One, and always assigned a destiny. 
Agamben notes the contemporary insistence on recovering heritage as 
task, and against it he proposes the old Aristotelian notion of the taskless 
man, or people without a task, without an ergon, as the horizon of a new 
visitation of the political. “Politics is what corresponds to the essential 
de-tasking of men, to the radically work-less being of human communi-
ties” (343). This workless community is the undestined community of 
the vanquished: the free future of the common.
Notes
1. Galli develops these ideas in Spazi politici and in a short sequel called La 
guerra globale. The notion of “global war” that is the subject of the supplement 
to Spazi politici initiates the analysis of the possible consequences of the 
end of the restraining period. What the restrainer restrained was the very 
political tension of the architectonics of modernity. If the latter was primarily 
designed, negatively or nihilistically, to prevent conflict or rather to relegate 
it to an exteriority, today conflict has become generalized, to such an extent 
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that no categorical distinction can be made between politics and war. 
Globalization is war. And war is the (fracturing) unity of being for our time. 
If we could think of an exception to war, then we should, and it is an urgent 
task under which Galli posits the very possibility of a new freedom. No 
freedom, then, without a new conceptuality, even though it is also the case 
that a new conceptuality cannot by itself guarantee freedom. The stakes could 
not be higher. It is now no longer enough to change the world: one must first 
interpret it. That is, one must first develop an adequate vocabulary, given the 
collapse of our language(s).
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Chapter 9
Bare Life
Ewa Plonowska Ziarek
One of the most important new concepts introduced in contemporary 
theory is Georgio Agamben’s notion of bare life. Agamben’s crucial con-
tribution allows us not only to revise the Foucauldian theory of biopow-
er, but also to rethink the political contradictions of modernity. Despite 
its importance, Agamben’s theory of bare life does not, however, suffi-
ciently address two crucial questions: the problem of resistance and the 
negative differentiation of bare life with respect to racial and gender dif-
ferences. Thanks to Agamben’s revision of biopolitics, it becomes clear 
that resistance cannot be limited to the contestation of the law or power 
structures; in fact, one of the most pressing political questions raised by 
Homo Sacer is whether bare life itself can be mobilized by emancipatory 
movements. The second issue we need to reconsider is the way bare life 
is implicated in gendered, class, colonial and racist configurations of the 
political and, because of this implication, suffers different forms of vio-
lence.1 The central paradox bare life presents for political analysis is not 
only the erasure of political distinctions but also the negative differentia-
tion, or privation, such erasure produces with respect to differences that 
used to characterize a form of life that was destroyed.
To develop the paradoxes of bare life, let us begin with Agamben’s 
definition of this concept. Reworking Aristotle’s2 and Hannah Arendt’s3
distinctions between biological existence (zoe) and the political life of 
speech and action (bios), between mere life and a good life, Agamben in-
troduces in Homo Sacer his own interpretation and his own necessarily 
selective genealogy of “bare life” from antiquity to modernity. Stripped 
from political significance and exposed to murderous violence, bare life 
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is both the counterpart of the sovereign decision on the state of excep-
tion and the target of sovereign violence. To avoid misunderstanding, I 
would like to stress the point that is made sometimes only implicitly in 
Agamben’s work and not always sufficiently stressed by his commenta-
tors: namely, the fact that bare life, wounded, expendable, and endan-
gered, is not the same as biological zoe, but rather the remainder of the 
destroyed political bios. As Agamben puts it in his critique of Hobbes’ 
state of nature, mere life “is not simply natural reproductive life, the zoe
of the Greeks, nor bios” but rather “a zone of indistinction and continu-
ous transition between man and beast” (1998, 109). More emphatically, 
the conclusion of Homo Sacer stresses the fact that “[e]very attempt to re-
think the political space of the West must begin with the clear awareness 
that we no longer know anything of the classical distinction between zoe
and bios” (187). To evoke Theodor Adorno, we could say that bare life, 
not only the referent but also the effect of sovereign violence, is damaged 
life, stripped of its political significance, of its specific form of life.
For Agamben, bare life constitutes the original but “concealed nucleus” 
of Western biopolitics in so far as its exclusion founds the political realm. 
Bare life is always already captured by the political in a double way: first, 
in the form of the exclusion from the polis—it is included in the politi-
cal in the form of exclusion—and, second, in the form of the unlimited 
exposure to violation, which does not count as a crime. Thus, the most 
fundamental categories of Western politics are not the social contract, or 
the friend and the enemy, but bare life and sovereign power (7–8). As 
Agamben’s broad outline of the political genealogy suggests, the position 
and the political function of bare life changes historically. This genealogy 
begins with the most distant memory and the first figuration of bare life 
expressed in ancient Roman law by the obscure notion of homo sacer—
that is, the notion of the banned man who can be killed with impunity by 
all but is unworthy of either juridical punishment or religious sacrifice. 
Neither the condemned criminal nor the sacrificial scapegoat, and thus 
outside the human and divine law, homo sacer is the target of sovereign 
violence exceeding the force of law and yet anticipated and authorized 
by that law. Banished from collectivity, he is the referent of the sovereign 
decision on the state of exception, which both confirms and suspends the 
normal operation of the law. In Agamben’s genealogy, the major shift in 
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the politicization of bare life occurs in modernity. With the mutation of 
sovereignty into biopower, bare life ceases to be the excluded outside of 
the political but in fact becomes its inner hidden norm: bare life “gradu-
ally begins to coincide with the political realm” (9). However, this inclu-
sion and distribution of bare life within the political does not mean its 
integration with political existence; rather, it is a disjunctive inclusion of 
the inassimilable remnant, which still remains the target of sovereign vio-
lence. As Agamben argues, “Western politics has not succeeded in con-
structing the link between zoe and bios” (11).
In contrast to the ancient ban, or the inclusive exclusion from the politi-
cal, a new form of disjunctive inclusion of bare life within the polis emerg-
es with modern democracies. In democratic regimes this hidden incor-
poration of bare life both into the political realm and into the structure 
of citizenship manifests itself, according to Agamben, as the inscription 
of “birth” within human rights—an inscription that establishes a danger-
ous link between citizenship, nation, and biological kinship. As the 1789 
Declaration of the Rights of Man proclaims, men do not become equal 
by virtue of their political association but are “born and remain” equal. 
Democratic citizens are thus bearers of both bare life and human rights, 
they are at the same time the targets of disciplinary power and free demo-
cratic subjects. In a political revision of Foucault’s formulation of mod-
ern subjectivity as “empirico-transcendental” doublet,4 Agamben argues 
that the modern citizen is “a two-faced being, the bearer both of subjection 
to sovereign power and of individual liberties (Agamben, 1998, 125). The 
democratic subject of rights is thus characterized by the aporia between 
political freedom and the subjection of mere life, without a clear distinc-
tion, mediation, or reconciliation between them.
Since bare life is included within Western democracies as their hidden 
inner ground and as such cannot mark their borders, modern politics is 
about the search for new racialized and gendered targets of exclusion, for 
the new living dead (130). In our own times, such targets multiply with 
astonishing speed and infiltrate bodies down to the cellular level: from 
refugees, illegal immigrants, inmates on death row subject to suicide 
watch, comatose patients on life support, to organ transplants and fetal 
stem cells. For Agamben, this inclusion of bare life within the bodies of 
each citizen becomes catastrophically apparent with the reversal of the 
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democratic state into totalitarian regimes at the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury. As the disasters of fascism and soviet totalitarianism demonstrate, 
and as the continuous histories of genocide show, by suspending politi-
cal forms of life, totalitarian regimes can reduce whole populations to 
disposable bare life that could be destroyed with impunity. This is what 
according to Agamben constitutes the unprecedented horror of Nazi 
concentration camps: the extreme destitution and degradation of hu-
man life to bare life subject to mass extermination: “Insofar as its inhabit-
ants were stripped of every political status and wholly reduced to bare 
life, the camp was also the most absolute biopolitical space ever to have 
been realized, in which power confronts nothing but pure life, without 
any mediation” (171). If Agamben controversially claims that camps are 
not just the extreme aberration of modernity but its “fundamental biopo-
litical paradigm” (181), which shows the “thanatopolitical face”of power 
(142, 150), it is because concentration camps for the first time actualize 
the danger implicit in Western politics, namely, the total genocide made 
possible by the reversal of the exception signified by homo sacer into a 
new thanato-political norm. Such collapse of the distinction between ex-
ception and norm, such transformation of the temporal exception into 
material space, together with the “absolute” and unmediated subjection 
of life to death, constitutes the “supreme” political principle of genocide.
The most compelling force of Agamben’s work is his diagnosis of the 
ways the aporia of the bare life/life opposition in Western politics gives 
rise to new forms of domination and to the reversal of democracy into 
fascism. Nonetheless, Agamben’s analysis of this aporia from antiquity to 
modernity misses two crucial issues: the question of resistance and the 
negative differentiation of bare life along racial, ethic, and gender lines. 
First of all, as several commentators and critics, most notably Ernesto 
Laclau, argue, what is lacking in Agamben’s work is a theory of the “eman-
cipatory possibilities” of modernity.5 Yet if we were to reconstruct such 
a theory in terms of Agamben’s philosophy, then the task of conceptu-
alizing resistance could not be limited to the contestation of the law or 
power structures; in fact, one of the most important political questions 
is whether bare life itself can be mobilized by oppositional movements. 
By focusing on the way bare life functions as the referent of the sovereign 
decision, Agamben, unfortunately, answers this question in the negative: 
198 Ewa Plonowska Ziarek
“The ‘body’ is always already a biopolitical body and bare life, and noth-
ing in it … seems to allow us to find solid ground on which to oppose the 
demands of sovereign power” (187, emphasis added). The second problem 
Agamben ignores is the way bare life is implicated in the gendered, sexist, 
colonial and racist configurations of biopolitics. If we argue that bare life 
emerges as the after-effect of the destruction of the symbolic differences 
of gender, ethnicity, race or class—differences which constitute political 
forms of life—this means that bare life is still negatively determined by 
the destruction of a historically specific way of life. Thus another paradox 
of bare life is the simultaneous erasure of the political distinctions and 
the negative differentiation retrospectively produced by such erasure.
Let us consider these two issues—the differentiation of bare life and 
its role in emancipatory movements—in turn. Although Agamben’s 
heterogenous examples of bare life—for instance, the father/ son rela-
tion in antiquity, Nazi euthanasia programs for the mentally ill, refugee 
camps, the ethnic rape camps in the former Yugoslavia, the comatose 
body on life support, and especially the most extreme case of the Musel-
mann—are always diversified according to racist, gendered, and ethnic 
and historical distinctions, his conceptual analysis does not follow the 
implications of such diversification. Consider for instance Agamben’s 
brief comment about the difference between ethnic rape camps and 
Nazi camps: “If the Nazis never thought of effecting the Final Solution 
by making Jewish women pregnant, it is because the principle of birth 
that assured the inscription of life in the order of the nation-state was 
still—if in a profoundly transformed sense—in operation. This principle 
has now entered into a process of decay” (176). Needless to say, the sexu-
ally and racially marked difference between these two forms of sovereign 
violence—killing and rape—cannot be reduced to the principle of birth 
alone. Agamben refrains from any further explorations of rape as a sexu-
al political violence because such an analysis would complicate his very 
concept of bare life, always defined as a life that can be killed, but not as 
life that can be raped or subjected to sexual violence.
To show the necessity of supplementing Agamben’s conceptualization 
of bare life, I would like to consider briefly Aristotle’s and Orlando Patter-
son’s discussion of slavery, on the one hand, and the modern uses of the 
hunger strike, on the other. In terms of Agamben’s genealogy of bare life, 
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slavery is an important case to consider because its ancient and modern, 
racialized forms represent instances of bare life co-extensive with both 
the Greek polis and modern democracy and yet irreducible to the catego-
ry of either homo sacer or the camp. Let us begin the exploration of bare 
life and slavery with the text that is foundational to Agamben’s political 
theory—with Aristotle’s Politics. As soon as Aristotle introduces the cru-
cial distinctions between zoe and bios, oikos (home) and polis, he is con-
fronted with the localization and legitimation of enslaved life, which does 
not seem to fit easily into these distinctions. Thus, it is not only the case 
that, as Thomas Wall argues, in the Greek polis bare life “was abandoned 
to the home, the oikos” (39). There is also the more fundamental problem 
that Aristotle’s defense of slavery creates a conceptual aporia undermin-
ing his definition of slavery as an “animate instrument” belonging to the 
household. Implicated in the network of differences fundamental to the 
differentiation of the public space of the city—such as the differences be-
tween the body and the soul, the male and the female, the human and the 
animal, passion and reason—enslaved life, defined by Aristotle as prop-
erty, does not have a “proper” place. In his apologia, Aristotle writes the 
following: “The soul rules the body with the authority of a master: reason 
rules the appetite with the authority of the a statesman The same prin-
ciple is true of the relation of man to other animals Again, the relation 
of male to female is naturally that of the superior to the inferior We may 
thus conclude that all men who differ from others as much as the body 
differs from the soul, or an animal from a man … are by nature slaves” 
(Aristotle, 1254b, 16). As these multiple analogies show, the political 
subjection and exclusion of femininity and slavery is “like” the subjection 
of the body to reason and animality to humanity. Perhaps bearing wit-
ness to the threat of enslavement in war, this analogy potentially makes 
the body of each Greek citizen “like” the enslaved or inhuman body. And 
conversely the enslaved body blurs the distinction between the human 
and the animal, the household and the city. Because of its in-between 
position on the “threshold” (to use Agamben’s apt term), slavery in Ar-
istotle’s text begins to haunt the Greek polis from within and from with-
out, making the Greek citizen, prior to its modern counterpart, already “a 
two-faced being, the bearer of bodily” enslavement to reason and a political 
being among equals.
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Although subjected to the violence of the master rather than to sov-
ereign banishment, enslaved life in Aristotle’s Politics, like the obscure 
figure of “homo sacer” in Roman law, blurs the boundaries between the 
inside and the outside of the political. It is Orlando Patterson’s influential 
study of slavery from antiquity to modernity that gives a full account of 
the liminality of the slave’s paradoxical position in the social order. In his 
seminal work Slavery and Social Death, Patterson argues that the enigma 
of slavery exceeds both the juridical and the economic categories of law, 
production, exchange, or property. What all these categories fail to expli-
cate is both the “total” domination of the enslaved life and the liminality 
of slaves’ position. Like the indistinction, or the threshold, between the 
inside and outside marked by homo sacer, slave’s liminality (Patterson 42, 
44) collapses both the political and the ontological differences between 
the human and the inhuman, monstrosity and normality, anomaly and 
norm, life and death, cosmos and chaos, being and “nonbeing.” In one of 
the most suggestive passages devoted to the interpretation of the Anglo-
Saxon representation of slavery/servitude in Beowulf, Patterson writes: 
“It was precisely because he was marginal, neither human nor inhuman, 
neither man nor beast, neither dead nor alive, the enemy within who was 
neither member nor true alien, that the slave could lead Beowulf and his 
men across the deadly margin that separated the social order above from 
the terror and chaos of the underground” (48).
What is then the relation between these two different expressions of 
subjugation and liminality represented, on the one hand, by homo sacer 
and, on the other hand, by enslaved life? The key link between bare life/
sovereignty and the master/ slave dialectic is the substitutability of slav-
ery for death: either for the death of the external enemy or the death of 
the internal “fallen” member of the community. According to Patterson, 
this substitution of enslavement for death is echoed in the “archetypal” 
meaning of slavery as social death (26). Such substitution of enslavement 
for death does not give pardon but, on the contrary, creates the anomaly 
of the socially dead but biologically alive and economically exploited be-
ing. Because the expropriation of the slave’s life constitutes him or her as 
a non-person, or a socially dead person, it produces another instance of 
bare life, violently stripped of genealogy, cultural memory, social distinc-
tion, name and native language, that is, of all the elements of Aristotle’s 
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bios. Akin to the “secular excommunication,” slavery in all its different 
historical formations from antiquity to modernity was institutionalized 
as the extreme destruction of the socio-symbolic formation of subjectivi-
ty. This extreme mode of deracination and exclusion from symbolization, 
the polis, and kinship, reconstituted enslaved life as a nameless, invisible 
nonbeing—as pro nullo (40).
The notion of slavery a substitute for death complicates Agamben’s cen-
tral thesis that sovereign decision/bare life constitutes the foundational 
political paradigm in the West. Although the extreme delegitimation and 
the nullity of enslaved life makes it another instantiation of bare life, the 
very fact that such life undergoes substitutions of one form of destruction 
for another undermines from the start the centrality of just one paradigm 
of politics. In fact, as Hortense Spillers, Sadiya Hartman, and Alexander 
Weheliye in different ways argue, the institution of slavery as social death 
is not merely a historical phenomenon, but the continuous unfolding of 
suffering and dispossession that on the one hand, “engenders the black 
subject in the Americas” (Hartman 51) and on the other hand engenders 
a matrix of Western political modernity. According to Weheliye, “as op-
posed to being confined to a particular historical period, echoes of new 
world slavery rest in many contemporary spaces” (66). Second, slavery 
raises the question whether the destruction of the historically specific 
form of life is a ‘condition’ of exchangeability as such. As Patterson ar-
gues, the destruction of the political forms of life turned human beings 
into “the ideal human tool… perfectly flexible, unattached, and deraci-
nated” (337). Because of its fungibility, such a “disposable,” “ultimate hu-
man tool” (7) is also a perfect commodity; and indeed, Patterson notes 
instances where slavery functioned as money. We can argue, therefore, 
that the violent production of social death functions as a hidden ground 
not only of politics but also of commodity exchange. Consequently, the 
substitution of social death for biological death indicates a possible trans-
formation of the sovereign ban into ownership and exchange.
The biopolitics of substitution inscribed in the power relations of 
slavery changes the character of both death and birth. Deprived of its 
finitude, the anomaly of social death denotes a spectral duration of non-
being beyond the categories of absence and presence, potentiality and 
actuality. On the one hand, the spectrality of social death constitutes a 
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permanent threat of anomaly and aberration; on the other hand, it is con-
tinually put to work in order to produce profit, and as such is the lynch-
pin of biopolitics and economics. This spectral character of social death, 
which continues to endure in the form of nonbeing, also destroys the 
principle of natality, understood in the most broad terms, not only as the 
biological birth, but also as the claims of genealogy, the principle of a new 
beginning (Arendt 7–11 ).
What both slavery and homo sacer have in common is the production 
of bare life stripped of its historically specific form of life, yet what distin-
guishes them is the contrast between sovereign ban and the marginal in-
clusion of enslaved life. If the sovereign decision on the state of exception 
captures bare life in order to exclude it, the biopolitics of slavery is con-
fronted with the profitable inclusion of the socially dead beings. Hence, 
Patterson argues that after the stage of violent depersonalization, the 
next stage of enslavement introduces “the slave into the community of 
his master, but it involves the paradox of introducing him as a nonbeing” 
(38). Since, unlike homo sacer, the socially dead being has to be included 
within and made profitable, this second stage of the biopolitics of slavery 
poses the dilemma of “liminal incorporation” (45). The paradox of lim-
inal incorporation is the opposite of the sovereign ban, even though it 
creates similar effects of indistinction. In place of a sovereign decision on 
the state of exception, we have institutionalized containment within the 
law of a permanent anomaly, which confounds the differences between 
life and death, destruction and profit.
The difference between the sovereign will and the slaveholder’s domi-
nation is most evident in the latter’s destructive dependence on enslaved 
bare life. Patterson stresses the reversal of the slaveholder’s absolute dom-
ination into parasitical dependence. In so doing, he rewrites the Hegelian 
master slave dialectic—which explains such dependence in terms of the 
desire for recognition—as “human parasitism.” In fact “the parasitism of 
slavery” supplements both Agamben’s and Hegel’s philosophies: what it 
adds to Agamben’s theory of sovereignty is the parasitical dependence of 
the absolute power; the novelty it introduces to the Hegelian struggle for 
recognition is the “biopolitics”of the body—the consumption of bare life 
by the exploiting parasitical master (Paterson 46, 336): “the dominator, 
in the process of dominating and making another individual dependent, 
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also makes himself (the dominator) dependent On this intersubjective 
level the slaveholder fed on the slave to gain the very direct satisfactions 
of power over another” (336–337). As the other side of absolute mastery, 
the parasitical dependence of power on bare life is precisely what escapes 
both Agamben’s biopolitical paradigm of sovereign will and Hegel’s par-
adigm of recognition. Like a reversed figure of the vampire sucking the 
blood of the living, the parasitical side of absolute power suggests that 
perhaps sovereignty is one of the most powerful political fantasies, mask-
ing power’s dependence on bare life that is already dead and yet contin-
ues to threaten and provide satisfaction.
The reversal of domination into parasitical dependence has another 
crucial consequence that is downplayed in Agamben’s theory of sover-
eignty: such dependence provides a new ground to theorize the possi-
bility of resistance and emancipation. The emphasis on resistance, which 
negates a prior destruction of human forms of life and calls for the cre-
ation of new forms, culminates in Patterson’s claim that the most impor-
tant political discovery of enslaved peoples is that of freedom: “The first 
men and women to struggle for freedom, the first to think of themselves 
as free… were freedmen. And without slavery there would have been no 
freedmen” (342). Although Patterson is deeply troubled by making en-
slavement even a contingent condition of freedom, nonetheless his insis-
tence on the ongoing struggle for liberation by the dominated peoples 
points to another legacy of modernity Agamben sidesteps in his analysis: 
the legacy of revolutionary and emancipatory movements.
Agamben is right that the praxis of liberation calls for an ontology of 
potentiality. Yet he never considers potentiality from the perspective of 
bare life—that is, from the perspective of the impossible—focusing in-
stead on the often obliterated difference between potentiality and sover-
eign power. What makes it especially difficult for him to theorize eman-
cipation in greater detail are the parallels he establishes all too quickly 
between potentiality, event, the excess of the constituting power and sov-
ereign exception. Consider Agamben’s characteristic response to Anto-
nio Negri,6 who defends the political possibility of resistance and creative 
praxis. In his polemic, Agamben claims that there are in fact no grounds 
to distinguish between revolutionary praxis and sovereign exception:
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The problem of the difference between constituting power 
and sovereign power is, certainly, essential. Yet the fact that 
constituting power neither derives from the constituted order 
nor limits itself to instituting it—being, rather free praxis—
still says nothing as to constituting power’s alterity with re-
spect to sovereign power. (43)
Perhaps Agamben does not see any criterion by which to distinguish 
transformative praxis from sovereign violence because he is primar-
ily concerned with the topological excess of sovereign violence vis-à-vis 
the political order. As he admits, “the question ‘Where?’ is the essential 
one once neither the constituting power nor the sovereign can be situ-
ated wholly inside or altogether outside the constituted order” (Agam-
ben 42). However, if we switch the terms of the analysis from “where” 
to “how”—that is, from Agamben’s topology to the most important Fou-
cauldian lesson about techniques and modalities of power—then the dif-
ference between transformative praxis and sovereign violence becomes 
more apparent. Although both types of power exceed the constituted or-
der, their mode of operation is different. The excess of sovereign power 
manifests itself as a suspension of the law, as the exclusion of bare life, as 
a state of exception that either confirms the norm, or, in extreme cases, 
collapses the distinction between the exception and the norm. The mode 
of operation of the transformative power, however, is not the decision on 
the exception but the negation of existing exclusions from the political 
followed by the unpredictable and open-ended process of creating new 
forms of collective life—a process that resembles in certain respects more 
an aesthetic experiment “without truth” (Agamben, 1999, 259) than an 
instrumental action.
As I have suggested, another reason Agamben does not consider the 
practice of liberation in greater depth is that his ontology of potentiality 
is developed to undermine sovereign will and not to transform bare life 
into a site of contestation and political possibility. To theorize the notion 
of bare life as a contested terrain I would like to turn now to a different, 
far more recent, political case—the case of the hunger strike, in particu-
lar, the British suffragettes’ use of hunger strike in the struggle for wom-
en’s voting rights at the beginning of the twentieth century. The hunger 
strike reveals once again three interrelated aspects of bare life: first, its 
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negative differentiation with respect to the politics of race and gender; 
second, its subjection to different forms of violence; and finally, its role in 
multiple emancipatory movements. Let me begin with the facts that tend 
to be all too easily taken for granted: at the turn of the 20th century, racial-
ized and gendered subjectivities still occupied liminal positions in West-
ern democracies, and as such were associated in the political imaginary 
with the inclusive exclusion of bare life. And yet these subjectivities were 
also the “bearers” and creators of a very different legacy of modernity—
the legacy of multiple liberation movements. In this context, the hunger 
strike can be regarded as an invention of a new mode of political contes-
tation, which mobilizes bare life for emancipatory struggle. Consequent-
ly, this case allows us to supplement Agamben’s analysis in a crucial way: 
the hunger strike not only reveals the hidden aporia of democracy—the 
aporia between the politicization of bare life as the object of biopower 
and political freedom guaranteed by human rights—but also shows how 
this aporia can enable revolutionary transformation.
Although the history of the hunger strike is often obscure, it was prac-
ticed in ancient Rome, medieval Ireland, and India as means of protest, 
usually, to force a debtor to return his debt or to exert moral pressure.7
After the Easter Rising of 1916 in Ireland, the hunger strike tactic was 
by adopted by the Irish struggle for independence (1917)8 and, most fa-
mously, by Mohandas Ghandi (Sharp 637). Nonetheless, it was British 
militant suffragettes who in 1909 revived and redefined the hunger strike 
as the modern political weapon of an organized movement by linking it 
for the first time with the discourse of human rights.
Although one of the most dramatic episodes in the struggle for wom-
en’s suffrage,9 hunger striking and the political reprisals of forcible feeding 
are, like the hunger strike in general, still under-theorized means of dem-
ocratic protest. In his study of nonviolent political action, Sharp classifies 
the hunger strike as a means of political intervention demanding a trans-
formation of power relations and a redress for injustice (359). For Kyria 
Landzelius, the hunger strike is a “corporeal challenge” to “the discursive 
practices of power” (1999, 83). The hunger strike is both a protest and 
a demand for new freedoms, an appeal articulated through the double, 
sharply disjoined medium of publicly circulating letters and the starving 
body secluded in prison and barred from public appearance. The “vio-
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lence” of hunger strike seems paradoxical: such violence, inflicted on the 
self as a substitute target for the political enemy, acts by refusing to act; it 
collapses clear distinctions between passivity and activity, actuality and 
potentiality, subjugation and resistance. On one hand, the hunger strike 
repeats, usurps and exposes in public the hidden irrational violence of 
the sovereign state against women’s bodies. On the other hand, by usurp-
ing the state’s power over bare life, “the non-act” of self-starvation negates 
women’s exclusion and calls for the transformation of the law. By usurp-
ing sovereign power over bare life, hunger striking women occupy both 
of these positions—the sovereign and homo sacer—at the same time; and 
this is what distinguishes their status from comatose patients and the in-
mates of concentration camps, that is, from all those beings who, in ex-
treme destitution, are reduced to bare life alone. What is thus performed 
in the hunger strike is the collapse of the distinctions between sovereign-
ty and bare life, will and passivity, potentiality and actuality, the struggle 
for freedom and the risk of self-annihilation. Maud Ellmann rightly calls 
such a performance a “gamble with mortality” (21). And as the word 
“gamble” implies, at stake here is a transformation of the central oppo-
sition between the sovereign decision and bare life into radical contin-
gency in political life. Although not analyzed by Agamben, the emphasis 
on the collective political struggle over bare life is an important element, 
which defines the hunger strike as a weapon against the political enemy.
Hunger strikers’ usurpation of the sovereign decision over mere life in 
the struggle for political rights negates their exclusion and suspends the 
current law, at least on the symbolic level. Yet this act does not constitute 
a state of exception, which, through the act of exclusion, establishes the 
normal frame of reference or, as in the case of fascism, turns exception 
into a new norm. Rather, suffrage militancy represents a revolutionary 
call for a new law yet to come. As Kyria Landzelius argues, the hunger 
strike stages a political trial of the existing law and political authority. 
In this “meta-juridical trial” (220), the private act of starvation reverses 
the guilty verdict imposed on the militant suffragettes into a public con-
demnation of the government. Thus, the hunger strike “perverts” juridi-
cal punishment into the means of interrogation of the law itself and the 
contestation of the Government’s authority. By reversing the roles of 
the defendants and the accusers, the drama of the hunger strike publicly 
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condemns the government, delegitimates the authority of the existing 
law, and calls for its transformation. The hunger strike performs, there-
fore, a double chiasmatic transfer between bare life and the law, between 
the present and the future: On the one hand, it transforms the private 
act of starvation into a collective contestation of the existing law; on the 
other hand, it summons the as yet non-existent authority of the new law 
by risking the physical life of the body. In a catachrestic movement, this 
gamble with mortality anticipates what is unpredictable and beyond an-
ticipation: a new law and a new form of life of female bodies. In so do-
ing, it transforms impossibility into the “potentiality” of transformation. 
It is thus a very different passage from the one Agamben analyzes—not 
the passage from potentiality to actuality, but from impossibility to 
possibility.
As a counter to the sovereign decision, hunger strikers “seize hold” of 
their bare life, wrestle it away from sovereign decision, and transform it 
into the site of the constitution of a new form of life yet to come. Suffrag-
ettes’ public redefinition of the female body so that it no longer bears the 
repressed signification of bare life and acquires instead a political form 
not only challenges the sovereign decision over bare life, but in so doing 
calls for a new mediation of life and form outside the parameters of that 
decision. At stake here is a new type of link between bare life and political 
form that would be generated from below, as it were, rather than imposed 
by a sovereign decision. As Thomas Wall argues, it is the absence of the 
relation between bare life and its politically qualified ways of life that calls 
for sovereign decision: “Bare life is nonrelational and thus invites deci-
sion. It is the very space of decision … and, as such, is perpetually au 
hasard” (39). By contesting sovereign decision on bare life, the new link 
between bare life and forms of living cannot be confused either with a 
dialectical reconciliation or a celebration of prepolitical life. At the end 
of Homo Sacer, Agamben only hints at what this new form of “mediation” 
supplanting sovereign decision might look like:
This biopolitical body that is bare life must itself instead be 
transformed into the site for the constitution and installation 
of a form of life that is wholly exhausted in bare life and a bios 
that is only its own zoe … we give the name form-of-life to 
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this being that is only its own bare existence and to this life 
that, being its own form, remains inseparable from it. (188)
In this difficult passage Agamben only hints at what this new form of 
“mediation” supplanting sovereign decision might look like. It seems to 
me that a key point here is the interconnection and yet nonidentity be-
tween form and life, human and inhuman,10 which makes their separation 
and unification equally impossible. Such a politicization, or the conflict-
ing creation of form for bare life, takes us beyond the usual three alterna-
tives that govern the discussion of the body in politics: the paradigm of 
biopolitics, the nostalgic return to the remains of the natural body, or the 
equally naive social construction of a new technological body.
I hope that this essay makes abundantly clear that the notion of “bare 
life” can open new possibilities of interpretation of the biopolitics of race 
and gender for contemporary political philosophy, feminist thought, and 
critical race studies. Yet, as my discussion also shows, such reconsidera-
tion of “bare life” in the context of racial and sexual politics calls for some 
fundamental revisions of that concept. First of all, as we have seen, bare 
life cannot be regarded in a complete separation from all cultural/politi-
cal characteristics. If bare life emerges as the remnant of a destroyed hu-
man form of life, then, according to Agamben’s own emphasis on its inclu-
sive exclusion in the political, its formulation has to refer, in a negative way, 
to the racial/sexual/ethnic/class differences that used to characterize its 
form of life. In other words, bare life has to be defined as the remnant of a 
specific form of life that it not yet, or no longer, is. Furthermore, bare life 
cannot be always be considered as the exclusive referent of the sovereign 
decision, but has to be reconceptualized as a more complex, contested 
terrain where new forms of domination, dependence, and emancipato-
ry struggle can emerge. By analyzing bare life as the target of sovereign 
violence, Agamben allows us to diagnose new forms of domination and 
political dangers in modernity. Although any praxis of freedom is depen-
dent on such a diagnosis, such praxis at the same time exceeds the consti-
tuted forms of power and requires reflection on the often occluded role 
of bare life in another paradigm of democratic modernity—that of the 
revolutionary tradition. In the context of the revolutionary paradigm, the 
excess of bare life over the constituted forms of life not only does not au-
thorize the sovereign decision on the state of exception but in fact marks 
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openness to what is yet to come—a possibility of political transforma-
tion, a creation of new forms of life, an arrival of a more expansive con-
ception of freedom and justice. In so doing, it transforms impossibility 
into contingency in political life.
Notes
1. Catherine Mills is one of the very few Agamben interpreters to raise the 
question of sexuality and sexual embodiment, but in the context of Agamben’s 
theory of testimony rather than his theory of bare life (215–218). For the 
most extensive discussion of sexuality and bare life in the context of slavery, 
see Alexander Weheliye (65–81) and Ziarek (2008, 89–105) Diane Enns’ 
careful analysis of the ambiguities of the revolt of occupied bodies reduced to 
bare life is another crucial extension of Agamben’s work in colonial contexts. 
See also Andrew Benjamin, “Particularity and Exception: On Jews and 
Animals,” 71–88.
2. In Politics, Aristotle makes a famous distinction between mere life and a good 
life to define the function of polis: “while it comes into existence for the sake 
of mere life, it exists for the sake of a good life” (1252 b 27, 10)
3. Arendt follows the Aristotelian distinction between zoe and bios in a number 
of her texts, most notably in The Human Condition, where she identifies the 
political life not only with speech and action but most importantly with the 
condition of human plurality (7).
4. See Foucault’s discussion of “the empirical and the transcendental” in Order of 
Things, (318–321).
5. According to Laclau, the absence of the theory of resistance is intertwined 
with the lack of the theory of hegemony. Laclau argues that Agamben fails to 
distinguish between totalitarian and the democratic sovereignty emerging 
from the hegemony of democratic movements (9). For a different critique 
of the lack of attention to resistance in the context of the body and the 
contingency of political struggles, see Kalyvas, 112–113.
6. In response, Negri claims that “there are in fact two Agambens.” The first one 
undermines the creative ontology of potentiality that the second espouses 
(1–2). I am grateful to Diane Enns for this reference.
7. For a brief discussion of the history of the hunger strike, see Sharp (363–367).
8. Maud Ellmann argues that the Irish nationalists might have been inspired by 
suffrage, yet in order to conceal this debt, appealed to the medieval practice of 
fasting against debtors to compel them to repay a debt (11–12).
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9. According to Jane Marcus, it is “perhaps the primary image in the public 
imagination regarding the ‘meaning’ of the suffrage movement” (2).
10. In the context of his discussion of the survivors’ testimonies in Remnants of 
Auschwitz, Agamben defines such a link between the damaged life and the 
human as the aporetic task of witnessing to the inhuman. The ethics of such 
witnessing neither abandons nor assimilates it to the human. For my further 
discussion of the ethical structure of the survivors’ testimony in Agamben’s 
Remnants of Auschwitz, see Ziarek (2003, 201–203).
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Chapter 10
Sustainability
Haun Saussy
A restaurant menu stuffed into my mailbox the other day offers “1/2 
Pound Burger from Authentic, Artisan, Sustainable Cattle Topped with 
Sustainable Bacon, local Abby Cheese, local Arugula” ($14). For a lexi-
cographer, no evidence is too humble. The hamburger from “Sustainable 
Cattle Topped with Sustainable Bacon” tells of a word that has vastly ex-
panded its field of reference in recent years.
What the chef means is not hard to explain. “Sustainable cattle” are pre-
sumably animals fed on grass, not grain, and raised without the hormones 
that speed other cattle from birth to a profitable size for slaughter. Pigs do 
not eat grass, but there must be a similar rationale for “sustainability” in 
producing bacon. If the beef and bacon do not have to be trucked in from 
thousands of miles away, the restaurant and the diner accomplish another 
gain for the environment, reducing the costs of transport, packaging, and 
refrigeration. But whether eating beef and bacon is a “sustainable” prac-
tice at all is another question. It might be sustainable if it were restricted 
to a small aristocracy, as in the Homeric poems. I am not sure how many 
acres of pasturage beef cattle require per head, but it is not likely that 
Connecticut contains enough acres to sustain many “sustainable cattle,” 
or enough to sustain the state’s population. A food culture that includes 
regular doses of beef would not be sustainable under the grass-fed defi-
nition of sustainable cattle farming. And when the farmer’s accountant 
looks at the costs of leasing pasturage, or the opportunity costs of hold-
ing land in pasture as opposed to selling it for housing developments and 
shopping malls, the conclusion may be that sustainable farming is not 
economically sustainable, or not for long. In short, the word applies so 
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generally, and to the objects of so many contradictory interests, as to give 
us reason to doubt that there is such a thing as “sustainability.”
Another example: the sourcebook State of the World 2010: Transform-
ing Culture from Consumerism to Sustainability, published by the World-
watch Institute, is full of apt critiques of consumerism but nowhere de-
fines “sustainability.” The term has become a vague designator for a broad 
set of behaviors undertaken in order to avoid the destruction of natural 
resources, behaviors that may be mutually undermining but that have 
the common characteristic of breaking with the model of ever-increasing 
growth through increased consumption. And as in my menu example, 
the trade-off between consumerism and sustainability may be no trade-
off at all, once sustainability becomes yet another consumer desirable 
(no less desirable for all that; I have not yet tried the sustainable bacon 
burger, but I’m sure it tastes better than its mass-produced rival).
What practices are sustainable? If a timber company scrupulously 
plants one seedling for every tree felled, and a few more to make up for 
failures to thrive, the operation is sustainable, assuming that the soil qual-
ity is not degraded over time. Every unit taken out of the ecosystem is 
replaced by a unit of input. With solar or wind energy, presumably the 
ecological cost of extracting the materials to make photoelectric panels 
and rotors is amortized, at least by human calculations, by the hydrocar-
bon-based energy generation they replace. With the pumping of oil, the 
quarrying of Carrara marble or the depletion of soil by centuries of agri-
culture, the return of the extracted unit is hard to envisage: most human 
activities are not environmentally neutral, and by that standard, are not 
“sustainable” for an indefinite future; they gain the showy label “sustain-
able” by being less brutally extractive than some other existing practice.
The equivalent term in some other languages, “durable,” makes a less 
exorbitant claim. Why have English-speakers elected to use “sustainable,” 
and to use it in so many contexts?
“Sustainable” became the obligatory word for the concept through the 
publication of “Our Common Future,” the 1987 report of the United Na-
tions’ World Commission on Environment and Development (chaired 
by Gro Harlem Brundtland). The Commission declared: “Sustainable 
development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”
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But where did the Commission get its choice of word? The answer 
lies in one of Buckminster Fuller’s deflections of the vocabulary of sci-
ence and engineering, one of his attempts to shift the energies devoted 
to “weaponry” toward the purposes of “livingry.” In his free-verse mani-
festo And It Came to Pass—Not to Stay (1976) Fuller described his life 
activities thus:
For I am intent
Exclusively through artifact inventions
To accomplish prototyped capabilities
Of providing ever more performance
With ever less resources…
All of which chain reactions will trend
To ever higher performance attainments
Of the ever improving artifact instrumented services…
And I purpose…
To accomplish universal economic success
Well being and freedom of humans
Together with a sustained abundance
For all foreseeable generations of humans to come…
And with such design-science-attained
         Sustainable abundance for all
Proven to be feasible
And attainable for all humanity by 1985
Will also come obsolescence
Of all the political powers’
Historically demonstrated 
Ultimate recourse
To hot official
And cold guerilla warfaring … (211–13)
The passage also encodes the proximate cause of the association be-
tween the word “sustainable” and the idea of an energy process that does 
not deplete its underlying resources, but returns as much in output as 
was put into it: namely the nuclear chain reaction. Enrico Fermi and Leo 
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Szilard’s atomic pile, built in an abandoned University of Chicago squash 
court in 1942, appeared to reverse the usual relation between energetic 
inputs and outputs with its self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction.1 The 
new world economy opened by atomic energy would operate on a dif-
ferent economic basis from the world of carbon-based fuels, Fuller rea-
soned. Something else happened: atomic bombs, superpower rivalry, 
consumption-led development. “Sustainable,” with all its ambiguities and 
vague aspirations, is the inherited mark of that moment of postwar opti-
mism. It is the unread symbol of the reversal of economic laws that might 
be achieved if only human nature could be amended.
Notes
1. The plaque on the Stagg Field site today reads: “On December 2, 1942, man 
achieved here the first self-sustaining chain reaction and thereby initiated the 
controlled release of nuclear energy.”
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Chapter 11
The Global Unworld
A Meditative Manifesto
Krzysztof Ziarek
Contemporary economic, political, and cultural debates tend to revolve 
around both the planetary scope of issues molding today’s reality and the 
globally interconnected character of the problems facing us: from global 
economic crisis and worldwide security threats to global climate change 
or global systems theory. Globalization has not simply become the conve-
nient watchword for mass media as well as academic discussions but has 
in fact come to shape the standard for reflecting and critically measuring 
the planetary scope and the globally interfaced nature of reality today. In 
short, despite—or perhaps because of—a veritable flood of publications, 
it seems to have become a largely uninterrogated “global” consensus that 
the world now functions and is experienced as a global or planetary phe-
nomenon. One could argue over which of the terms, “global” or “plan-
etary,” is better suited to help us think through the issues critically. The 
adjective “global” underscores the globe-wide and globe-complex nature 
of the various phenomena affecting and effecting our daily experience. 
It literally rounds off and gives a self-contained, spherical shape to our 
insights and formulations, furnishing an unarticulated linguistic illusion 
that when we invoke, for instance, global trade or global climate change, 
no concern and no corner of the globe are left out or remain unaccount-
ed for. Through its optically all-inclusive embrace and geometrical un-
dertones of perfection, the term “global” maintains an unambiguously 
totalizing perspective and effects an assuredly possible complete grasp of 
the matter. On the one hand, the global scope of this designation disqui-
ets with the visions of the totalizing and all-affecting span of the prob-
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lems, which allows for no points of escape, while, on the other hand, it 
silently reassures with the power of containment and effectiveness on the 
globe-wide scale.
If the category of the global seems to operate as though outward, cen-
trifugally radiating from the point of our location toward a spherical 
embrace of earthly reality, the label “planetary” suggests a centripetally 
moving view, anchored in a broader, “universal” perspective; that is, it re-
fers literally to the frame of the universe, or at least the solar system, as a 
moving network of interrelated and mutually affecting planetary bodies. 
One could argue that the notion of the planetary is, therefore, broader, 
perhaps already intimating a possible displacement of the planet earth 
from the unvoiced position of centrality still implied in the name “glob-
al.” In this approach, “global” would still mark a decidedly earth-centric 
and, therefore, implicitly anthropocentric mode of thinking, while “plan-
etary” would open thought to a perspective as if “from above” or “from 
out there,” making our planet a focal point but not necessarily the center 
of thought’s gravity. On second thought, though, the perspective of the 
planetary, universe-wide eye-view (if such a perspective were possible to 
begin with) turns out to be very much an earth-bound, or globe-depen-
dent, if you will, projection, expanded outward only to be turned back 
telescopically onto itself. The centripetal force of the planetary conceals, 
thus, the initially centrifugal momentum of the global. Both perspectives 
are in the very momentum of their unfolding, the same; not identical but 
intrinsically entwined, coming into being together through their recipro-
cal countering. The global en-counters the planetary and vice versa. Each 
has its advantages, perhaps: the global underscoring the planet-wide 
scope and the degree of its complexity, the planetary emphasizing the 
embeddedness of the globe in an even larger system of factors.
Yet what seems to me to be of more interest and perhaps critical signifi-
cance is the reflection on how these notions of the global and the plan-
etary always already texture and shape reality and modes of experienc-
ing it. I propose here a brief essay into such a critical mode by way of 
several pointers from Heidegger’s reflection on planetary power (Macht) 
and its manipulative operations (Machenschaft). The reason is not sim-
ply that Heidegger provides one of the earliest philosophical reflections, 
dating from mid 1930s, on the planetary, or more precisely on modern 
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technology, power, and capital in their planetary phase, but that the very 
momentum of Heidegger’s critique comes from keeping the tension and 
the countering between the planetary or the global, on the one hand, and 
the worldly, on the other. To put it succinctly, I am interested in exploring 
what happens to the world in the epoch of planetary power and global 
capital, how the experience of the world becomes foreshortened into 
the planetary, and whether the world can still come to pass in the age of 
globalization.
Heidegger’s meditations on the character, scope, and operations of 
power (Macht) in the 1938–39 book Besinnung, published only in 1997 
and translated into English as Mindfulness as recently as 2006,1 strike me 
as still very much current—in fact, perhaps even easier to register today 
in their complex critical impetus. In remarks that can now be seen as a 
forerunner to many of today’s debates, Heidegger initially characterizes 
power through five aspects. First, power is dynamic, which “means pro-
pulsiveness of power that is launched and let loose and overflows itself.” 
In short, power tends to increase or trans-power itself. Second, power is 
total, as it “can tolerate nothing outside its arena of effectiveness which 
could still be addressed as ‘actual.’” Heidegger points out here the intrin-
sic connection in German between effectiveness and actuality (Wirklich-
keit): the actual is only what has been effected and what can be grasped 
in terms of having been effected. Third, power is imperial, exercising its 
command through missions and insertions, actualized in the manner 
not dissimilar from the recent reflections provided by Hardt and Negri 
in Empire. Power is also rational “and strikes upon that calculating char-
acter in everything of the nature of command as it surrounds the closed 
circle of the distribution and the steering of forces” (14). The steering 
in this quotation presages the cybernetic and informational character 
of power, whose effectiveness we witness today in its micro-genetic and 
macro-financial operations. Finally, and most relevant for us, power is 
planetary, which “wants to say that each instance of the empowering of 
power is always ‘total’ in itself (in relation to a country, a people), but also 
that each sets its limits only at the boundaries of the inhabited globe and 
its domain of disposability (the atmosphere and the stratosphere) which 
says right away that the planet as a whole is ‘used’ as a product of power 
and that therefore detecting a planetary opponent becomes unavoidable” 
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(14). While I want to acknowledge here that Heidegger seems to have 
been a good forty or fifty years ahead in diagnosing the terms of power’s 
operation which have by now become the standard currency of critical 
discourse, notwithstanding the modifications brought about by infor-
mation revolution, biopolitics, or global warming, I am less interested in 
pointing to a historical precedent than in pursuing further Heidegger’s 
reflection on what happens to world and the experience of “worlding” 
in the epoch of the culmination of modernity in the planetary reach and 
transpowering (Übermächtigung) of power, whether by means of infor-
mational technology, economic operations of capital, or military force.
The remarks cited above prepare the way for Heidegger’s later reflec-
tion on the essence of technology, or technicity, as the Ge-stell, which indi-
cates the multiply gathered ways (the prefix Ge-) in which what is actual 
comes to be as such through being posited (Darstellen), emplaced (Stel-
len), produced (Herstellen), represented (Vorstellen), ordered (Bestellen), 
disfigured (Verstellen), etc. To say that the Ge-stell is the modus operan-
di of reality today is to point to how all unfolds into a standing-reserve 
(Bestand) of resources, always already at hand, intrinsically available and 
disposable. The availability to be accessed, processed, manipulated, or 
engineered constitutes the very being of what comes to exist today. In 
other words, to be means to be in essence, in how something comes to 
be, available. This availability explains itself in(to) the terms of power, 
which means that being available stands for availability to and for power; 
not only for power to colonize, conquer, or empower, but also to spread 
and increase in complexity and magnitude. In short, availability means 
the intrinsic capacity of power to transpower itself. The key characteristic 
of the technicist operations of modern power is its tendency to increas-
ingly challenge and provoke (Herausfordern), force, and enforce being 
into unfolding as ever more intensely and thoroughly available. What we 
seem to be witnessing almost daily is the intensification of the degree of 
availability, in which anything and everything comes to be as already suf-
fused with power and open to further over-powering. Whether we think 
of the rapidly advancing genetic technologies, the increasingly pervasive 
susceptibility to and flow of information, or the crises precipitated by 
electronic operations of financial capital, they all testify to the availabil-
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ity to and for power in its flexible operations of producing, empowering, 
dominating, coding, decoding, etc.
One of the key vectors of this “planetary” availability which Heidegger 
diagnoses, running always in parallel to the availability of the planet as a 
total reserve standing at the ready, is availability for consumption, that is, 
availability to be capitalized for production, reproduction, commodifica-
tion, and consumption. In his timely L’indemne: Heidegger et la destruction 
du monde, Frédéric Neyrat proposes to think of Heidegger’s explanation 
of the generalized—global or planetary—consumability on the ontologi-
cal level, which suggests precisely that to be in modernity comes to mean 
to be consumable: not just provided for consumption but in essence 
open to being consumed and, as such, replacable: whether as resource, 
product, commodity, service, etc. In order to be consumable, a good 
needs to be constituted as replaceable in its essence. The narrower sense 
of consumption associated with the consumption of commodities in cap-
italism and consumerist culture becomes possible by way of this onto-
logical consumability and illustrates the degree to which capital today is 
adept at increasingly capitalizing and exploiting this constitutional con-
sumability of being. It is this conception of availability to consumption 
that, as Neyrat indicates, can provide an interesting avenue for a philo-
sophical critique of capital beyond socio-economic explanations and yet 
integrating and contextualizing them within the planetary operations of 
power sketched out by Heidegger and increasingly discussed in today’s 
approaches: from Foucault and Deleuze to Negri, Agamben, or Esposito.
In “Overcoming Metaphysics,” a collection of fragments gathered over 
several years and published in 1955 (Heidegger Controversy 67–90), Hei-
degger makes his reflection on the possibility of the experience of the 
world pivot precisely on the question of consummability, thought in tan-
dem with the notion of availability. I would differ on this point from Ney-
rat and point out that for Heidegger it is availability that allows for and 
explains consumability and not the other way round. It is because beings 
come to be as intrinsically dispose-able, that is, both “at the disposal” of 
power, available to it and open to its manipulative thrust, and also dis-
posable, replaceable and consumable through the processes of power. 
Dispose-able: being at the disposal and therefore as easily disposable as 
available. The standing reserve (Bestand) indicates a seamless extension 
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of availability into replacability, of consumption into disposing of and re-
production. Writing about consumption in the context of armament and 
war, Heidegger remarks:
The consumption of beings is such and in its course deter-
mined by armament in the metaphysical sense, through which 
man makes himself the ‘master’ of what is ‘elemental.’ The 
consumption [Verbrauch] includes the ordered use [Gebr-
auch] of beings which become the opportunity and the mate-
rial for feats and their escalation The world wars are the ante-
cedent form of the removal of the difference between war and 
peace. This removal is necessary since the ‘world’ has become 
an unworld [Unwelt] as a consequence of the abandonment 
of beings by Being’s truth In the age of the exclusive power 
of power, that is, of the unconditional pressing of beings to-
ward being used up in consumption, the world has become 
an unworld in that Being does presence [west], but without 
really reigning [ohne eigenes Walten, without properly holding 
sway]. Beings are really [effectively] as the real [Das Seiende ist 
wirklich as das Wirkliche.] There is effecting [Wirkung] every-
where, and nowhere is there a worlding of the world and yet, 
although forgotten, there is still Being. Beyond war and peace, 
there is the mere erring of the consumption of beings in the 
plan’s self-guaranteeing in terms of the vacuum of the aban-
donment of Being. (84, modified)
What is necessary for the world to globalize and become available to 
the planetary coursing of power is the technicist revealing of beings as 
driving toward their being used up in consumption; in short, what marks 
the age of world power (whether as peace or as war) is the global avail-
ability of beings to consumption. Yet this revealing into being consum-
able marks also the turn of the world into an unworld. Since the world 
discloses itself as unworld, and thus discloses itself by veiling itself as 
world, only in the epoch of planetary power and Machenschaft, the un-
world is necessarily only as a global unworld. Put simply, Heidegger’s 
point is that the world no longer worlds, that there is no worlding of the 
world, when beings manifest as a global standing reserve of resources, 
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available as in essence dispose-able and thus ready to be consumed. We 
see all as dispose-able resources, that is, precisely in terms of everything 
being available, consumable, and replaceable, rather than letting what 
exists be as what it is. In fact, we do not simply see or disclose beings 
into their availability but increasingly force them to disclose themselves 
as dispose-able: let’s say, the “forcing” open of the human genome, or 
other gene sequences, as available to manipulation, engineering, and re-
production. We could ask, in a Heideggerian fashion, what is a human 
being when it is disclosed as a potentially and intrinsically manipulable 
sequence of genes. Is humanity first and foremost a gene pool, and is the 
dominance of this technicist way of revealing what being human means 
predetermining the question of being along the progressively calculative 
scale of technicist power and manipulation?
Such questions run parallel to the problem of the global unworld. But 
we could still ask why this turning of the world into a planetary unworld 
should be an issue at all: do we need the world, in the sense in which 
Heidegger thinks worlding, or can we just make do with the globe or the 
planet, assuming that we still might have a possibility of choice in the 
matter? And what kind of issue is this when we might be facing the global 
extinction of the human race or significant portions of it, or perhaps even 
most, if not all, forms of life on earth? While the question of the (un)
world is not practical in any immediate sense, it is, I would argue, pre-
cisely the question of praxis in the elemental sense of who, as humans, 
we are and might be in the world, if the world is to world at all. Let’s re-
member that for Heidegger the question of our age is the question of be-
ing—not of humanity or animality, ecology or climate, though all these 
issues are implied and in fact critically implicated, that is, held open into 
deciding, in the kind of praxis that is at issue in Heidegger’s critique of 
power and technicity. Heidegger insists, and I am inclined to follow him 
in this respect, on the need and urgency of displacing the human from 
the position of centrality in our thinking and our discussions. What this 
means in terms of how one might think or at least begin to think in the 
context of the global unworld today is by thinking the complex relation-
ality, which Heidegger calls das Ereignis or event (of propriation), a rela-
tionality which gives to be by way of a spatio-temporal play of beings in 
multiple relations between “earth” and “sky.” It means beginning from the 
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always already finite event of the play of time-space rather than from the 
all temporal, albeit historical, pan-technicist view of experience as plan-
etary, globally circumscribed, and interlinked, and dispose-able. For Hei-
degger, it means trying to let things or beings unfold in the while (Weile) 
and expanse (Weite) of their time-space rather than rushing to calculate 
and consume them in their technically disclosed availability.
Heidegger’s questions are obviously not those of an economist or a 
market analyst, a politician or even a political theorist, of a climate sci-
entist, a physicist, a genetic engineer, of a business or science ethicist. In 
what is certainly a deliberately provocative gesture, Heidegger asks if we 
can still think what it would mean if humanity survived the threatening 
catastrophes and continued as living beings but, in the process, allowed a 
forgetting of what being means and how humans are given to be as mor-
tals. Commenting on the remarks which the American chemist Stanley 
made in 1955 in Lindau: “The hour is near when life will be placed in 
the hands of the chemist who will be able to synthesize, split, and change 
living substance at will,” Heidegger observes: “We marvel at the daring 
scientific research, without thinking about it. We do not stop to consider 
that an attack with the technological means is being prepared upon the 
life and essence [Wesen] of man compared with which the explosion of 
the hydrogen bomb means little. For precisely if the hydrogen bombs do 
not explode and human life on earth is preserved, an uncanny change in 
the world moves upon us” (Discourses 42). Over fifty years later we seem 
to be much nearer or maybe already at the point predicted by Stanley, 
with additional economic, military, and climactic complications attend-
ing the situation, and in this context Heidegger’s question sounds per-
haps even more poignant. Certainly the questions Heidegger intimated 
in 1955 are being raised around us, but what is decisive, at least from 
the Heideggerian perspective, is precisely the perspective in which such 
questions are being raised and are allowed to resonate.
Is the perspective for the accelerating discussions of globalization and 
planetary power essentially and exclusively technicist, in Heidegger’s 
sense, and, in practical terms, dominated by techno-science? We seem to 
be engaged, certainly when it comes to politics, economics, and science, 
in frantically trying to find a technicist solution to a technicist dilemma: 
whether that means global climate change or increasingly sharper crises 
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of global capital. When we approach the issue of critical climate change 
in the perspective of what needs to change in the way we think/critique 
in order to reflect on the climate change, or in other words, what the 
critical climate change makes it possible or necessary for us to change in 
the praxis of our thinking and modes of our being, are we still pursuing 
possible answers within a rush of what Heidegger would call calculative 
thinking, no doubt critical but still essentially calculative thinking, look-
ing for a better or a new grasp of the situation, advocating for a new/bet-
ter solution, looking for new means to effect a change in our lives and 
possibly produce a change in the changing climate? To quote Heidegger 
once again: “Calculative thinking never stops, never collects itself. Cal-
culative thinking is no meditative thinking (keine besinnliches Denken) 
which thinks after and/or according to the meaning (Sinn) which reigns 
in everything that is” (Discourse 46). The difference which Heidegger un-
derscores is between, on the one hand, a mode of being or experiencing 
that attends to, keeps itself open to, and moves by way of, the finite play 
of time-space in which this very thinking originates and takes place and, 
on the other, the continuously accelerating calculative thinking, speedily 
searching for newer answers, theories, and means. The German terms de-
ployed by Heidegger, besinnliches Denken or, more frequently, Besinnung, 
suggest that in question here is not disembodied philosophical specu-
lation or theoretical thinking as opposed to praxis, but instead a way of 
being not divided into the sensible and the intelligible, body and mind, 
since Besinnung indicates a thoughtful comportment or being-in-the-
world which participates in and co-shapes the very manifestation of what 
exists as world. Once could say perhaps that Besinnung is an originative 
way of being/acting/thinking in the sense that it takes part in the unfold-
ing of world at the very same time that it thinks this world and experi-
ences its own being in it.
The apparent urgency of the situation appears to preempt any such 
thinking/being that I have proposed to weave out of Heidegger’s critique 
of technicity. We appear to have no time to waste on idle philosophical 
speculation or non-technicist and in-effective action, on collecting our 
thoughts in a meditative thinking, as we need to produce and possibly ef-
fect a solution to a crisis which it may be already too late to avert anyway. 
The urgency of the crisis seems to nullify in advance any possibility of de-
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ciding between calculative thinking and meditative thinking the way Hei-
degger outlines it in, among other places, the already quoted Discourse 
on Thinking. We cannot afford to attend to this possible, if elusive, differ-
ence. What we need to find, that is, to calculate, is a better way of cal-
culatively grasping our situation, predicting various possible outcomes, 
and effecting or producing a result which would minimize the negative 
effects of the multiple threats attending humankind’s existence in the 
age of globalization. In short, we need to increase the power, scope, and 
grasp of calculative (techno-scientific) thinking and do it as fast as pos-
sible. In Heidegger’s terms, the only available possibilities which unfold 
in the planetary operations of power (Machenschaft) serve to trans-power 
power, to increase its scope and efficiency. Any other ways of thinking are 
inefficient (to say the least), idle, escapist, unreal, and, given the situa-
tion, perhaps even dangerously trivial.
And yet this is precisely the context in which I would insist we need to 
heed Heidegger’s provocation, namely that we do not yet think precisely 
in the sense that calculative thinking which pervades, shapes, and ani-
mates our reality is not thinking that is attentive to being and to our mor-
tal way of being. As Heidegger remarks in a seminar following his 1962 
lecture “Time and Being,” technicity is Janus-faced (53). It is the frantic 
acceleration of its calculatively effective power that opens the space and 
possibility for a potential turn in technicity, an attendant flip in the way 
that technicity allows and disallows us to face existence. It is when we are 
confronted with nuclear annihilation or extinction due to global climate 
change, that we might have an opportunity not just to increase our ca-
pacity to calculate, predict, and effect solutions, but also to attend to the 
question of what it means to be as mortals on this earth, in a finite, each 
time singular and each time always one time, event of being. We could 
think about it perhaps as technicity reaching a point of letting itself be 
called into question and thus possibly initiating an opening onto a trans-
formation. This is what Heidegger is letting thinking prepare for: for the 
possibility that might open itself up within the frantically technicist ac-
celeration of being’s availability, availability perhaps to the point of self-
destruction, at least of humans.
Heidegger’s position is that we need to let being, its singular and one-
time happening, take center stage, and thus to redirect our questioning 
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of all beings: humans, animals, things, climate, capital, economy, etc., 
through this perspective of the finite play of time-space. It is precisely this 
heightened situation of threat and danger, danger which in Heidegger’s 
time manifested itself as the devastating aftermath of World War II and 
the threat of nuclear conflict, and which today speaks to us perhaps more 
in the language of global climate change, world-wide economic instabil-
ity, and genetic and informational possibilities and threats. If Heidegger 
is right, then this is precisely the opportunity to open thinking to a ques-
tioning otherwise foreclosed to it, downplayed if not banished by the 
proliferating effectiveness and effects of calculative thinking we associate 
most easily with techno-science, but whose effectiveness, Heidegger sug-
gests, reaches further into the very way in which being unfolds into real-
ity, disallowing the worlding of the world. To recall an earlier quote, there 
is only effecting and no worlding of the world. The age of globalization 
tends to perpetuate and intensify precisely the global or planetary un-
worlding, and to such an extent that the very issue of world is no longer 
experienced as an issue or a question. What obscures and covers it over is 
the urgency of calculative and calculated acting, whose importance only 
an unthinking, that is, calculatively unthinking, human being could ques-
tion. And yet, this is precisely what Heidegger dared to question, and for 
which, largely misunderstood and/or unread, he has been repeatedly re-
buked by the Frankfurt School and many others.
What I am suggesting is that today, even more so than fifty or so years 
ago, this question needs perhaps to be dared again. It is not I or us, that is, 
whatever individuals or communities we propose to invoke in the name 
of our discourses, that need this question. At issue is what Heidegger 
ventures to rethink through the meaning of being, namely, the indispose-
ability of its event, which each time has always already given the play of 
time-space in its singular unfolding. But if being in its indispose-ability 
is at issue, so is Da-sein as the way for mortals to be attentive to their fi-
nite and singular, each time given to me, way of being. When reality tran-
spires, that is, folds out into a global unworld, humans come to be the 
undead—or, more precisely, the undying, no longer open to or capable 
of being towards death. They flee mortality not simply into religions or 
atheism, into moral stringency or relativism, into asceticism or pleasure, 
but also into the technicist visions of undying existence by way of perpet-
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uated electronic downloads of consciousness and informational undeath. 
They forget that it is only from within being towards death, through mor-
tality, that humans come to exist and thus have the possibility of letting 
the world world and of letting themselves inhabit the world. The Janus-
face of technicity could then be a modern memento mori, but a highly 
ambiguous one, a memento mori in crisis, opening to deciding what dy-
ing means. Not just facing the possibility of death on a historically un-
precedented scale, a techno-climactically enforced mass disappearance of 
population. For this specter of planetary death all too easily closes us to 
mortality, renders us undead or, to be precise, undying, forgetful of the 
opportunity of being mortal and of the possibilities unfolding in being 
towards death. A Janus-faced memento mori: undead death or mortality.
At issue, as I suggested earlier, is where to begin, and keep beginning, 
so that the world would be allowed to world and not just unfold globally 
into an unworld. This possibility of beginning is perhaps best marked in 
the French term “mondialisation,” which, unlike the other possible term, 
“globalisation,” preserves in in-decision the play of globalizing and world-
ing. There mondialisation could still be either global unworlding or world-
ing. Heidegger suggests a step back, which would be primarily a step back 
from calculative thought and into meditative thinking. This step back 
should not be misunderstood as abandoning calculation, denigrating 
technology, or the actualizable possibilities it provides. Rather, in ques-
tion is the capacity of thinking to step back from its own, increasingly ef-
fective modes of calculative thinking into meditative thinking: “It would 
be foolish to attack technology blindly. It would be shortsighted to con-
demn it as the work of the devil. We depend on technical devices; they 
even challenge us to ever greater advances. But suddenly and unaware we 
find ourselves so firmly shackled to these technical devices that we fall 
into bondage to them. Still we can act otherwise” (Discourse 53–54).
Otherwise would mean other than calculatively or technicistically, at-
tentive to the technicist revealing, unfolding with it and yet thinking oth-
erwise. What matters is precisely keeping this otherwise in play, without 
neglecting the progression of calculative thought. The crisis we are facing 
needs to be brought into the open as a crisis: not only of our technologi-
cal civilization but as a crisis in technicity itself—in short, as the crisis 
intimated in the Janus-face, marking the twofoldness of technicity. Crisis 
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does not mean simply, according to its ordinary connotation, a problem 
or a threat but, if we attend to the word itself, an opportunity for a deci-
sion. And it should not be just a decision for this or that calculated solu-
tion, but rather a crisis in which what would be put into question and 
thus opened to deciding would be precisely calculative thinking itself. 
The either/or, if that is how this situation demands to be thought, is not 
between various solutions but between the implications of calculative 
thinking in its time-space for decision in relation to meditative thinking. 
In other words, what would be brought into question and up for a deci-
sion would not be particular courses of action but rather the orientation 
or the space in which acting or not acting become possible to begin with. 
What is called for—in the specific sense in which Heidegger considers 
the issue of “what calls (for) thinking?” (Was heisst Denken?)—is, there-
fore, not simply a change within the climate of technicity, that is, a shift or 
intensification of the way in which modern thinking operates technically, 
but a change to the very climate of technicity. What is called for by the 
operations of power in the age of globalization is the transformation in 
the essence (Wesen) of technology, an opening up of the possibility of an 
otherwise to technicity.
That is why this call for a transformation of thinking is so difficult and 
brings with it no assurances or guarantees that thinking will undergo a 
transformation. This is the case because such a transformation cannot be 
produced (made in the sense of machen), enforced (by power, Macht), or 
effected (in the sense of Wirkung). Such a transformation cannot be actu-
alized or realized because effecting is precisely what has been setting the 
tone for modernity, and doing so quite literally, as the Stimmung, that is, 
as the tonality of the technicist power relations. Effecting a change would 
therefore not only not change the operation of power but, on the con-
trary, would reinforce and intensify the very modality of power’s work-
ing as power, namely, its force of effecting, producing, or empowering. 
To put it differently, rather than putting power into question, effecting a 
change in thinking would amount to a trans-powering.
The crisis our planet appears to be in can be understood and treated 
simply in technicist terms, that is, as a crisis within technicity, a crisis 
which calls for a technical decision, a decision between various techni-
cal means that could potentially resolve the crisis, whether by minimiz-
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ing its global effects or finding an escape route, one which would extend 
the lease on the life of the planet, and thus offer further assurances that 
technicity and its operations of power can be effectively managed on its 
own terms. Or we could face, confront, encounter, and thus potentially 
counter, or even just inaugurate the possibility of countering, technicity; 
in short, we could face the fact that technicity, if Heidegger’s assessement 
holds, is Janus-faced. The crisis, then, would not be seen as a crisis in 
technicity but a crisis confronting technicity’s Janus-face. The crisis is not 
simply a critically dangerous situation. In fact, one could say that seeing 
“crisis” as just a particularly heightened threat or danger, say, global en-
dangerment of life, is already a merely technicist and foreshortened con-
ception of crisis. It is an understanding of crisis technically telescoped 
onto a problem and thus anticipating simply a better, that is, a more tech-
nically advanced, solution. In its etymological resonance, crisis evokes 
precisely the possibility of deciding, of bringing into the open the very 
fact that there is something to decide to begin with, which in this case 
would signal the initial discernment that technicity is Janus-faced, and 
thus seeing this Janus-face character as a possibility for a crisis, that is, 
a possibility for deciding. This possibility for deciding would be critical 
precisely in the sense that it would confront the two-faced character of 
technicity, that it would face at the same time both directions or perspec-
tives of technicity.
Perhaps we need a step back from this technicist understanding of cri-
sis to be able to confront—which means facing more than just one, tech-
nicist, front of the issue—whether and how the world worlds today. This 
could translate into bringing up the very notion of crisis into crisis and 
thus reopening it to its etymological resonance of a possibility for deci-
sion. The crisis is thus not only danger or threat but also an opportunity, 
and in this context, an opportunity to con-front and face the two-faced 
workings of technicity; an opportunity to step back from calculative 
thinking and face its otherwise, which Heidegger calls meditative think-
ing. The crisis thus becomes an opportunity for opening the space for de-
cision and thus broadening the space and the play of thinking. Not just 
deciding, or deciding quickly for this or that solution, but holding open 
to the very play of deciding, staying open to the crisis and what it might 
render possible for thinking. In short, this understanding of crisis might 
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open us to seeing another face of what confronts us and not simply fore-
close the space of the critical to the technicist (mis)understanding of de-
cision. Though one face of technicity tends to suggest to us that at issue 
is deciding what to do, its other, as yet not quite seen, face calls this very 
way of thinking into question, “critiques” it in the sense of inaugurating a 
possibility of holding open what seems already completely decided: the 
dominance of technicity itself. Technical decisions have always already 
been decided as to their essence or nature: they will be technical in in-
tent, modus operandi, and execution. They will treat technicity with an 
intensification of technical doing, and thus will not bring technicity into 
a crisis. Beyond the critical change of climate, we need to try and open 
“critique” to its own crisis, to a change of critical climate. Crisis would 
then mean bringing into question the very operations of technicity and 
its modern workings of power and holding them in crisis. Not escaping 
into ready-made technical solutions to our thinking, assuredly better and 
more sophisticated ones, but with-standing the crisis, that is, standing 
with the crisis and in its space of play, maintaining the tension of decid-
ing, holding open the possibilities energized by the very opening of the 
play of the crisis, of its critical time-space.
For a post-Heideggerian thought this would mean holding in play and 
weighing calculative and meditative paths of thinking, and thus holding 
open the crisis and, within it, the possibilities of thinking itself. In short, 
it would mean de-cision in the sense of Ent-scheidung, both making the 
differentiating cut but also intensifying the play, the decidable undecid-
ability, between calculative thought and meditative thinking. It would 
critically hold open the global unworld to the possibility of worlding. The 
fact that planet Earth is in crisis should not mean forgetting that we exist 
in a global unworld. Perhaps the crisis in reality needs to become open 
into the crisis of reality, that is, of Wirklichkeit: of the paradigmatic status 
of effecting, making, producing, causing, enacting, etc. The calculative 
procedures en-countered by the “incalculable” of meditative thinking. A 
meditative fold in the essence of technology, a wrinkle in the play of its 
time-space. Technicity revealing its unsuspected face, and this ambigu-
ous two-face en-countered as the opportunity of crisis, of holding open 
for deciding. The crisis of (un)worlding.
The Global Unworld 231
Notes
1. Martin Heidegger, Besinnung. Trans. as Mindfulness.
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Chapter 12
Bailout
Randy Martin
The financial meltdown that struck in 2007 hit the world with all the 
force and surprise of a natural disaster. The pristine sands of transaction 
were quickly littered with the debris of deals gone south (alas, the glob-
al direction from which turbulence invariably seems to emanate). Alan 
Greenspan, whose stint at the helm of the Federal Reserve concluded 
shortly before the rains came, referred to the meltdown that halved the 
value of the stock market, unemployed millions and sent millions more 
into foreclosure, as a “once-in-a-century credit tsunami.” One impulse in 
stemming the crisis seemed to be the apportionment of blame, as often 
as not a displacement of natural disaster onto human nature—no small 
irony this for a calamity whose artifice was fully on display. Excessive 
greed meant expunging those who had taken advantage of the system. 
And what of those who had crafted the system? When the waters reced-
ed, would the conceptual landscape remain unmarred? In a moment of 
weakness, or perhaps reflection, Greenspan, in an appearance before the 
House Oversight Committee, acknowledged under questioning that he 
had made a “mistake” in believing that banks, operating in their own self-
interest, would do what was necessary to protect their shareholders and 
institutions. Greenspan called that “a flaw in the model … that defines 
how the world works” (Associated Press). Conceptually speaking, fore-
casting and cycles are part of the lattice-work that joins meteorologists 
and economists. While the former have been quick to sound the alarm 
of what devastation awaits, economists have been less forthcoming about 
what models they see correcting their errant prognostications. The ma-
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chinery had come undone by which the future with all its portents of un-
certainty appears to be a friendly presence, imminently manageable.
Confessionals aside, four years into the debacle it is far from clear 
whether the old ideas are simply waiting out the storm, or whether the 
climate for thought may have come due for a change. The sudden possi-
bility of bailout, rescue, intervention where no assistance was needed, re-
calls an antediluvian edenic state for which water removed leaves the ves-
sel intact. Robert Shiller, an economist, had warned of investors’ mimetic 
herd behavior that blunted market signals, which he termed irrational 
exuberance. Shiller notes that bailout was probably first used to describe 
a pilot’s self-ejection from a plummeting plane, and only in the 1950s did 
it begin to get associated with economic policy interventions. This gene-
alogy suggests a slyness by which economists would survive the crashing 
economy that had moments before flown to such heights. There is also 
the prospect that the massive application of social resources that attach 
to the bailout may generate its own counter-currents and leave the coast-
line fundamentally altered. Under the sign of restoration, bailout would 
seemingly seek to put the old egg on the same wall, hence the importance 
of the familiar entourage of Tim Geithner and Lawrence Summers who, 
as Treasury Secretaries past and present, had done important masonry 
work on the now crumbled facade of financial support.
Yet the insistence on assistance, even as so many institutions com-
plained that the help was unwanted or burdensome to the point of re-
turning the tainted public funds—hints at the very untoward necessity 
of regulation where freedom was to reign. Even a cursory examination 
of government involvement in market matters would disclose that the 
advance of financial capital has required ever more elaborate regulatory 
scaffolding; that the profusion of leveraged products like swaptions, col-
lateralized debt obligations, and mortgage-backed securities generates 
conflicts that require more rules—and that the rules fail to resolve those 
conflicts and continue to proliferate (MacKenzie).The recent crisis has 
added common-sense understanding to the efforts to denaturalize the 
economy and open the black box of the market—implicating econo-
mists’ performativity of theoretical modeling in the price-making activity 
of the former, and pluralizing the latter as a materialized network of hu-
man and machinic agency (MacKenzie; Callon). The mixing of biology 
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and psychology into what is called behavioral finance seeks to counter 
the cognitive and affective biases that keep humans from their utilitarian 
best (Shefrin). On the longer view, however, various economic models 
have had both persistent conceptual disparities and continuously un-
reliable effects, leading to the observation that “the neoclassical school 
has nonetheless maintained its appearance of monolithic continuity and 
placid confidence not due to anything particularly conceptual that the 
economists have said or done; it is rather more directly attributable to 
more durable structures like the nation-state, the corporation, and the 
military” (Mirowski and Nik-Khah 216). Under such circumstances, the 
sudden disclosure of dysfunction in the theory and practice of markets 
that the bailout would seem to force into general view does not itself de-
part from the internal and technical history of these practices.
Bailout poses not so much the question of whether there should be 
regulation or a resumption of the old wild ways (which were always al-
ready replete with statutes of all sorts) but what wealth is being regulated 
for. The politics of bailout discloses the double morality by which the 
perquisites of capital are detached from the entitlements of labor. The 
worry over handing money to business is called “moral hazard”—a judg-
ment most commonly made after the fact that giving money to failed in-
vestment approaches will only encourage bad behavior in the future by 
allowing the abusers to believe that they can take excessive risk with im-
punity. The belated concern speaks not simply to the government’s claim 
that despite the mixed message they had to act or things would have been 
much worse, that making the world safe for Business meant saving busi-
nesses, but also to the inability to discern what risks were excessive and 
what investments parasitically speculative until after the fact.
In contrast, the anxiety aroused by labor is invariably pre-emptive. Di-
rect assistance to the millions of homeowners variously labeled “blem-
ished,” “irresponsible,” and “speculators” (in the case of subprime mort-
gage holders, disproportionately people of color, and the newest citizens 
of the ownership society) would spread a contagion of uncontainable and 
unmeetable expectation—a malady better known as moral panic (Mar-
tin). Ironically, job loss, stock-market implosion, and home-price col-
lapse (leaving owners “underwater,” or owing more on their homes than 
they are worth) were the mechanisms of contagion, for by the middle of 
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2009, most of the new foreclosures—the tsunami’s “third wave”—were 
happening to those with “good credit” and fixed mortgages (Brush). If 
capital’s needs come as always already met, labor’s want is posed as ulti-
mately preventable.
Before the meltdown, fiscal policy focused on control of the money 
supply through continual modulation of the prime interest rate (an in-
terventionist tool honed while Greenspan was chairman of the Federal 
Reserve). The idea was to stop inflation before it started, and this meant 
countering the threat of increased wages when unemployment began to 
fall. The pre-emptive logic was undergirded by a larger invitation for la-
bor to think of itself from the subject position of the investor, one who 
shed dependence on government entitlement altogether and became 
financially self-sufficient through management of its own portfolio—
which would include pensions, college funds for the children, and the 
multiply-mortgaged home as a personal bank. While the security of cor-
porations must be guaranteed for the good of the republic, guaranteeing 
security for the citizenry weakens their moral fiber, which needs to be 
woven from personal responsibility. While success conceals its means 
and ends, failure to manage the future’s risks through present investment 
decisions constitutes a population at risk. In other terms, removal of the 
conditions of security from a population posits them as being a menace, a 
potential enemy, an object of war.
The logic of warfare inhabited the space where social entitlements once 
resided. The 1983 report, “A Nation At Risk” positioned grade-school 
kids’ low test scores as a threat to national security. The war on drugs 
militarized what was once local police work on a national scale. Culture 
wars attacked identities held at odds with a national sensibility. The pre-
emptive logic of these domestic wars itself anticipated the war on terror, 
with its forward deterrence to stop the contagion of those who could not 
abide the imperium’s hazardous morality. The at-risk could free them-
selves from war’s devastation by hurling themselves into the arms of the 
risk capable. Terrorists and those who posed risks to security would see 
their homelands reconstructed in ways that would allow them no place to 
reside. The injunction by George W. Bush after the September 11 attacks 
not to be intimidated, but to go out and shop, presumably on credit, was, 
in this regard, its own kind of veiled threat. The global war without end 
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was to share a futurity, with the endless supply of credit, the never-falling 
home price, and the ever-expanding pool of newly mortgage-eligible.
Greenspan’s tsunami struck amidst this state of terror, this inurement 
to risk that fueled flights of construction and riots of production. Only a 
crash would make it seem necessary to segregate what was real and what 
fictitious in this economy, when it had been the insinuation of finance 
more deeply into the realm of manufacture that had created such a storm 
of volatility. Far from visiting a baleful ideology on docile bodies, the en-
tanglement of continually evaluative price-making circulation in the ex-
panded field of production demands a corporal hyperactivity, a body that 
(like the hazardous Citibank itself), never sleeps, but that spins informa-
tion into action, that treats the home as an office, that does not await the 
future to retire into a fading sunset but stands proudly on the prow and 
screams, “bring it on.” To all this, bailout would seem to shout, “stop.” On 
closer inspection, it asks for a restart—but on lines whose ties to recon-
struction and renovation, restoration and reinvention, continuity and 
disruption do not so readily sort themselves out. Part of the challenge in 
even delimiting the parameters of the bailout is the enormous slippage 
around what it is, what can be placed on its books, and what promises a 
return and what a loss.
When lists are compiled that include loans and credits to individual 
firms—from A.I.G’s $85 billion and JPMorgan Chase’s $87 billion in re-
payments, to the $200 billion to renationalize Fannie and Freddie Mac, 
to the $25 billion for GM and Chrysler’s bankruptcies, to the $700 bil-
lion Troubled Asset Relief Program, to the $300 billion stimulus package, 
to the loan guarantees of some $2 trillion to bank debt and deposits—
the total for the bailout leers toward $15 trillion (Talbott). Yet such ag-
gregations of funds also invite comparison to what comparably massive 
sums have underwritten in the past. One such mash-up includes: Mar-
shall Plan: Cost: $12.7 billion, Inflation Adjusted Cost: $115.3 billion; 
Louisiana Purchase: Cost: $15 million, Inflation Adjusted Cost: $217 
billion; Race to the Moon: Cost: $36.4 billion, Inflation Adjusted Cost: 
$237 billion; S&L Crisis: Cost: $153 billion, Inflation Adjusted Cost: 
$256 billion; Korean War: Cost: $54 billion, Inflation Adjusted Cost: 
$454 billion; The New Deal: Cost: $32 billion (est.), Inflation Adjusted 
Cost: $500 billion (est.); Invasion of Iraq: Cost: $55 1billion, Inflation 
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Adjusted Cost: $597 billion; Vietnam War: Cost: $111 billion, Inflation 
Adjusted Cost: $698 billion; NASA: Cost: $416.7 billion, Inflation Ad-
justed Cost: $851.2 billion (Ritholz).
The possibility of such large-scale historical comparison of what a so-
cial surplus can deliver suggests the possibility of shifting the frame by 
which policy is thought from one of personal responsibility to one of col-
lective deliberation. But even these exercises accept a zero-sum trade-off 
between the dull weight of “is” and the unbearable lightness of “ought.” 
The fixable futurity of finance becomes fungible; the bubble burst emits 
the scents of altered routes. Oft-forgotten in these numbers games are the 
forgone revenues of the tax cuts enacted with the help of bipartisan con-
gressional support in Bush’s first term, which by then were already near-
ing $2 trillion with trillions more to come (Orszag). Admittedly, these 
pale compared to the 95% top marginal rate of the fifties, labor’s dimin-
ishing wage share of increased productivity, concentrations of capital 
gains through dividend-taking stock ownership, and the like. The point 
is that there is always another calculus available that can turn naturalized 
scarcity into commonly constructed abundance. The magic of the bail-
out has been to focus attention on the necessity of where money must go 
without consideration of the contingency of where it comes from. But 
the sense that action must be taken opens the prospect that the mantra, 
“there Is no alternative” would yield to “anything is possible,” a perhaps 
ungovernable promise that drove in a new government, now associated 
with the desire to make all things right.
Hence, bailout prompts a haunting, a return of a spectral post-scarcity 
socialism even while the referents of public ownership, nationalization, 
and expanded entitlement hint at a sea change in the name of a trope 
meant to ease anxieties and stay the course. It should be unsurprising that 
a new Obama administration would be marked by this moniker against 
its own very conventional financial positions (Leibovich). The recogni-
tion of a need for activist government discloses as much about what soci-
ety has been like as it predicts what it will be. For the climate change afoot 
may not foretell an absolute beginning or end, but a refiguring of the so-
cial imaginary—in this case that of nothing less than neo-liberalism itself. 
It would seem to make all the difference in the world to present under-
standing if, rather than believing that we are being delivered to a new era, 
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we come to notice that whatever winds prevail, the countercurrents were 
likely there all along. This would mean that if bailout were to force even 
the most stalwart kingmakers to admit a flaw in the model of how the 
world works, we would not expect them to be the source of an alterna-
tive model or metric. Rather, we might want to know about the complic-
ity of more critical vocabularies in naturalizing this now-ruined concep-
tion by which faith in markets is renewed. That conception goes by the 
shorthand of neo-liberalism, and it may now be time to worry whether 
its critics contributed to neo-liberalism’s appearance of invulnerability 
as much as its acolytes did. To grasp this dilemma and imagine bailout 
as a departure from the investment in the very ideology it critiques, it is 
worth dwelling on perhaps the most exemplary account of this beastly 
complex, Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine. At issue is whether bailout 
brings shock to a close or is a continuation of the doctrine through other 
means. Equally salient here is what the figure of shock, which treats the 
human body and the nation state as sharing the same neural pathways, 
does to the whole question of anthropocentric agency.
The Never-Ending Story
From its start in the laboratories of Dr. Ewen Cameron during the 1950s 
to the application of Milton Friedman’s “laissez-faire laboratory” in the 
developing nations of Chile and Argentina twenty years later, shock trav-
els from the body of the behaviorally challenged subject to that of the 
developmentally disobedient nation, and from the newly born cognitive 
science to the newly borne dismal science. In a manner reminiscent of 
modern art’s signature, the shock of the new, the term references both 
cause and effect, an obligatory forward motion that is meant to make 
manifest capitalism’s drive for innovation. Accordingly, crisis becomes 
an opportunity. As Friedman put it, “only a crisis—actual or imagined—
produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken 
depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic 
function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive 
and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevita-
ble” (7). The economics department as sleeper cell. Klein is keen to dem-
onstrate how shock travels opportunistically from the personal trauma of 
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natural or human-induced catastrophe (whether tsunamis, hurricanes, 
bombings, or electro-shock); to the political suspension of democratic 
rights and participation, through coups, invasions, or massacres; to eco-
nomic restructuring that removes social supports, ravishes infrastructure, 
maldistributes wealth, and exacerbates poverty. Those who resist, refuse, 
oppose, or might be associated with such obstacles to the progress of 
neo-liberal reason are subject to the most barbarous forms of unreason: 
torture, isolation, disappearance, extraordinary rendition. When shock is 
the cure, the aberrant body comes already tortured, its savaging by the 
agents of state taken as a property of illness in need of treatment—a con-
stitutive contradiction that Michael Taussig observed for the operations 
of colonialism more broadly, namely that the civilizer savages the native 
other in a denial of the expropriator’s own barbarity.
If shock provides a kind of contagion economy that offers itself as treat-
ment, it presents a specter of spread not only from deviant body to popu-
lation, but from country to country. Klein also tracks the global march of 
shock in a relentless reckoning of how the world has been remade: “For 
economic shock therapy to be applied without restraint—as it was in 
Chile in the seventies, China in the late eighties, Russia in the nineties, 
and the U.S. after September 11, 2001—some sort of additional major 
collective trauma has always been required, one that either temporarily 
suspended democratic practices or blocked them entirely” (13). Hence, 
the post-9/11 world was not simply blowback, chickens coming home 
to roost, the revenge of the repressed, or other consequences of imperial 
reach returning to bite, but the very homegrown idea of market emanci-
pation finally having its day arrive at the moment when the democratic 
body politic lay stunned, its political will stunted. The shock world tour is 
a gripping horror story that travels across Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Para-
guay, England, China, Poland, Russia, Bolivia, Sri Lanka, Iraq, and even 
back to New Orleans.
But if this metaphor of shock seems arrestingly complete, it can also 
make us worry over what might follow. As a trope of mastery, apparently 
immutable and irresistible, shock is everywhere, but just as suddenly as it 
came, locust-like, it “wears off.” Hence, while shock would here seem to 
banish human agency, it enacts a kind of dystopian enlightenment sub-
ject that always knows what it wants and how to get it, a psycho-physio-
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logic that returns an ur-subject to what might suffer its absolute absence. 
In simpler terms, the key to the effectiveness of shock doctrine as history 
and as argument lies in the analogy between physiology and economy. 
Clearly the latter would aspire to the scientificity of the former, and both 
would hold that science itself exists in an ideationally absolute nether-
world, what Philip Mirowski calls an “effortless economy.” Klein creates a 
homology between the individual body and society through an ideologi-
cal identification between the two aforementioned academics, McGill 
psychiatrist Ewen Cameron and Chicago economist Milton Friedman, 
both of whom claim for their applied research, even when it is funded 
by the results-oriented CIA, the protective cloak of disinterested science. 
Far from being dispassionate researchers, both men were focused on 
making-over the world:
Friedman’s mission, like Cameron’s, rested on a dream of 
reaching back to a state of “natural” health, when all was in 
balance, before human interferences created distorting pat-
terns. Where Cameron dreamed of returning the human 
mind to that pristine state, Friedman dreamed of depattern-
ing societies, of returning them to a state of pure capitalism, 
cleansed of all interruptions—government regulations, trade 
barriers, and entrenched interests. Also like Cameron, Fried-
man believed that when the economy is highly distorted, the 
only way to reach that prelapsarian state was to deliberately 
inflict painful shocks: only “bitter medicine” could clear those 
distortions and bad patterns out of the way. Cameron used 
electricity to inflict his shocks; Friedman’s tool of choice was 
policy—the shock treatment approach he urged on bold poli-
ticians for countries in distress. Unlike Cameron, however, 
who was able to instantly apply his pet theories on his unwit-
ting patients, Friedman would need two decades and several 
twists and turns of history before he too got the chance to put 
his dreams of radical erasure and creation into action in the 
real world. (Klein 60)
If depatterning body and economy, self and society operate metaphori-
cally, the diabolical shock doctors act metonymically, the evil idea stand-
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ing for entire systems of control. While shock itself is certainly a pattern 
of directed violence, it is animated by an ideological drive that comes 
close to serving as an understanding of capitalism as such. For all the at-
tention to freeing markets and restructuring economies, there is little at-
tention to the vast and complex social organization by which bodies are 
assembled by and through labor toward what are considered productive 
ends, of how wealth is amassed but by dint of greed, and of the massive 
cooperation that capital itself depends upon if it is to persist. Klein is nev-
er shy about naming capitalism, but her persistent pursuit of following its 
disastrous methods can leave one wondering how to think of it beyond 
the sum of greed and ideology by which shock assumes its doctrinal sub-
jectivity. This can appear precisely when she is trying to point beyond 
the personal to something endemic, as evident in this passage on the war 
against Iraq:
Iraq’s current state of disaster cannot be reduced either to 
the incompetence and cronyism of the Bush White House 
or to the sectarianism or tribalism of Iraqis. It is a very capi-
talist disaster, a nightmare of unfettered greed unleashed in 
the wake of war. The “fiasco” of Iraq is one created by a care-
ful and faithful application of unrestrained Chicago School 
ideology. What follows is an initial (and not exhaustive) ac-
count of the links between the “civil war” and the corporatist 
project at the heart of the invasion. It is a process of ideology 
boomeranging on the people who unleashed it—ideological 
blowback. (444)
The move from “incompetence and cronyism” to “unfettered greed,” 
meant to signal something like capitalism’s structural moment, does 
not open up an especially wide space. Accumulation will be understood 
more as motive than as means, hence Iraq is a case study in social strip 
mining through the “de-Bathification” that eliminated government per-
sonnel, free trade policies that undermined local light industry, and dis-
bursements of cash meant to usurp public distribution of necessities and 
keep insurgents at bay. The insurgency was directed against the “recon-
struction” that was not only treating the country as a scene of extraction, 
but destroying the social economy that had made Iraq a political target in 
242 Randy Martin
the first place. Klein, whose work as a journalist in Iraq made her keenly 
aware that the resistance “filled the vacuum” and provided a “shadow re-
construction” nonetheless is wary about drawing the link between the 
Mahdi Army’s political support and its capacity to sustain a population 
through a war economy. Here is an anti-imperialist movement in which 
the Western left typically finds no ready solidarity. In addition, we may 
detect a limit to treating war and capitalism as but ideological drives that 
destroy lives and not also means by which interdependencies and collec-
tive demands are formed. In this tragic formulation, violence begets more 
violence, but it is difficult to read how demands on behalf of what Mi-
chael E. Brown (1985, 2008) calls, after Marx, “the society of producers” 
might be the internal and unwanted consequences of capital’s maelstrom.
The metaphorization of war leaves it strangely ungoverned, uncontain-
able, and uncontestable (Deer). Ideas, motives, and ideologies all matter, 
but how they delimit effects, what they fail to cover, what contrary mo-
bilizations take place in their midst may prove the more consequential 
politically. Klein herself pinpoints the ways in which disaster capitalism 
generates surplus populations that might display contrary tendencies, 
but wants to keep us focused on the destruction:
Everywhere the Chicago School crusade has triumphed, it 
has created a permanent underclass of between 25 and 60 per-
cent of the population. It is always a form of war. But when 
that warlike economic model of mass evictions and discarded 
cultures is imposed in a country that is already ravaged by di-
saster and scarred by ethnic conflict, the dangers are far great-
er. There are, as Keynes argued all those years ago, political 
consequences to this kind of punitive peace—including the 
outcome of even bloodier wars. (512)
It might seem foolish or pedantic to argue with the negative effects of 
shock, to worry over how to think about a population-for-itself, seeming-
ly disjoined from what is treated as economically productive. If the mo-
tive of depatterning is a return to a primordial condition of docile bodies 
before social demands became institutionalized, we learn in Klein’s final 
chapter that “shock, by its very nature, is a temporary state” and that with 
time, “the effects of terror receded” (564). Klein confesses that while liv-
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ing in Argentina during the 2001 protests against “IMF prescribed aus-
terity measures” she couldn’t understand the “jubilation” in the streets. 
“Now I think I do: the state of shock had finally worn off ” (565). As it 
turns out: “The dirty secret of the neoliberal era is that these ideas were 
never defeated in a great battle of ideas, nor were they voted down in elec-
tions. They were shocked out of the way at key political junctures” (569). 
If, after Friedman, crisis provides opportunity, so, too, does its demise of-
fer the prospect to keep alive alternatives “until the politically impossible 
becomes politically inevitable.” A turning of tides.
Her claim might be that shock gets refamiliarized, that once normal-
ized by its spread around the world it no longer shocks, and turns the 
strangeness of the body’s altered state back upon the world. She under-
stands that memory absorbs and thereby resists shock (586), and that 
a potent story is the best protection and antidote for the vulnerabilities 
faced in the aftermath of September 11. “As soon as we have a new nar-
rative that offers a perspective on the shocking events, we become re-
oriented and the world begins to make sense again.” This confidence in 
the power of getting the story right, her own universalism, is met by a 
steady particularism; namely, that legions of local, community-based “re-
pair people” (589) can compensate for what has been systematically de-
stroyed by reassembling the broken shards into a machinery of their own 
advancement. Her faith in an expansive political and cultural difference 
resides in grassroots movements, who emerge from shock to engage in a 
kind of developmental bricolage:
The task of the region’s new left, therefore, has become a mat-
ter of taking the detritus of globalization and putting it back 
to work. In Brazil, the phenomenon is best seen in the mil-
lion and a half farmers of the Landless Peoples Movement 
(MST) who have formed hundreds of cooperatives to reclaim 
unused land. In Argentina, it is clearest in the movement of 
“recovered companies,” two hundred bankrupt businesses 
that have been resuscitated by their workers, who have turned 
them into democratically run cooperatives. For the coopera-
tives, there is no fear of facing an economic shock of investors 
leaving, because the investors have already left. In a way, the 
reclamation experiments are a new kind of post-disaster re-
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construction—reconstruction from the slow motion disaster 
of neoliberalism. In sharp contrast to the model offered by the 
disaster capitalism complex in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gulf 
Coast, the leaders of Latin America’s rebuilding efforts are the 
people most affected by the devastation. And unsurprisingly, 
their spontaneous solutions look very much like the real third 
way that had been so effectively shocked out of the way by the 
Chicago School campaign around the world—democracy in 
daily life. (575)
The idea that what we need to reconstruct our world is already at hand 
is one with enormous appeal. Revolution is immanent and not a still 
larger bang awaiting detonation. Periodizing such a response is no doubt 
complicated. The MST did arise from the scarred earth of the Brazilian 
dictatorship, but in the mid-1980s when neo-liberalism presumably was 
in full swing elsewhere in the world. Doubtless the same could be said 
for shock doctrine and disaster capitalism themselves. David Harvey 
has effectively enjoined neoliberalism with the violence of which Klein 
speaks, but it is certainly hard to find a moment of capitalist development 
free from the decimation of populations, something acutely observed 
by Michael Perelman to lie at the start of the primitivizing accumulation 
process. Names for the present conjuncture can only be spelled in short-
hand. Of necessity, neoliberalism will leave much out. But the term has 
suffered from a temptation to overconsolidate the ideological coherence 
of the state-capital nexus whose fracture from varieties of neoconserva-
tive constituency was on display in the 2008 U.S. election.
The paradox of neo-liberalism is that, far from stripping away the in-
ert body of the state so as to free the economy to pursue its true expres-
sion, what was called de-regulation, regulatory activities of government 
became hyperactive. Michel Foucault’s prescient observations during 
his 1978 lectures at the Collège de France on this then-emergent phe-
nomenon make this abundantly clear: “The problem of liberal policy was 
precisely to develop in fact the concrete and real space in which the for-
mal structure of competition could function. So, it is a matter of a mar-
ket economy without laissez-faire, that is to say, an active policy without 
state control. Neo-liberalism should not therefore be identified with 
laissez-faire, but rather with permanent vigilance, activity, and interven-
Bailout 245
tion” (132). For Foucault, this interventionist disposition is by no means 
exceptional, but suggests the kind of ongoing labor of regulation that the 
state and economy will require of themselves and demand of others. This 
work of the political suggests that even shock may ask more of us than 
to lay still on the table, and that hyperactivity is a pervasive and readily 
observable consequence. Accordingly, shock would describe the queasy 
condition of navigating between subject and object, of intervening with-
out guarantee, of rippling waves of consequence ungoverned by inten-
tionality. When this futurity is borne in the present, the simple juxtaposi-
tion of utopian and dystopian moments cannot settle the matter of what 
to do with the politics of knowledge, of what interventions will yield, of 
what returns on mobilization we can expect. Bodies are not simply made 
docile but set in frenzied motion. Neoliberalism has meant more work 
from those pressed to labor.
Bail-In
The longer history of a tense union between interventionist and mini-
malist state has wracked the republic since its origins (Smith). The gains 
of an elegant formulation of power can be offset by maximizing its hold 
on the imagination and minimizing the myriad counter-histories and ex-
pansions of the political that have also been part of the recent and more 
distant pasts. The peril of historicism is the seduction that we all belong 
to the same time and that opportunity comes and goes with the smooth 
swing of a pendulum, erasing the ongoing accomplishment of precisely 
the alternatives we seek. The explanatory challenges posed by shock’s to-
talizing reach suggest a phantasmatic economy of violence that does not 
readily intersect with the vast assemblage of labor and productive capac-
ity that has wielded such excess. Indeed, to the narrative that violence 
is something epiphenomenal to the actual grist of life, we might insert 
the current account common across various ideological dispositions of 
financial shock, meltdown, and bailout. The current reign of finance is, 
of course, another great experiment hatched from the labs of economics 
departments. In this case finance is reduced, like shock, to ideology and 
greed—the emancipation from which will return us to the authenticity 
of hard work and use value. But finance cannot be reduced to speculative 
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activity; its expansion has abetted the massive rift between productive ca-
pacity and means of consumption. The rise and spread of finance has fu-
eled industrial production around the world. The former has not become 
a false surrogate of the latter. The moralistic dismissal of finance does no 
more to foster an ethical production of goods than does the attribution of 
capital’s violence toward labor to excessive greed and bad ideology free 
us from the coercions of the wage relation.
A reconsideration of the political spaces opened by the current reign 
of finance needs to begin by asking what forms or sociality or mutual 
indebtedness are being produced—before and after the storm. Key to 
the management, risk, and production of volatility has been the growth 
in derivatives markets, traded publicly (credit markets) and privately 
(over the counter), whose notional value exceeds one quadrillion dol-
lars (Bank of International Settlements). The rate of increase of these 
contracts to buy or sell variable attributes of commodities (such as in-
terest or currency exchange rates) and the skyrocketing multiplication of 
global Gross Domestic Product (measured in trillions of dollars), often 
act as a kind of cognitive anesthetic rather than a pathway for thought. 
Prosaically, derivatives incorporate a range of operations that make the 
circulation of capital possible. First, they trade risk by serving as a kind 
of insurance. A premium is paid to buy or sell a bundle of goods, servic-
es, currency, mortgages, or other credit or debt at a particular time for 
a particular price, thereby hedging against an unexpected modulation in 
a market. This bundle also becomes a tradeable commodity in its own 
right that makes markets and increases price volatility. Any commodity 
comes to have a multiplying array of tags or profiles that index its value 
but also set it in motion. The ability to set prices in anticipation of the 
completion of a production cycle points to a second feature of deriva-
tives, one that allows them to serve as a global equilibration of price the 
way that gold once did. But rather than relying on fixed exchange rates 
and set temporalities of production, derivatives bring the future into the 
present. Finally, derivatives commensurate the value of different forms of 
capital, taking common attributes of very different kinds of commodities, 
such as their currency exchange rates, and associating them on a global 
scale. Each of these operations intensifies labor and presses on productiv-
ity by importing global market conditions to local instances of activity. 
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Within companies, excellence is pegged to the best performers, said to 
outperform the average by a fivefold factor. Within academia, stars are 
said to be the measure by which fields are made and others adjudged 
mere contributors. All attention runs to the best and the rest are left defi-
cient and disposable.
Australian political economists Dick Bryan and Mike Rafferty have 
examined the socializing effects of derivatives and have called for what 
they term labor’s finance: “The reproduction of labour power becomes 
the site where neutral, stable money is defined in the sphere of working 
class finance, and all other monetary and asset forms, in the sphere of 
capital, benchmark themselves to that labour anchor” (Bryan, Rafferty, 
and MacWilliam). This inversion of who gets pegged to what and where 
resources are most deservedly applied points to finance beyond itself as 
a new axis for political reorientation and remediation. Such priorities 
would certainly set the bailout on a different course: one that reverses 
the double morality of hazard and debt to valorize the productive excess 
that expanded debt can draw upon. As Melinda Cooper and Angela Mit-
ropoulos put it, “we are interested in pushing the exercise in excess even 
further, in praise of a usurious economy from below that would begin 
with the most intimate of acts while breaking beyond their normative 
sexual and racial boundaries. Briefly put, how is it possible to live on bor-
rowed time, to extend credit to oneself and others, while defaulting on 
the contractual arrangements one might have with the creditor?” (Coo-
per and Mitropoulos).
Instruments of finance, like securities and derivatives, can be treated 
merely as weapons of mass destruction, their spectral existence and mag-
nitude trotted out as a kind of shock and awe—but they also have had the 
practical effect of creating interdependencies and mutual indebtedness 
of populations to one another. The politics of this socialization of finan-
cial labor are not readily captured by a return to the local. The financial 
meltdown points to the availability of massive amounts of wealth with-
out clear ideological or functional ends—witness the difficulty that the 
architects of the bailout had in explaining what had happened and why 
the hundreds of billions of dollars were needed, as well as the banks’ abil-
ity to account for what they were actually doing with the money. In the 
words of one of the banks to survive state-led monopolization, “We’ve 
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lent some of it. We’ve not lent some of it. We’ve not given any accounting 
of ‘Here’s how we’re doing it’,” said Thomas Kelly, a spokesman for JPM-
organ Chase, which received $25 billion in emergency bailout money. 
“We have not disclosed that to the public. We’re declining to” (MSNBC). 
It is possible that this lack of transparency might be corrected by bet-
ter regulation, but the wider absence of understanding makes such cor-
rection unlikely. Rather, the disclosure that trillions of dollars of public 
funds are available in the first place seems to have encouraged recogni-
tion that social wealth in the aggregate can be applied to attend to more 
general human needs.
Making good on this promise entails more than marshaling the quotid-
ian pockets of democratic will, but rather reconnecting what labor makes 
available, whether in shock or in awe, for a more general reconstruction 
of society. If the blame game is meant to be self-erasing, the greater con-
sequence is to elide consideration of the financial crisis’s effects rather 
than its causes. The wobbly state of knowledge disclosed to underpin 
economic thinking may well be tied to a larger conundrum of expertise 
more broadly. Lyotard’s now-reliable formulation of generalized doubt 
toward grand narratives can be extended to the specialized discourses of 
expertise, the vertiginous state that ensues when all are experts and no 
expertise can be considered reliable enough. It seems unlikely that the 
failure to produce facts adequate to the management of their own rami-
fications is a predicament that can be isolated to the intellectual labor of 
financial manufacture. The skepticism toward expertise is a more general 
feature of its proliferation, as more claim the mantle of the professional 
managerial class and more assert a capacity for knowledge effects beyond 
their own specialization.
When this phenomenon hit humanities departments two decades ago 
it was referred to as the culture wars. Many more wars have subsequently 
ensued, still with this logic of the minor discourse, the specialized tech-
nique (of which terror is, like finance but one more) wreaking havoc on 
generalized understanding of how the world should be. The false prem-
ises of the invasion of Iraq may now seem as irrelevant to what it has 
wrought as are the billions of dollars deployed to shock and awe financial 
institutions into normal functionality. In neither case was normalcy re-
stored, but the question of what inventions might be salutary given the 
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evident surplus capacity to marshal expenditure without ends. This too 
is a condition of knowledge production. Now we may be seeing a more 
generalized decomposition of professional autonomy while demands for 
the social efficacy for what is known is only on the rise. Rather than be-
moan this state as one of cognitive impotency, we might be wiser to take 
firmer stock of what we place our learning in the service of. The parting 
of the mists should also allow us to see that this socialization of capital 
and of labor, whether named by finance, globalization, neoliberalism, or 
capitalism itself, was also likely there all along. The bailout would come 
to stand as a critical juncture—not the origin of a new world, but a re-
enchantment with those attentions to wealth whose returns are mutually 
enriching. The change of course would allow us to consider what of our 
mutuality we want to take on board and what ballast we can readily let 
go. The place for these ruminations is already upon us. The map remains 
for us to draw.
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Chapter 13
Auto-Immunity
Henry Sussman
The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make 
whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from 
Paradise and has got caught in his wings; it is so strong 
that the angel can no longer close them. The storm drives 
him irresistibly into the future, to which his back is turned, 
while the pile of debris before him grows toward the sky.1
It might well seem, under the aura of Walter Benjamin, that history is 
doomed to fall a step behind the manipulations to the operating systems 
of technology, might, social organization, and commerce impacting di-
rectly on people’s lives; that an inevitable time-lag creeps between the 
exercise of power and where it can be picked up, on the street or super-
highway, by critique’s fish-eye lens. Benjamin’s Angel of History has been 
summoned to his last-ditch mercy mission both by the collector, who 
looked longingly at childhood and its unaffected faculties and discern-
ments, and by the avatar of shock, who knew that there was no turning 
back once people existed under the regimes of automation, unbridled ex-
traction and acceleration, and clueless power and technology. Abject in 
his very orientation, the Angel of History must be pushed forward into 
the future over the mounting heaps of debris that accumulation and cul-
tural striving emit as byproducts. He has been interned both ahead of his 
moment and behind it. There is a familiar pathos to this predicament of 
angelic (or messianic) exile: a similar wild-goose chase on the part of K. 
in Kafka’s The Castle looms, for instance, in the background of this image. 
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If history is, ultimately, a tragedy for Benjamin, more precisely a Baroque 
stage-set strewn with the paraphernalia of death, its most prominent fea-
ture is the blind spot occasioned by an unavoidable time-lag between the 
acquiescence to power and new modifications to its delivery systems, 
whether at the level of bureaucracy, technology, or policing and military 
might, planned and implemented in the hub of strategic operations. His-
tory’s angels and other victims are fated either to overshoot their mo-
ment or watch hopelessly as it passes them by.
If social observers and critics could only catch up with the nexus of 
interconnected financial, military, and techno-administrative manipula-
tions directly impacting on culturally diverse ways of Life, in the ‘hood, 
on the land, in the favela, and in the hutong, so runs the Trauerspiel, the 
outrages of ideological reaction, runaway extraction and accumulation, 
psychotic greed, and social injustice without redress or remediation, 
could be met preemptively. The delayed mission of mercy and redemp-
tion on the part of the Angel of History becomes, in the end, a brilliant 
figurative resignation to critique’s inbred inability to capture in timely 
fashion the new wrinkles in power’s delivery, undercover updates to the 
Prevailing Operating System (what we once might have called Weltan-
schauung, ideology, hegemony, metaphysics, or épistème).
Although its disclosures are invariably somber and unsettling, Naomi 
Klein’s recent journalism brings the long tradition of bewailing the inac-
tivity occasioned by the constitutional delay between exploitation, ap-
prehension, and articulation to an abrupt end. I say this in full respect to 
the inspiration and near-bewildering insight so many of us have drawn 
from the critical investigations of Walter Benjamin and allied historians 
of culture. Herself drawing on informational and communicative tech-
nologies of near-instantaneous velocity, Klein has morphed the Angel of 
History into a wide receiver, hurtling toward the end-zone, the game, mi-
raculously, still up for grabs. A second or two remains on the time-clock, 
not much more. Irreplaceable casualties have in any event transpired; 
the toll of past negligence is irreversible. Under the aegis of a luminous 
master-narrative of global economic development and political domina-
tion over the past five decades, somehow assembled under her own drive 
and momentum, Klein legitimately claims the authority to analyze the 
categorical, fundamentalist outrages even while they happen.
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A flow-monitor out of the pages of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia diptych, Klein is more than capable of the 
jarring, revelatory flashes fueling the critical community’s long run on 
Walter Benjamin and Jacques Derrida. Benjamin, for example, particu-
larly in “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” is no stranger to the shock-effect 
that she most ingeniously gleans from the impact of unconstrained free-
market economic policies on a global palette of economic systems that 
were once operative, albeit in fits and starts, bubbles and busts, on the 
basis of local histories, climates, monitoring devices, and correctives. The 
shock that Benjamin observed and tracked as it unrolled from the nine-
teenth century was above all an unassimilated energetic surge. “Baude-
laire speaks of a man who plunges into the crowd as into a reservoir of 
electric energy. Circumscribing the experience of the shock, he calls this 
man ‘a kaleidoscope equipped with consciousness.’”2
It is out of this unprecedented and overwhelming resource of unbri-
dled energy that Benjamin, in the essay on Baudelaire situated at the ex-
treme of his inscriptive density and intensity, can pursue the nineteenth 
century’s characteristic mood and gesture: from the spasm that lights 
matches and clicks cameras to the robot-like movements of the assembly 
line to the playful “escape” from this regime through automatic gambling 
machines and dodgem cars.
The shock that by Klein’s account has been a strategic factor in sub-
jugating a vast range of national jurisdictions and cultures to corporate 
thinking and practice has been a far more sordid matter. Strategic shock 
becomes the primary delivery-system for an old time economic religion, 
reduced to a few unwavering tenets, crystallized by Milton Friedman and 
his Chicago School:
The three trademark demands—privatization, government 
deregulation, and deep cuts to social spending—tended to be 
extremely unpopular with citizens, but when the agreements 
were signed there was still at least the pretext of mutual con-
sent between the governments doing the negotiating, as well 
as a consensus among the supposed experts. Now the same 
ideological program was being imposed via the most baldly 
coercive means possible: under foreign military occupation 
after an invasion, or immediately following a cataclysmic nat-
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ural disaster. September 11 appeared to have provided Wash-
ington with the green light to stop asking countries if they 
wanted the U.S. version of “free trade and democracy” and to 
start imposing it with Shock and Awe military force The idea 
of exploiting crisis and disaster has been the modus operandi 
of Milton Friedman’s movement from the very beginning—
this fundamentalist form of capitalism has always needed di-
sasters to advance. (Shock Doctrine 9)
The clearest example was the shock of September 11, which, 
for millions of people, exploded “the world that is familiar” 
and opened up a period of deep disorientation and regression 
that the Bush administration expertly exploited. Suddenly we 
found ourselves in a Year Zero Never strong in or knowledge 
of history, North Americans had become a blank slate—“a 
clean sheet of paper” on which “the newest and most beauti-
ful words can be written,” as Mao said of his people.
That is how the shock doctrine works: the original disaster—
the coup, the terrorist attack, the market meltdown, the war, 
the tsunami, the hurricane—puts the entire population into 
a state of collective shock. The falling bombs, the bursts of 
terror, the pounding winds serve to soften up whole societ-
ies much as the blaring music and blows in the torture cells 
soften up prisoners. Like the terrorized prisoner who gives up 
the names of comrades and renounces his faith, shocked so-
cieties often give up things they would fiercely protect. Jamar 
Perry and his fellow evacuees at the Baton Rouge evacuation 
were supposed to give up their housing projects and public 
schools. (16–17)
Klein’s scenario is of the ideological preparation, akin to seismic shock 
and the concomitant erosion of a given society’s social buttressing, for 
states of exception, referring the severe measures back to some identifi-
able catastrophe. The states of exception initiated under the shock re-
gime, above all the widespread overt use of torture and the activation of a 
vast mercenary apparatus (“military subcontractors”) not fully account-
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able under military code or federal regulation, have become the stocks-
in-trade of U.S. and Allied military, economic, and diplomatic policy.
Characteristic of Klein’s analysis in the introductory passages from The 
Shock Doctrine cited immediately above is the clean follow-through from 
ideological manipulation, propaganda, and theatricality to very specific 
technologies of military and social control. Not only can the minor, but 
telling revisions to the ideological sub-text be tracked from one scene of 
adventure to the next, almost on a monthly basis; the ideology is itself 
modular. Its three basic tenets, each with but very little wiggle-room for 
variation, amount to the litanies in a fundamentalist religion even starker 
and more unwavering than the culture prevailing in the hotbeds of ter-
rorist aggression. Not unlike Freud’s schematic for the arrangement of 
mnemonic material at the end of Studies on Hysteria,3 Klein inventively 
mobilizes concentric strata and epochs of U.S. cultural invention as back-
grounds to the military and economic artifacts, above all of the George 
W. Bush presidency. The immediate pretext for the fire-and-brimstone 
rhetoric for Shock and Awe may well be the increasing prevalence in U.S. 
society of fundamentalist evangelists and their political sidemen and ide-
ological operatives. But this is subtended in her analysis by the growth 
and prominence of such agencies as the World Bank and IMF over the 
past forty years and by an even deeper underpinning of imaginary terror 
extending back to the very stirrings of the Cold War, the scenario of the 
brainwashing and deployment of human drones in such a film as “The 
Manchurian Candidate,” as well as the culture of forced electric shock-
therapy, the psychiatric practice on which the fantasy of brain-program-
ming is based.
Klein narrates a sequential tale beginning substantially with the U.S.-
engineered overthrow of Salvador Allende on 9/11/1973, and refusing 
to relinquish its detailed testimony until having pursued a filigree strand 
of structurally parallel destabilizations, in succession, in Argentina, Bo-
livia, Brazil, Poland, China, South Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Ko-
rea, Israel, and, most tellingly, on two separate grim occasions, Iraq. Klein 
orchestrates the global iteration of a regime that, while capable of making 
accommodations to certain differences in geography, economic activity, 
and culture, adheres rigidly to such core-tenets as were cited above, prac-
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tices whose purism packs the deepest-seated political consequences, de-
manding decades to repair.
It can come as scarce surprise to members of the critical network, that 
Klein, in unmasking and articulating the programmatic subtext to a sys-
tematic strategy of unbridled exploitation and political repression under 
the banner of economic purism positions herself along the pathway of 
certain of Jacques Derrida’s most memorable destabilizations in the name 
of free inquiry and expression. Not only has Klein brought critique to the 
moment where it can, and is all the more so compelled to address eventu-
alities unfolding in the moment—the core postulate of the IC3 project, if 
it admits of one. Klein’s narrative and her analysis furnish tangible proof, 
one certainly not limited to Derrida’s most overtly “political” works, say 
Specters of Marx or Rogues, that the battery of textual-environment based 
rhetorical gestures and reading strategies known as “deconstruction,” are, 
in the age of information-politics, as indispensable a contrapuntal politi-
cal strategy and systematic release-valve as exists. Klein appeals, for ex-
ample, to Keynesian economics as a mixed palette of interests and coun-
terforces in which it was possible to arrive at subtle compromises and 
balances suitable to specific environments.
For this reason, Chicagoans did not see Marxism as their 
true enemy. The real source of the trouble was to be found in 
the ideas of the Keyneseans in the United States, the social 
democrats in Europe, and the developmentalists in what was 
called the Third World. These were believers not in a utopia 
but a mixed economy, to Chicago eyes an ugly hodgepodge of 
capitalism for the manufacture and distribution of consumer 
products, socialism in education, state ownership in essentials 
like water services, and all kinds of laws designed to temper 
the extremes of capitalism. Like the religious fundamental-
ist who has a grudging respect for fundamentalists of differ-
ent faiths and for avowed atheists but disdains the casual be-
liever, the Chicagoans declared war on these mix-and-match 
economists. What they wanted was not a revolution exactly 
but a capitalist Reformation: a return to uncontaminated cap-
italism. (53)
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In Klein’s parlance, viable economic practice is a rich tapestry of strate-
gies variegated in their orientations and in the interests they are primed 
to serve. The economy is an ever-changing spectrum of investments, 
stopgap measures, and imaginary long-term strategies. To reduce all 
economies to one economy, to subjugate this one economy to the slo-
gans of a complacent, unwavering economic theology, founded on the 
attribution of divine benevolence and equilibrium to the Market, is tan-
tamount to the destruction of the environmental diversity whose imma-
nent loss Gregory Bateson bemoaned at the very outset of the current 
ecological and climatic catastrophes. Bateson visualized this fatal simpli-
fication both as an anthropocentric drive to urbanize the human habitat 
in its entirety and as a fatal reduction of the biosphere:
Man, the outstanding modifier of environment, similarly 
achieves single-species ecosystems in his cities, but he goes 
one step further, establishing special environments for his 
symbionts. These, likewise, become single-species ecosys-
tems: fields of corn, cultures of bacteria, batteries of fowls, 
colonies of laboratory rats, and the like. (Bateson 451)
There is an ecology of bad ideas, just as there is an ecology of 
weeds When you narrow down your epistemology and act on 
the premise, “What interests me is me, or my organization, or 
my species,” you chop off consideration of other loops of the 
loop structure. You decide that you want to get rid of the by-
products of human life and that Lake Erie will be a good place 
to put them. You forget that the wider eco-mental system 
called Lake Erie is part of your wider eco-mental system—and 
that if Lake Erie is driven insane, its insanity is incorporated 
into the wider system of your thought and experience. (492)
Bateson’s rich insight here, that ecologies and systems can be driven as 
insane as the men who appropriate their output and specialize their ele-
ments and processes with monomaniacal zeal, sets the stage for Klein’s 
constitutional repugnance to the procrustean colonizing of free-market 
economic principles, implemented by such organizations as the World 
Bank and IMF. Bateson’s Lake Erie, in keeping with this volume’s overall 
drift, is a sink, a catchment area that, until saturated, performs invaluable 
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ecosystematic service: such as by metabolizing and otherwise channel-
ing waste and byproducts.4 As the curtain rose on the present moment of 
ecological disaster and economic implosion, Bateson discerned the feed-
back loop circulating the madness as well as the pollution back and forth 
between humans and the environment. It’s not only the case that Lake 
Erie’s insanity precipitates our own. It’s a two-way street; our productivist 
preoccupation with resource shortages (resource as in raw material) leads 
to the foreclosure of recognizing that natural waste management facili-
ties (“sinks”) are resources in their own right. This thought-occlusion is 
tantamount to a deficit in long-term attention. It precipitates Lake Erie’s 
insanity in the form of chemical saturation, which then, in a demented 
feedback loop, makes our inattention and flawed policy even crazier.
Lake Erie has attained a level of madness that even Bateson could not 
have foreseen. Bioinvasions by species such as the Asian carp have at-
tacked biodiversity and weakened bio-resilience to previously unimagi-
nable degrees. During the floods of the 1980’s, the Asian carp escaped 
fish-farms in Mississippi to colonize the entire Mississippi River basin 
and to slowly penetrate the Great Lakes habitat. This voracious fish de-
vours a disproportionate amount of the plants and animals at the base 
of the Great Lake food chain. In this way, it decimates native fish popu-
lations, and will eventually outnumber all native species. This is merely 
one further shock to an already depatterned eco-mental system. Premo-
nitions of the Asian carp have already prompted a number of electric 
barriers—purportedly non-lethal—along the Chicago Ship and Barrier 
Canal. Electrified steel cables now line the canal floor at strategic points, 
creating a deterrent electrical field. Such measures tangibly complicate 
the lines otherwise drawn between a Foucauldian biopolitics and an 
Agambenesque thanato-politics. The compulsive imperative to maintain 
the economic and economic “health” of the Great Lakes has resulted in, 
among other stopgaps, dumping tons of poison into the canal and an en-
suing fish-kill of over 200,000 tons. Similar crossover between bio- and 
thanato-politics has taken place in Tanzania’s Lake Victoria, where the 
introduced species, the Nile perch, in similar fashion “occupied” the lake, 
sharply reducing its biodiversity. In this instance, conflict fought out at 
the ecological level prompted human conflict and economic disarray. 
The Nile perch was exploited as an “export crop.” As the documentary, 
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“Darwin’s Nightmare” demonstrates, the airplanes delivering the Tanza-
nian perch to their European markets returned with the munitions that 
prolonging the military theater of regional strife aggravated by dire eco-
nomic shortage.
Bateson’s rallying cry for eco-diversity in its broadest sense also ante-
dates Derrida’s isolation of différence itself, perhaps the preeminent sub-
unit of articulation and information in a text-centered complex of cultural 
production underscoring the arbitrariness, contingency, and tenuousness 
of systematic arrangements, whether legal, socio-political, or economic. 
In Bateson’s terms, the system installed in the Southern Cone (Argentina, 
Chile, and Brazil) by “the Chicago Boys and their professors” (102) in 
the 1970’s was an inert ecology devoid of the flex and diversity necessary 
for productive adaptation,
based entirely on a belief in “balance” and “order” and the 
need to be free of interferences and “distortions” in order to 
succeed. Because of these traits, a regime committed to the 
faithful application of this ideal cannot accept the presence of 
competing or tempering worldviews. In order for the ideal to 
be achieved, it requires a monopoly on ideology; otherwise 
… the economic signals become distorted and the entire sys-
tem is thrown out of balance. (203)
In contrast to what she observed while tracking the epic trajectory of a 
narrow-minded, self-serving economic theology, and in spite of her own 
reflex empathy toward the receiving end of the Shock Doctrine, wherever 
its operations happen to be mobilized, Klein is herself hardly an econom-
ic purist or naïve holdout for rigid Marxian economics:
I am not arguing that all forms of market systems are inher-
ently violent. It is eminently possible to have a market-based 
economy that requires no such brutality and demands no 
such ideological purity. A free market in consumer products 
can coexist with free public health care, with public schools, 
with a large segment of the economy It’s equally possible to 
require corporations to pay decent wages, to respect the right 
of workers to form unions, and for governments to tax and re-
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distribute wealth so that the sharp discrepancies that mark the 
corporatist state are reduced. (20)
Klein betrays herself here: she is as avowed a partisan of complexity 
in the field of economic arrangements as is Derrida on the always tenu-
ous interface between the systems of exploitation and extraction and the 
conceptual embroideries, suturing public opinion to signifiers, both le-
gitimating and implementing the Prevailing Operating System. Any eth-
ics toward which the Derridean gloss on a bewildering multiplicity of 
cultural artifacts gravitates is an exhortation to complexity in the service 
of wiring release-mechanisms within the otherwise closed circuitry of 
philosophical solipsism, imperialist adventure, unconstrained economic 
development, and politico-administrative fundamentalism. Deconstruc-
tion’s deep-wired ethical slant places it in productive differential solidar-
ity with the best of post-colonial and gender critique, with the systemic 
dismantling and rewiring undertaken, in different ways by Lacan, De-
leuze and Guattari, and now two distinct generations of systems theo-
rists.5 Certainly as well with the dynamic, wide-angle panorama brought 
under acute analysis and critique by a committed journalist of Naomi 
Klein’s caliber.
The particular coordinate at which the present entry to an inherently 
multi-perspectival omnibus is situated pivots on the interface at which 
two seemingly antithetical discourses meet up only to discover substan-
tial accord on specific points as well as analytical orientations. Derrida’s 
text is clearly philosophically concept-driven while constitutively literary 
in grain and weave. Klein’s is unabashedly in the service of the facts, the 
data emerging both from meticulous investigative archival work and un-
remitting tracking of trends. Derrida’s prose is by design stylistically el-
liptical and opaque; Klein’s lucid and sequential according to media con-
vention and “the law of genre.”6 I’ve argued in The Task of the Critic that 
disagreements in discourse are never substantive or “philosophical.” They 
are invariably matters of discourse design, the parameters of the screen 
or display on which they’ve been arrayed. Given the sharp discrepancies 
between the respective prose media that Klein and Derrida synthesize, 
their substantive mutual affirmation is all the more striking. It is no doubt 
grounded in nothing more overbearing than an ethics of the rigorous 
pursuit and adumbration of complexity to the full range of its implica-
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tions. Indeed, to an increasing degree the only parameter in whose terms 
substantial disagreement on the issues, from foreign policy to healthcare 
and economic policy, becomes explicit is the palpable tension between 
complex and stripped-bare approaches.
On a substantive or thematic level, the deconstructive philosopher 
and the journalistic flow-monitor of exploitative and accumulative trends 
agree on a remarkable spectrum of recent phenomena, from the World 
Bank and IMF to the precipitous expansion of military forces serving 
corporate interests rather than those determined by sovereign entities.
The beast is not simply an animal but the very incarnation 
of evil, of the satanic, the diabolical, the demonic—a beast 
of the Apocalypse. Before Iraq, Libya had been considered 
by the Reagan administration to be a rogue state, although I 
don’t believe that the word itself was ever used. Libya, Iraq, 
and Sudan were bombed for being rogue states, and, in the 
last two instances, with a violence and cruelty that fall nowise 
short of those associated with what is called “September 11.” 
But the list is endless (Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, Iran, 
and so on). For reasons that would be interesting to study, In-
dia and Pakistan, despite their reckless postures with regard 
to nuclear disarmament, particularly in 1998, have never fig-
ured among the rogue states (although India did everything it 
could at the United Nations to have Pakistan condemned as a 
rogue state). (Rogues 97)
Derrida here performs an extrapolative read-out of the apocalyptic 
beast or monster associated with those states and other political entities 
accorded “rogue” status (more on which below). As we’ve seen, Klein 
needs to take embedded politico-theological zeal as seriously as Derrida 
does throughout his ingenious exposes of Abrahamic rhetoric, imagery, 
metaphysics and eschatology. The global panorama through which he 
pursues the attribution of this status, an appellation making sense only 
within the sacrosanct closure of political fundamentalism, is in scale on a 
par with Klein’s documentary pursuit of the Shock Doctrine around the 
globe back to its sources in the U.S. economy. Her discourse, fact-driven 
as it is, relies on her ability to discern the imagistic continuity between 
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the ideological pronouncements and rationalizations driving the global 
extractive adventure and the empirical trends, whether on the street or in 
the prison cell: “The shock doctrine mimics this process precisely [“soft-
ening up” populations to accept new eventualities], attempting to achieve 
on a mass scale what torture does one on one in an interrogation cell” 
(16). The teasing-out of key images, whether of wheels, torture, or loose 
cannons, is as indispensable to the wiring of journalistic focus and com-
pression as it is to theoretical excursis.
Agree as Klein and Derrida substantially do on the drift, scale, ratio-
nale, and impact of shock capitalism, the wiring of their respective pur-
views on global politics becomes a shared (or shorted) circuit on this 
far more intriguing and profound register, in the engine-room of figura-
tion and rhetoric. For Klein, the ultimate consummation of the universal 
Shock Doctrine is a far-cry from the “end of history” declared by Fran-
cis Fukuyama.7 It is, rather, the attack on the U.S. domestic economy by 
the very draconian measures by which it, in collusion with the World 
Bank, IMF, and, at least in Derrida’s account, the U.N., have subjugated 
and depleted a bewildering array of the world’s local ecologies. The plot 
of a fundamentalist spirit of economic severity coming home to haunt 
the overheated system that launched it, a vengeful and repressive trajec-
tory, torques and structures Klein’s presentation in far-reaching ways. It 
is no accident that the section of The Shock Doctrine devoted to Iraq, in 
many ways a consummate one, is titled “Iraq Full Circle: Overshock.” Or 
that a pivotal section of the definitive first chapter is called “Shock Ther-
apy Comes Home.” This sub-section begins with an uncannily prescient 
epitaph to the current economic meltdown—one revealing a shocking 
dearth of economic and labor diversity, an irreversible displacement of 
production and opportunity hors système. “Friedman’s Chicago School 
Movement has been conquering territory around the world since the sev-
enties, but until recently its vision had never been applied in its country of 
origin” (11). The elements of the economic system set into motion when 
the evangelical fundaments of the Shock Doctrine entrenched them-
selves at home comprise a terse summation of the current status quo, one 
that will not be rectified by emergency infusions of TARP capital alone:
To kick-start the disaster capitalism complex, the Bush ad-
ministration outsourced, with no public debate, many of the 
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most sensitive and core functions of government—from pro-
viding health care to soldiers, to interrogating prisoners, to 
gathering and “data mining” information on all of us. The role 
of the government in this unending war is not that of an ad-
ministrator managing a network of contractors but of a deep-
pocketed venture capitalism. (12)
And that’s just the home front of the War on terror; the real 
money is in fighting wars abroad. Beyond the weapons con-
tractors, who have seen their profits soar thanks to the war in 
Iraq, maintaining the U.S. military is now one of the fastest-
growing service economies in the world. (12)
Then there is humanitarian relief and reconstruction. Pio-
neered in Iraq, for-profit relief and reconstruction has already 
become the global paradigm The primary economic role of 
wars, however, was as a means to open new markets that had 
been sealed off and to generate postwar peacetime booms. 
Now wars and disaster responses are so fully privatized that 
they are themselves the new market; there is no need to 
wait until after the war for the boom—the medium is the 
message. (12)
Amid the weapons trade, the private soldiers, for-profit re-
construction and the homeland-security industry, which has 
emerged as a result of the Bush administration’s particular 
brand of post-September 11 shock therapy is a fully articu-
lated new economy. It was built in the Bush era, but it now ex-
ists quite apart from any one administration and will remain 
entrenched until the supremacist ideology that underpins it is 
identified, isolated, and challenged. (13)
Drawing on a very different archive of resources, Derrida can still hone 
in on the self-destructive consequences of solipsism (itself trapped in its 
“ipseity”), self-aggrandizing strategy, and logic when they circulate back 
to the Homeland. Throughout Rogues, Derrida’s talisman for this casu-
istry is the wolf ’s irrefutable circular reasoning in La Fontaine’s “The Wolf 
and the Lamb.” He deploys this logic, for example, in explaining the ex-
ception made in the Charter of the United Nations empowering its two 
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primary powers at the time, the U.S. and U.S.S.R., to defend themselves 
against an armed attack, “until the Security Council has taken the neces-
sary measures to assure peace and security” (99).
The reason of the strongest not only determines the actual 
policy of that international institution but, well before that, 
already determined the conceptual architecture of the charter 
itself, the law that governs, in its fundamental principles, and 
in its practical rules, the development of this institution. (100)
In Derrida’s parlance—with a glance backward to the foundations of 
philosophical solipsism and to the dynamic of auto-affection that he 
isolated early on, in the Husserlian phenomenology, an intense philoso-
pheme encapsulating the decisiveness of linguistic contingency to mod-
ernist aesthetics and discourse8—the end result of the battery of violent, 
invasive, and exploitative economic measures condensed and put for-
ward with such lucidity by Klein is a systematic immune-reaction. Em-
broidering on nothing more formidable or high-tech than a movement, 
turning, and the geometrical figure of the wheel, roue, predicated by it, 
Derrida accounts for a disastrous feedback loop within a system that can-
not always be just, but that might, under optimal conditions, be amelio-
rated by diversity and critique, out of respect for the complexity both of 
its intrinsic workings and of the lives implicated by it. The wheel turns. 
Within its etymological compass, the roué is profiled as an outcast, to be 
punished on the wheel. His scapegoating, with the impunity elaborated 
by Giorgio Agamben with such lucidity in Homo Sacer,9 becomes the ba-
sis for the rogue status conferred on states purportedly behaving as loose 
cannons. The suffering inflicted as the wheel rotates becomes a figural as 
well as etymological basis for torture.
There never was, in the 1980’s or 1990’s, as has sometimes 
been claimed, a political turn or ethical turn in “deconstruc-
tion,” at least not as I experience it. The thinking of the politi-
cal has always been a thinking of difference and the thinking 
of difference always a thinking of the political, of the contour 
and limits of the political, especially around the enigma or 
the autoimmune double bind What happens [between 1965 
and 1990] remains without relation or resemblance to what 
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the figure that I continue to privilege here might lead one to 
imagine, that is the figure of a “turn,” of a Kehre or turning. 
If a “turning” turns by “veering” round a curve or by forcing 
one, like the wind in one’s sails, to veer or change tack, then 
the trope of turning turns poorly or turns bad, turns into the 
wrong image. For it diverts thought or turns it away from 
what remains to be thought; it ignores or runs counter to the 
thought of the very thing that remains to be thought. If every 
send-off is differential, and if the trace is a synonym for this 
send-off [renvoi], then there is always some trace of democ-
racy; indeed every trace is a trace of democracy. (39)
Even while disavowing wholesale shifts in direction or “turns” that 
have been attributed to deconstruction, in this passage Derrida encap-
sulates the by no means intuitive follow-through that could link democ-
racy, not as the module for specific governments but as the deliberative 
field of open-ended possibility (much akin to “the experience of the im-
possible”)10 to writing as the inscription or scoring of diversity, the in-
commensurable, as différance itself. The trace is the merest instance, the 
“trace-element,” of writing, or in Agamben’s terms, “bare writing.” By 
means of turnings and veerings, the operational possibilities of “the de-
mocracy to come,” never a specific instance in its name, are tied to the 
practice, persistence, registration, and critical reception and embellish-
ment of writing. Any politics of deconstruction, Derrida gestures here 
above all figuratively, will be enunciated by writing in the political traces, 
turns, and variants that it assumes: the mark of the scapegoat or undesir-
able, the spasmodic and elliptical twists attributed to the rogue or voyou, 
the undecidable duplicity of autoimmunity, making it impossible to de-
termine whether an act of aggression strikes the designated enemy or the 
power mobilized to lash out, the torture meted out by the circular ma-
chine of punishment and humiliation.
In keeping with the succinct solidarity between any possible democ-
racy and writing in its deeper philosophical sense that he underscores in 
the citation immediately above, Derrida pursues the circular reasoning 
and autoimmune implications of contemporary shock capitalism both 
in their philosophical roots and over the vast spectrum of national and 
regional cultures that Klein has “covered” in multiple senses of the word:
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Before any sovereignty of the state, of the nation-state, of 
the monarch, or, in democracy, of the people, ipseity names 
a principle of legitimate sovereignty, the accredited or recog-
nized supremacy of a power or force, a kratos or a cracy. This 
is what is implied, posed, presupposed, but also imposed in 
the very first position, in the very self- or autopositioning, of 
ipseity itself, everywhere there is some oneself, the first, ulti-
mate, and supreme source of “reason of the strongest” as the 
right [droit] granted to force or to the force granted to law 
[droit]. (12)
Derrida’s work on ipseity here, with the seal or closure that it applies to 
entities and agencies, whether of the singular or collective variety, plumbs 
to the deep roots of will, selfhood, self-centeredness, high-handedness, 
one is tempted to add narcissism (for those who might tolerate this rheto-
ric), whether in the singular or plural, in philosophy’s very engine-room, 
the khōra where its most basic parts throb and murmur. Sealed by uni-
lateral momentum, volition, assertion, the entity is primed, at the most 
basic level, for the “reason of the strongest.” In the Lacanian universe, nar-
cissism is the isolation allowing individuals to think, behave, and express 
themselves like planets (no doubt, also to feel like them).11 Derrida’s take 
on blind or completely cynical self-assertion is both more physical (as in 
grounded in physics) and more etymologically vibrant than what is ulti-
mately a Romantic figure of “sublime isolation.” To his quest both back-
ward and downward in philosophy’s history and architecture to ipseity, 
arising among the elementary forms of kratos and cracy, Derrida adds one 
of his most fanciful and productive etymological fugues, one in which 
the physics of turning morphs wildly, implicating the turrets of absolut-
ist feudal power as well as the wheels plied by potters and executioners. 
Yet there is a philosophical gist to the open-ended drift of words related 
to turning: the figure of the unmoved mover at the heart of Western ap-
proaches to politics and power as well of theology.
We are at the same time around and at the center of the circle 
or the sphere where the values of ipseity are gathered together, 
the values of the together [ensemble], of the ensemble and the 
semblable, of simultaneity and gathering together, but also of 
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the simulacrum, simulation. For let us not forget that, like the 
circle and the sphere, the turn (all turns [tours], and all tur-
rets, all towers [tours], including the turret of a chateau or the 
turning surface of a potter’s wheel [tour]) requires surfaces, a 
surface area, lines that turn back to or toward themselves ac-
cording to a certain motivation, a certain mover, and a possi-
ble rotational movement, but always, simultaneously, around 
a center, a pivot or axle, which, even if it too ends up turning, 
does not change place and remains quasi immobile. (12)
Now, sovereignty would be precisely this, a force (kratos), a 
force in the form of a sovereign authority This sovereignty is 
a circularity, indeed a sphericity. Indeed, sovereignty is round, 
it is a rounding off. The circular or spherical rotation, the 
turn of the re-turn on the self, can take either the alternating 
form of the by turns, the in turn, the each in turn (we will see 
this in Plato and Aristotle in a moment) or else the form of 
an identity between the origin and the conclusion, the cause 
and the end or aim, the driving [motrice] cause and the fi-
nal cause. (13)
The grounding of Klein’s reportage in the day-by-day accretion of in-
formation, in actuality in the full senses of the term, might not allow her 
a tour de force of linguistic steeping and associative virtuosity such as 
the one demonstrated in the two extracts immediately above. How ab-
solutely astonishing and even hopeful, then, that in a very different way, 
Derrida’s exposition could be as resolutely dedicated to disclosing the 
violence, oversimplification, and self-serving rapacity and greed in shock 
capitalism as she is. Furthermore, as suggested above, that her account, 
a bravura performance in its own right, could rely in pivotal instances 
as much on imagistic suggestion and shorthand as Derrida’s. Derrida 
can buttress the Western fundament of ipseity as the “deep structure” of 
self-assertion and repetition over time by invoking formats of alternation 
culled from Plato and Aristotle. Klein is left with an appeal to the World 
Court of decency and common sense, as they have evolved within the 
current configuration of politics and information.
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Yet where both Klein and Derrida end up, whether in tracking the 
Shock Doctrine across the globe or in accessing the very philosophical 
roots of obtuse and self-serving power, is a profound repugnance toward, 
and irresistible compulsion to expose and debunk torture, yet another 
turn in the figuration and performance of ipseity:
The torture of the wheel belongs to a long juridical and po-
litical history. It sets in motion not only the turning apparatus 
of a wheel but the quartering of the alleged criminal When I 
speak of a double question whose torture returns, and when 
I say that this question was at the same time and/or by turns 
historical and conceptual or semantic, I am describing a tor-
turing and quartering on the wheel. (12)
Be assured, the torture that Derrida laments here, even having derived 
it from a tropolgy set deep within the battery of philosophy and its lan-
guages, is every bit as tangible and destructive, delivered with increasing 
impunity in sites all over the world, as the one tracked and monitored by 
Klein, “a system designed to force them [prisoners] to betray the prin-
ciple most integral to their sense of self ” (112). Torture is surely the most 
concrete, in the Lacanian idiom, Real turn of the wheel whose most com-
plex articulation is the reversals and intangibles of the autoimmune sys-
tem. Like the wheel in its full nuance of complexity, autoimmunity is an 
absolutely capital scenario for Derrida to have extracted and derived, in a 
development-project of signification far more salutary than shock capi-
talism. It achieves such soaring pertinence, in a deconstructive medita-
tion that has always acknowledged the lack of any clear demarcation be-
tween the “insides” and ”outsides” of systems, because of the fluidity and 
volatility with which stimulus morphs into allergen, ally into enemy and 
vice versa, and, as we have seen, aggression against the enemy mutates 
into an insidious intrinsic system-virus.
Derrida goes to some lengths to demonstrate that the subtly in-turning 
or autotropic figure of autoimmunity is not isolated, either as a dynamic 
or a figure, in the battery of virtual conceptual and exegetical turnings that 
deconstruction has perforce accessed and harnessed. Indeed, in the cita-
tion immediately below, the cloud-chamber of autoimmunity is sutured 
to no less than two long traditions of conceptual and interpretative in-
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determinacy: the Kantian antinomy, whose constitutional double-vision 
is, indeed, also reproduced at certain moments when Hegelian dialectics 
stops dead in its tracks, “crashes,” shorts itself out. But to the extent that 
the autoimmune system (or non-system) can issue forth, at any moment, 
in the mutually counteracting messages of a double bind, Derrida places 
it also in the wake of the seminal thinking performed by the first genera-
tion of avowed systems and communications analysts, above all Gregory 
Bateson and Anthony Wilden. Autoimmunity, to invoke Derrida’s own 
favored word for this logical and communicative meltdown, is an aporia 
with wide-ranging political (among other) implications.
The formalization of this autoimmunity was there [Derrida’s 
“Faith and Knowledge”]12 carried out around the community 
as auto-co-immunity (the common of community having in 
common the same duty or charge [munus] as the immune, 
as well as the auto-co-immunity of humanity—and particu-
larly the autoimmine humanitarian. I could thus … inscribe 
the category of the autoimmune into the series of both older 
and more recent discourses on the double bind and the aporia. 
Although aporia, double bind, and autoimmune process are not 
exactly synonyms, what they have in common, what they are 
all, precisely, charged with, is, more than an internal contra-
diction an indecidability, that is, an internal-external, nondia-
lectizable antinomy that risks paralyzing and thus calls for the 
event of the interruptive decision. (112)
Sovereignty neither gives nor gives itself the time; it does not 
take time. Here is where the cruel autoimmunity with which 
sovereignty is affected begins, the autoimmunity with which 
sovereignty at once sovereignly affects and cruelly infects it-
self. Autoimmunity is always, in the same time without dura-
tion, cruelty itself, the autoinfection of all autoinfection. It is 
not some particular thing that is affected in autoimmunity but 
the self, the ipse, the autos that finds itself infected. As soon as 
it needs heteronomy, the event, time, and the other. (109)
Once again, in two juxtaposed citations from Rogues, we are party to 
the incredibly smooth and powerful follow-through between the dynam-
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ics of autoimmunity as a figural and exegetical phenomenon and its tan-
gible, often tragic repercussions in the sphere of global as well as local 
politics. If autoimmunity encapsulates the full craziness initiated in the 
multiple conditions of ipseity and the circular reasoning and self-interest 
extending from it, it is a counterpart to the insanities of giving, receiving, 
obligation, constraint, and reciprocity embedded in the conventions and 
practices of hospitality.13 As Derrida reminds us, the step from formal-
logical indeterminacy to blunt and irreversible acts of sovereignty on the 
world-stage is an incredibly brief one.
The allegorical figure in whom the aporias of autoimmunity are em-
bedded and concentrated is, of course, the rogue himself (voyou). By a 
logic of the scapegoat going back in Derrida’s exposition all the way to 
“Plato’s Pharmacy,”14 the rogue is the volition or agency that the socio-
political system has turned out, in Agamben’s rhetoric, banned.15 In an-
other display of balletic etymological and conceptual virtuosity akin to 
his work on the tour, one just preceeding the citation immediately below, 
Derrida derives the figure of the voyou from a series of usages and puns 
all having to do with the thoroughfare or way (voie).
The word voyou has an essential relation with the voie, the way, 
with the urban roadways [voirie], the roadways of the city or 
polis, and thus with the street [rue] the waywardness [dévoie-
ment] of the voyou consisting of making ill use of the street, 
or corrupting the street or loitering in the streets, in “roam-
ing the streets,” as we say in a strangely transitive formulation. 
This transitivity is in fact never far from the one that leads to 
“walking the streets.” (65)
The voyou is a composite figure of deviation from the way. In a turn of 
stunning inventiveness even for himself, Derrida extrapolates the param-
eters of the system of deviance, the voyoucracy emerging from the culture 
of street-deviance. Ever the systems theorist, though his links to this par-
ticular discursive subspecialty are rarely rendered explicit, Derrida points 
out the momentum by which even resistance or “counterpower” can be 
placed under bureaucratic administration.
The voyou is at once unoccupied, if not unemployed, and ac-
tively occupied with occupying the streets, either by “roam-
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ing the streets,” doing nothing, loitering, or doing what is not 
supposed to be done, that is, according to established norms, 
laws, and the police. The voyou does what is not supposed 
to be done in the streets and on all the other byways, which 
the voyoucracy actually has the power to make less viable or 
trustworthy. Voyoucracy is a principle of disorder, to be sure, 
a threat against public order; but as a crasy it represents some-
thing more than a collection of individual or individualistic 
voyous. It is the principle of disorder as a sort of substitute 
order (a bit like a secret society, a religious order, a sect or 
brotherhood, a kind of Freemasonry). The voyoucracy already 
constitutes, even institutes, a sort of counterpower or coun-
tercitizenship. It is what is called a milieu. This milieu, this en-
vironment, this world unto itself, gathers into a network all 
the people of the crime world or underworld, all the singu-
lar voyous, all individuals of questionable morals and dubi-
ous character whom decent, law-abiding people would like to 
combat and exclude. (65–66)
The environment, milieu, catchment area, or natural habitat of bel-
ligerent deviance, whether the scattered acts of voyous or the regime of 
voyoucracy, is invariably the street, the thoroughfare. We do not know in 
what continent, city, or backwater the street that Derrida conjures forth 
in the above extract happens to be located. But it is virtual, tangible, Real: 
as much so as the capitals and sites of violence assembled so adroitly by 
Klein into the shock narrative. The virtual place where Klein and Derrida 
eventuate is a shared one, defined by its commitment to resistance and 
disclosure. If Klein and Derrida share in a certain constructive belliger-
ence, it persists in the face of otherwise crippling and neutralizing auto-
immunity and double bind. There are no winners in the “battle of proper 
names”16 devolving on the appellation of singular or collective rogues. 
No one could put this impasse as eloquently as Derrida:
There are thus no longer anything but rogue states, and there 
are no longer any rogue states. The concept will have reached 
its limit and the end—more terrifying than ever—of its ep-
och. This end was always close, indeed, already from the be-
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ginning. To all the more or less conceptual indications I have 
mentioned, we must add the following, which represents 
a symptom of another order. The very officials who, under 
Clinton, most accelerated and intensified this rhetorical strat-
egy, who most abused or exploited the demonizing expres-
sion “rogue state,” are the very ones who, in the end, on June 
19, 2000, publicly declared their decision to give up at least 
the term. (106)
In the face of this zero-sum and zero-outcome game, engulfed and 
punctuated in violence as it may be, it remains incumbent on those of 
us with the capacity to persist in the acts of inscription, registration, and 
critique, regardless of how shocking or anomalous the new catastrophes, 
with whose “breaking” we’ve managed to catch up, happen to be. As Der-
rida beautifully orchestrates in the virtual street-scene that he summons 
forth as the homeland of the voyous, the quickly breaking argot of the 
actual, of what transpires today, remains dynamically anchored in the 
langue of long-standing cultural articulation, categorization, classifica-
tion, figuration, logic, and taxonomy. That Klein and Derrida find them-
selves on so many of the same pages gives us an indication of how varied, 
in script, medium, acceleration, style, and impact the current tablets and 
display-screens of cultural notation happen to be.
The diverse qualities, dimensionalities, stylistics, timeframes, and spa-
tializations of the media in which we participate, far from being leisure 
pursuits or interactions with techno gimmicks or appliances, are in fact 
the conditions of our knowledge, the very possibility of our expression 
and political enfranchisement. Our selection and familiarization with 
those media and inscriptive tools allowing our fullest responsiveness to 
the unfolding catastrophe of events are acts bearing the most tangible po-
litical as well as aesthetic implications. As draconian as the measures that 
shock capitalism currently implements may be, as unimpeded the incur-
sions of corporate armies and shadow-corporations, the picture will not 
improve if the investigative and critical “noise of the system” is silenced. 
Klein and Derrida open up a spectrum of writing media, displays, styles, 
temporalities, shelf-lives, audiences, and impacts of definitive signifi-
cance to our own possibilities of expression and participation in what-
ever democracy remains yet to come.
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Notes
1. Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History,” in Selected Writings, IV, 392.
2. Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” in Selected Writings, IV, 328.
3. Sigmund Freud, “Psychotherapy of Hysteria,” in The Standard 
Edition, II, 288–95.
4. The linkage between Bateson’s prescient sense of Lake Erie’s madness and the 
contemporary spate of bio-disasters in this paragraph and in the immediately 
one following was not only inspired by Jason Groves of the Department of 
Germanic Languages and Literatures at Yale University. It was written by 
him, as a secondary benefit to a very welcome updating, in terms of actualities 
in the ecological news, that he most kindly provided for my initial draft of the 
Introduction. His exemplary social activism gives a sense of freshness and 
urgency even to those of his writings with a primarily academic thrust.
5. For a magisterial, polyphonic overview of what the editors see as a palpable 
changing of the guard in systems theory, between “first-order” and “second-
order” levels of cybernetics and autopoiesis, see Bruce Clarke and Mark B. 
N. Hansen, eds., Emergence and Embodiment: New Essays in Second-Order 
Systems Theory.
6. This is of course the title of an essay that Derrida devoted to Maurice 
Blanchot. To my mind, even though this work this may be counted among 
Derrida’s most exuberant celebrations of literary thinking and textual 
synthesis, its rigorous philosophical critiques of a priori categorical thinking, 
of “profiling” in any possible sense, also qualify it as one of the most powerful 
and effective instances of political theory in the massive Derridean output. 
“The Law of Genre” is precisely an exceptional case that might at least temper 
the claims of “turns” to politics and religion in his work, or of a distinctive 
“later” phase, even where such categories are drawn, for example in Rogues, by 
Derrida himself. For “The Law of Genre,” see Acts of Literature, 221–52.
7. Derrida, as he meticulously invokes Marx as a revenant whose perspective and 
critical bearings will be decisive to any efforts at salvaging democracy as of 
the current entrenched and voracious moment of late-Capitalism, encounters, 
in his Specters of Marx, the writings of Francis Fukuyama, both as a symptom 
and ideological rationalization of what Klein then goes on to name the Shock 
Doctrine. Fukuyama appears on Klein’s screens independently: “There was 
now a twin consensus about how society should be run: political leaders 
should be elected and economies should be run according to Friedman’s rules. 
It was, as Francis Fukuyama said, ‘the end of history’” (Shock Doctrine 18). 
For Derrida’s Auseinandersetzung with Fukuyama, see Specters of Marx, 14–16, 
56–70, 74, 100.
8. See, for example, Derrida’s remarks on auto-affection in Speech and 
Phenomena, 78–80, 83–85.
274 Henry Sussman
9. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 82–83, 102, 106.
10. The “experience of the impossible” is a term that Derrida invokes both to 
designate the entrenched openness of democracy, its resolutely provisional 
character, and the radical contingency animating deconstructive bearings. 
See Specters of Marx, 35, 89.
11. See Lacan, Seminar of Jacques Lacan, I, 118–27; II, 235–47.
12. In Derrida, Acts of Religion, 87–88.
13. Derrida, “Hospitality,” 356–420. In its arabesque circumlocutions along the 
endlessly reversible feedback circuit looping hospitality and the mores of 
altruism on which it is based into hostility and the taking of hostages, this 
resplendent essay joins the passages in Rogues on turning, wheels, and rogues 
as writerly tours de force. Alone, it acquits itself brilliantly as a condensed 
“deconstructive sociology,” for those interested in crossing paths with this 
particular animal—even though Derrida’s writing chronicles many other 
collisions/encounters between thinking/writing and such social conventions 
as mercy, pardon, thanks, vows, monogamy, and literature (or any entrenched 
art-form) as an institution.
14. Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 128–42, 148–55.
15. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 17–19, 28–29, 49–50, 71–74, 81–83, 110–11, 166–80.
16. A key point in Derrida’s debunking a Rousseau-inspired high-handedness 
with respect to indigenous Amazonians evident in Claude Lévi-Strauss’s 
anthropological reminiscences. See Of Grammatology, 107–40.
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theory as currently constituted. In his magisterial Hitchcock’s Cryptony-
mies, the screen of inscription shifts upward to a sky that is also, in fun-
damental ways, both atmospheric and climatic. Cohen’s sky is the pan-
orama for a sequence of encroaching menaces was well as the tablet for 
rigorous critical response.
Jason Groves holds an M.A. from the Johns Hopkins University in Ger-
man Language and Literature.  He is currently a Ph.D. student at Yale 
University, where he is completing a dissertation, entitled Erratic Blocks: 
278 Notes on Contributors
Fictions of Movement from Goethe to Benjamin, which deals with attempts 
in literature, geology, and biomechanics to conceptualize erraticity. His 
engagement with critical climate change in the humanities spans several 
years and includes entries in The Global South and Telemorphosis: Theory 
in the Era of Climate Change, Vol. 1.
Randy Martin is Professor of Art and Public Policy at New York Univer-
sity and serves as director of the graduate program in arts politics. He is 
the author of Performance as Political Act: The Embodied Self; Socialist En-
sembles: Theater and State in Cuba and Nicaragua; Critical Moves: Dance 
Studies in Theory and Politics; On Your Marx: Relinking Socialism and the 
Left; Financialization of Daily Life; Empire of Indifference: American War 
and the Financial Logic of Risk Management; and Under New Management: 
Universities, Administrative Labor and the Professional Turn. He has edited 
collections on U.S. Communism, sport and academic labor and, most re-
cently, Artistic Citizenship: A Public Voice for the Arts (with Mary Schmidt 
Campbell) and The Returns of Alwin Nikolais: Bodies, Boundaries, and the 
Dance Canon (with Claudia Gitelman).
Yates McKee is a Ph.D. candidate in art history and instructor of contem-
porary civilization at Columbia University. His work on art and ecologi-
cal activism has appeared in publications including October, Grey Room, 
Third Text, and Qui Parle. With Gaelle Krikorian, he served as associate 
editor of Michel Feher’s Nongovernmental Politics. With Meg McLagan, 
he is currently co-editor of a successor volume: The Visual Cultures of 
Nongovernmental Politics.
Alberto Moreiras is Professor and Head of Hispanic Studies at Texas 
A&M University. He is the author of The Exhaustion of Difference: The 
Politics of Latin American Cultural Studies, and Linea de sombra: El no su-
jeto de lo politico. His current book project is entitled “Micrologies: Bio-
political Exceptions.” He is an editor of Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies, 
Res Publica, and of the new journal/digital platform Politica comun.
Tian Song teaches and does research at Beijing University’s Institute of 
History and Philosophy of Science. A piece based on the same research 
resulting in his Impasses of the Post-Global contribution appeared in the 
Notes on Contributors 279
Chinese Book Review Monthly (2006). His environmental activism has 
found an outlet in such venues as the 22nd International Conference on 
the History of Science (Beijing) and the Greenaccord International En-
vironmental Forum (Rome, 2007).
Henry Sussman teaches in the Department of Germanic Languages 
and Literatures at Yale University. He is also a fellow at the Center for 
Advanced Studies in the Humanities at the University of Cologne. In 
2006, he co-founded, with Tom Cohen, the Institute on Critical Climate 
Change (IC3). His most recent books are Around the Book: Systems and 
Literacy, Idylls of the Wanderer: Outside in Literature and Theory, and The 
Task of the Critic. In current work, he explores the common stake shared 
by artistic production, critique, and theoretical elaboration in the project 
of systematic healing.
Samuel Weber teaches German and comparative literature at North-
western University and directs that university’s Paris Program in Criti-
cal Theory. His most recent publications include Theatricality as Medium, 
Targets of Opportunity  and Benjamin’s Abilities. His current research ex-
plores aspects of “The Politics and Poetics of Singularity.”
Ewa Plonowska Ziarek is Julian Park Professor of Comparative Litera-
ture and founding director of the Humanities Institute at the State Uni-
versity of New York at Buffalo. She is the author of An Ethics of Dissensus: 
Feminism, Postmodernity, and the Politics of Radical Democracy and The 
Rhetoric of Failure: Deconstruction of Skepticism, Reinvention of Modernism. 
She edited Gombrowicz’s Grimaces: Modernism, Gender, Nationality. More 
recent activities in collaborative editing include Revolt, Affect, Collectivity: 
The Unstable Boundaries of Kristeva’s Polis, Time for the Humanities: Praxis 
and the Limits of Autonomy, and Intermedialities: Philosophy, Art, Politics. 
Her completed current writing project is Feminist Aesthetics: Literature, 
Gender, and Race in Modernism.
Krzysztof Ziarek is Professor of Comparative Literature at the State 
University of New York at Buffalo. He is the author of Inflected Language: 
Toward a Hermeneutics of Nearness, The Historicity of Experience: Moder-
nity, the Avant-Garde, and the Event, and The Force of Art. He has also 
280 Notes on Contributors
published essays on Clark Coolidge, Susan Howe, Myung Mi Kim, Stein, 
Stevens, Heidegger, Benjamin, Irigaray, and Levinas, and co-edited two 
collections of essays, Future Crossings: Literature Between Philosophy and 
Cultural Studies and Adorno and Heidegger: Philosophical Questions. He is 
the author of two books of poetry in Polish, Zaimejlowane z Polski and 
Sąd dostateczny. He is currently working on two projects: the “disappear-
ance” of world in the age of globalization and the post-Heideggerian no-
tion of being human.
Permissions
A version of Rey Chow’s “Sacrifice, Mimesis, and the Theorizing of Vic-
timhood” first appeared in Representations 94 (Spring 2006): 131–49.
A longer version of Ewa Ziarek’s “Bare Life” first appeared as “Bare Life 
on Strike: Notes of the Biopolitics of Race and Gender,” SAQ: The Agam-
ben Effect, ed. Alison Ross, 107.1 (2008): 89–105.
Chapter 3, Figures 1–8, photos copyright Subhankar Banerjee. Re-
produced with permission. Figure 7 ANTI—copyright 2009—repro-
duce at will.
Chapter 4, Figures 8–10, photos copyright Tian Song. Reproduced with 
permission. Figures 11–13, 14 photos copyright Zhao hua. Reproduced 
with permission.




